

# Codebook

## Negotiations in the Council of the European Union (NCEU)

Version 220906

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## Background variables

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### **ms**

[included in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

#### *Explanation:*

1 = Belgium (be), 2 = Denmark (dk), 3 = Germany (de), 4 = Greece (el), 5 = Spain (es), 6 = France (fr), 7 = Ireland (ie), 8 = Italy (it), 9 = Luxembourg (lu), 10 = the Netherlands (nl), 11 = Austria (at), 12 = Portugal (pt), 13 = Finland (fi), 14 = Sweden (se), 15 = United Kingdom (uk), 16 = Estonia (ee), 17 = Latvia (lv), 18 = Lithuania (lt), 19 = Poland (pl), 20 = Czech Republic (cz), 21 = Slovakia (sk), 22 = Hungary (hu), 23 = Slovenia (si), 24 = Cyprus (cy), 25 = Malta (mt), 26 = Bulgaria (bg), 27 = Romania (ro), 28 = Croatia (hr)

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### **workgroup**

[included in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

#### *Explanation:*

- 1 = C.41 Politico-military working party (PMG) 2003
- 2 = R.1 Working party on the environment 2003
- 3 = C.16 Mashrek-Mahgreb working party 2003
- 4 = F.7 Working party on tax questions 2003
- 5 = H Agricultural attachés 2003
- 6 = A.1 Coreper 1 (including A.15 Mertens group) 2003
- 7 = A.1 Coreper 2 (including A.14 Antici group) 2003
- 8 = A.11 Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 2003
- 9 = B.2 Working party on Enlargement 2003
- 10 = A.5 Political and Security Committee (PSC) (including C.36 Nicolaidis group) 2003
- 11 = A.8 Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) 2003
- 12 = C.25 Politico-Military working party 2006
- 13 = A.5 Political and Security Committee (PSC) (including C.36 Nicolaidis group) 2006
- 14 = Agricultural attachés 2006
- 15 = A.8 Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) 2006
- 16 = A.11 Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 2006
- 17 = D.4 Working party on Tax Questions 2006
- 18 = A.1 Coreper 1 (including A.15 Mertens group) 2006
- 19 = A.1 Coreper 2 (including A.14 Antici group) 2006
- 20 = J.1 Working party on the Environment 2006

- 21 = A.6 Article 36 committee 2006
- 22 = G.1 Working party on Competitiveness and Growth 2006
- 23 = C.25 Politico-Military working party 2009
- 24 = A.5 Political and Security Committee (PSC) (including C.36 Nicolaidis group) 2009
- 25 = F.17 Working party on Agricultural questions 2009
- 26 = A.8 Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) 2009
- 27 = A.11 Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 2009
- 28 = D.4 Working party on Tax Questions 2009
- 29 = A.1 Coreper 1 (including A.15 Mertens group) 2009
- 30 = A.1 Coreper 2 (including A.14 Antici group) 2009
- 31 = J.1 Working party on the Environment 2009
- 32 = A.6 Article 36 committee 2009
- 33 = G.1 Working party on Competitiveness and Growth 2009
- 34 = C.25 Politico-Military Group (PMG) 2012
- 35 = A.5 Political Security Committee (PSC) (including C.36 Nicolaidis group) 2012
- 36 = (A.18) Agricultural attachés (veterinary issues) 2012
- 37 = A.8 Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) 2012
- 38 = A.11 Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 2012
- 39 = D.4 Working group on Tax Questions 2012
- 40 = A.1 Coreper 1 (including A.15 Mertens group) 2012
- 41 = A.1 Coreper 2 (including A.14 Antici group) 2012
- 42 = J.1 Working party on the Environment 2012
- 43 = E.25 Coordinating committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS) 2012
- 44 = G.1 Working group on Competitiveness and Growth (subgroup on industry) 2012
- 45 = A.1 Coreper 1 (including A.15 Mertens group) 2015
- 46 = A.1 Coreper 2 (including A.14 Antici group) 2015
- 47 = A.5 Political Security Committee (PSC) (including C.36 Nicolaidis group) 2015
- 48 = A.8 Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) 2015
- 49 = A.11 Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 2015
- 50 = C.25 Politico-Military Group (PMG) 2015
- 51 = D.4 Working Party on Tax Questions (subgroup on indirect taxation including VAT) 2015
- 52 = E.25 Coordinating committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS) 2015
- 53 = F.17 Working Party on Agricultural Questions (subgroup labelling and processed agricultural products, including GMO) 2015
- 54 = G.1 Working Party on Competitiveness and Growth (subgroup on industry) 2015
- 55 = J.1 Working Party on the Environment (subgroup on climate policy issues) 2015
- 56 = A.1 Coreper 1 (including A.15 Mertens group) 2018
- 57 = A.1 Coreper 2 (including A.14 Antici group) 2018
- 58 = A.5 Political Security Committee (PSC) (including C.36 Nicolaidis group) 2018
- 59 = A.8 Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) 2018
- 60 = A.11 Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 2018
- 61 = C.25 Politico-Military Group (PMG) 2018

- 62 = D.4 Working Party on Tax Questions (subgroup on indirect taxation) 2018
  - 63 = E.25 Coordinating committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS) 2018
  - 64 = F.3 Working Party on Horizontal Agricultural Questions (subgroup unfair trading practices) 2018
  - 65 = G.1 Working Party on Competitiveness and Growth (subgroup on industry) 2018
  - 66 = J.1 Working Party on the Environment 2018
  - 67 = A.1 Coreper 1 (including A.15 Mertens group) 2021
  - 68 = A.1 Coreper 2 (including A.14 Antici group) 2021
  - 69 = A.5 Political Security Committee (PSC) (including C.36 Nicolaidis group) 2021
  - 70 = A.8 Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) 2021
  - 71 = A.11 Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 2021
  - 72 = C.25 Politico-Military Group (PMG) 2021
  - 73 = D.4 Working Party on Tax Questions (subgroup on indirect taxation) 2021
  - 74 = E.25 Coordinating committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS) 2021
  - 75 = F.20 Working Party on Chief Veterinary Officers 2021
  - 76 = G.1 Working Party on Competitiveness and Growth (subgroup on industry) 2021
  - 77 = J.1 Working Party on the Environment 2021
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### **year**

[included in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

*Explanation:* 1 = 2003 (February-March), 2 = 2006 (February-April), 3 = 2009 (April-May), 4 = 2012 (March-September), 5 = 2015 (October-December), 6 = 2018 (April-July), 7 = 2021 (October 2021-January 2022)

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### **intcond**

[included in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

*Explanation:* 1 = Interview conducted, 0 = Interview not conducted

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### **idno**

[included in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

*Explanation:* Unique identification number for each observation

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**gender**

[included in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

*Explanation:* 0 = Male, 1 = Female

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## Survey variables

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**be, dk, de, el, es, fr, ie, it, lu, nl, at, pt, fi, se, uk, ee, lv, lt, pl, cz, sk, hu, si, cy, mt, bg, ro, hr**

[included in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

*Question:* Our first question concerns co-operation within your working group [the X-group/committee]. Which Member States do you most often co-operate with in order to develop a common position?

*Explanation:* Points are assigned depending on the order in which the most frequent cooperation partners are mentioned.

10 = 1st mentioned, 9 = 2nd mentioned, 8 = 3rd mentioned, 7 = 4th mentioned, 6 = 5th mentioned, 5 = 6th mentioned, 4 = 7th mentioned, 3 = 8th mentioned, 2 = 9th mentioned, 1 = 10th mentioned

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## **years**

[included in 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

*Question:* How long (number of years) have you been representing your country in EU working groups and committees?

*Explanation:* Number of years, rounded up/down to closest 0.5 years.

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## **trust**

[included in 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

*Question:* Generally speaking – not thinking specifically about Brussels or politics - would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

*Explanation:* 1 = Most people can be trusted, 2 = Need to be careful in dealing with people

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## **infl1\_ms**

[included in 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021]

*Question:* Please think about the influence that other member states have on your member state during the discussions and negotiations in your working group/committee. In general which other member states have the greatest potential to influence the positions you take during the discussions?

*Explanation:* Points are assigned depending on the order in which the respondents spontaneously mentioned other member states.

10 = 1st mentioned, 9 = 2nd mentioned, 8 = 3rd mentioned, 7 = 4th mentioned, 6 = 5th mentioned, 5 = 6th mentioned, 4 = 7th mentioned, 3 = 8th mentioned, 2 = 9th mentioned, 1 = 10th mentioned

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## **interest, size, ideology, integration, bargaining, culture, implementation, personal**

[included in 2003, 2006, 2018]

*Question:* We would like you to evaluate [five/seven/six] factors which may or may not be of importance for your choice of cooperation partners within your working group.

The common interests in the specific issue at hand. [**interest**]

The size. (small and large Member States). [**size**]

The political-ideological proximity (for instance left-wing or right-wing governments). [**ideology**]

The degree of support for further European integration (i.e. whether a Member State is generally supportive of European integration). [**integration**]

[included only in 2003]

The reputation for negotiating skills [**bargaining**]

[included only in 2003 and 2006]

Common cultural values (e.g. language, geographical proximity, or other cultural identity factors). [**culture**]

[included only in 2003 and 2018]

The reputation for implementation efficiency [**implementation**]

[included only in 2018]

The personal relationship (i.e. whether you have a good personal relationship with the representative) [**personal**]

*Explanation 2003:* 1 = Of no importance at all, 10 = Of great importance.

*Explanation 2006 and 2018:* 1 = Of no importance at all, 5 = Of great importance.

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## **blocking\_1, blocking\_2, blocking\_3, blocking\_4**

[included in 2009, 2015, 2021]

*Question:* Thinking about the issues that you are usually involved in; if – hypothetically - your delegation would find itself in a situation

a) to groups where it is usually/always unanimity

- where you held a minority position,
- in a question of average (some, but not extreme) importance to you,

b) to groups where it is usually/always QMV (SMV)

- where you held a minority position,
- in a question of average (some, but not extreme) importance to you,
- where you are part of a blocking minority coalition (i.e. there are enough votes to block the decision)

c) to groups where there is sometimes unanimity and sometimes QMV (SMV)

- where you held a minority position,
- in a question of average (some, but not extreme) importance to you,
- where QMV formally applies and
- where you are part of a blocking minority coalition (i.e. there are enough votes to block the decision)

how likely would it be (on average what would happen) that you:

- would refrain from blocking the decision, but expected a direct and equivalent compensation in exchange [**blocking\_1**]
- would refrain from blocking the decision, without being directly compensated, but with the expectation that in the future you would have some extra goodwill to use because of your willingness to cooperate in this case. [**blocking\_2**]
- would refrain from blocking the decision, without expecting any compensation, short or long term. [**blocking\_3**]
- would block the decision, so that no decision was taken at this point [**blocking\_4**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Very unlikely, 5 = Very likely

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## **coop\_ext\_ms**

[included in 2009, 2012]

*Question:* For the countries that you have mentioned [**ms**] - on how many issues would you estimate that you cooperate on average (as a share of all the issues you are involved in)?

*Explanation:* Percentage of issues for the different cooperation partners

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## **outlier**

[included in 2009, 2012]

*Question:* Thinking about the issues that you are working with in your working group, how often would you say that you have a different position than most of the other member states, i.e. you have an outlier position among the member states?

*Explanation:* 1 = Very seldom, 2 = Fairly seldom, 3 = Neither seldom or often, 4 = Fairly often, 5 = Very often

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## **av\_imprtnt**

[included in 2012, 2015]

*Question:* Thinking about the issues that you are working with in your working group, how often would you say that these are of high importance to your member state compared to most of the other member states, i.e. you attach more importance to the issue than the average member state?

*Explanation:* 1 = Very seldom, 2 = Fairly seldom, 3 = Neither seldom or often, 4 = Fairly often, 5 = Very often

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## **coop\_exch1**

[included in 2012, 2018]

*Question:* Please think about a situation where a new representative from one of the [**coop\_exch1\_rand**] member states, whom you did not know before, has recently joined the working group/committee. In one of the first issues that are being negotiated you and this person have partly, but not completely, conflicting positions. To your member state the issue is of average importance, while for this particular [**coop\_exch1\_rand**] member state it is a more important issue.

At one point during the negotiations this person contacts you with a cooperation proposal. The proposal implies that you give your support to the position of this member state in the negotiations on this issue. In exchange this person promises to support your member state when you find yourself in a similar situation in the future.

How likely would you say it is that you would accept the proposal? [**coop\_exch\_1**]

*Explanation:* 1 = very unlikely, 2 = fairly unlikely, 3 = Neither unlikely nor likely, 4 = fairly likely, 5 = very likely

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### **coop\_exch1\_rand**

[included in 2012, 2018]

*Explanation:* 1 = Southern, 0 = Northern

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### **coop\_exch2**

[included in 2012, 2018]

*Question:* Please think about a situation where a new representative has recently joined the working group/committee. This is a [**coop\_exch2\_rand**] who you do not now before. We do not need to specify which country [**coop\_exch2\_rand**] is from. In one of the first issues that are being negotiated you and this person have partly, but not completely, conflicting positions. The issue is important to your member state, while for [**coop\_exch2\_rand**] it is an issue of lower importance.

How likely would you say it is that you would approach [**coop\_exch2\_rand**] with some sort of cooperation proposal to make [**coop\_exch2\_rand**] join your position, for example by offering your support on another issue in the future?

*Explanation:* 1 = Very unlikely and 5 = Very likely

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### **coop\_exch2\_rand**

[included in 2012, 2018]

*Explanation:* 1 = woman (she), 0 = man (he)

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### **risk**

[included in 2015, 2018]

*Question:* Thinking about the issues that you are working with in your committee/working group, how often would you say that you have a lot to lose and a lot to win depending on the outcome in these negotiations, so that a lot is at stake?

*Explanation:* 0 = Very seldom, 10 = Very often

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## **outvoted\_1, outvoted\_2**

[included in 2009, 2021]

Not posed to groups where it is usually/always unanimity

*Question:*

b) to groups where it is usually/always QMV (SMV)

Now, we turn to a second scenario in which you are still in a minority position, but this time the minority coalition is not big enough to have a formal possibility of blocking the decision

c) to groups where it is sometimes unanimity and sometimes QMV (SMV)

Now, we turn to a second scenario in which you are still in a minority position, the voting rule is still QMV, but this time the minority coalition is not big enough to have a formal possibility of blocking the decision

How likely would it be in this case that

- the majority would go through with their position, while you would have to accept being out-voted this time? [**outvoted\_1**]

- the majority offered you a compromise of some sort, even if they formally did not have to. [**outvoted\_2**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Very unlikely, 5 = very likely

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## **zerosum**

[included in 2015, 2021]

*Question:* Our next question concerns the degree of competitiveness in the negotiations. Some negotiations are best described as zero-sum games, where one party's gain is another's loss. Other negotiations are best described as positive-sum games, where it is possible to find mutual benefits for all parties. If you think about the negotiations that you are usually involved in, how would you characterize them in such terms?

*Explanation:* 0 = Negotiations are always a zero-sum game, 5 = Equally often zero-sum and positive-sum games, 10 = Always a positive-sum game

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## **pushy\_majority**

[included in 2015, 2021]

*Question:* I would like you to think about a situation where the majority of member states decide to push through a decision in the Council, even though the representative of one member state is clearly unhappy with the outcome. To what extent do you find such a decision problematic?

*Explanation:* 0 = Not at all problematic, 10 = Very problematic.

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## **brexit**

[included in 2018, 2021]

*Question [2018]:* The fact that the UK is leaving the EU, to what extent does it affect your choice of cooperation partners?

*Question [2021]:* The fact that the UK has left the EU, to what extent has that affected your choice of cooperation partners?

*Explanation:* 0 = to a very small extent, 10 = to a very large extent, 5= neither small nor large

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## **trust\_information**

[included in 2018, 2021]

*Question:* I now have a question regarding the information that is shared during the meetings in your committee/working group. This can be any type of information that may be relevant for the negotiations, for instance technical information, political information etc. To what extent do you [**2018: perceive, 2021: trust**] the shared information in the committee/working group to be accurate?

*Explanation:* 10 = it is generally possible to trust that the shared information is accurate, 0 = it is necessary to always keep a critical attitude to the shared information.

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## **emu**

[included in 2003]

*Question:* Some member states – Sweden, Denmark and the UK – do not participate in the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union. Do you think that fact in any way affects the cooperation patterns within your policy field?

*Explanation:* 1 = Yes, it matters, 2 = Yes, but only on Euro-related issues, 3 = Yes, but only on issues concerning economic policy, 4 = Yes, but only marginally, 5 = No, it makes no difference

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## **acomredur, aclarconvdur, acomrebef, aclarconvbef, acomimdur, acomimbef, amostimp**

[included in 2006]

*Question:* Now we have two questions that concern communication within your working group. The questions are fairly simple, but before we go ahead, I would like you to think of one particular issue that was discussed in a recent meeting you participated in, where you had a certain position which you communicated to the other delegates. Preferably it should also be a question where there was some controversy; on which there was no agreement right from the start. We don't need to know which issue this was, but please keep this issue in mind for our two questions.

Here is the first question. During the discussions on this particular issue: At the meeting, did you only communicate to the others which position you were holding, or did you also explain why your country was holding this particular position? [**acomredur**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Yes, did give reason, 2 = No, did not give reason

*Question (if yes, did give reasons):* A follow-up on this question. When you were giving reasons for your position, what was your intention? Was it mostly to make the others understand why you were in favor of this position, that is clarifying, *or* was it mostly to convince other delegates to change their minds? [**aclarconvdur**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Clarify and make others understand, 2 = Convince others to change their minds, 3 = Question not posed, 4 = Impossible to answer

*Question:* Let's now turn to the time before the meeting took place. Did you only communicate your position to other delegations *or* did you also give some reasons for taking this particular position? [**acomrebef**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Yes, did give reason, 2 = No, did not give reason

*Question (If yes, did give reasons):* Was this mostly to clarify and make others understand or mostly to convince others and change their minds? [**aclarconvbef**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Clarify and make others understand, 2 = Convince others to change their minds, 3 = Question not posed, 4 = Impossible to answer

*Question:* Fourth and last question. During the negotiations on this particular issue that you are thinking of: During the meeting, did you communicate how important this issue was for your country, or was that not necessary in this case? (I.e. not what you wanted, or why you wanted it, but how much you wanted it.) [**acomimdur**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Yes, 2 = No

*Question:* And before the meeting? Did you communicate it explicitly? (i.e. the importance of this issue for your country) [**acomimbef**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Yes, 2 = No

*Question (if both giving reason and explaining importance):* Comparing these two last questions: Which was most important to you – was it to explain why you were holding this particular position on the issue or was it to explain how important the issue was for your country? [**amostimp**]

*Explanation:* 1 = It was most important to explain the reason(s) for the position of my country, 2 = It was most important to explain the importance of the issue for my country, 3 = Did not give reason, but explained importance, 4 = Did give reason, but did not explain importance, 5 = Cannot separate, 6 = Did not give reason, did not explain importance

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## **minister\_coop**

[included in 2009]

*Question (posed only to respondents in high level committees):* Does it happen that the set-up of cooperation partners is different at the Council (ministerial) level than at the committee-level?

*Explanation:* Percentage of issues.

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## **count\_higher, count\_lower**

[included in 2009]

*Question:* We would now like to ask a few questions concerning the negotiations and decision-making on the issues that you are dealing with. For these questions we would like you to have in mind the handling of these issues not only in your working group/committee, but on all levels in the Council – working group level, committee level, ministerial level.

### a) to groups where it is usually/always unanimity

On the issues you are involved in how often would you estimate that there is an implicit or explicit counting of MS, to see whether a majority coalition exists?

### b) to groups where it is usually/always QMV (SMV)

On the issues you are involved in how often would you estimate that there is an implicit or explicit counting of votes, to see whether a qualified (simple) majority coalition exists?

### c) to groups where it is sometimes unanimity and sometimes QMV (SMV)

On the issues you are involved in, in cases where you have the possibility of QMV, how often would you estimate that there is an implicit or explicit counting of votes, to see whether a qualified (simple) majority coalition exists?

For lower level working groups:

- 1) within your working group? [**count\_lower**]
- 2) at higher levels in the Council? [**count\_higher**]

*Explanation:* Percentage of issues.

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## **compromise\_1, compromise\_2, compromise\_3**

[included in 2009]

*Question:* In a situation where you as a minority party was offered a compromise:

How likely would it be in this case that the compromise would

- be found within the particular issue at hand? [**compromise\_1**]
- involve compensating you on a different but related issue? [**compromise\_2**]
- involve compensating you on a different issue which was not related to the issue at hand? [**compromise\_3**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Very unlikely, 5 = Very likely

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**favours\_common, favours\_keeptrack, favours\_owe\_1, favours\_owe\_1\_ms1, favours\_owe\_1\_ms2a, favours\_owe\_1\_ms3a, favours\_owe\_2\_ms1, favours\_owe\_2\_ms2, favours\_owe\_2\_ms3**

[included in 2009]

*Question:* We return to one of the scenarios mentioned above, where a member state refrains from blocking a decision, without asking for a direct compensation. This could be described as the MS doing the group, or the majority, a favor. Another situation which involves favors would be that a MS supports the position of another member state, or a group of states, even if they initially had different positions, in order to help them succeed in the negotiations on a specific issue of importance to them.

These are some ways in which member states may do each other favors.

How common would you say that doing these sorts of favors are within the issue area you are working? [**favours\_common**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Very uncommon, 5 = Very common.

*Question:* How important is it for you to keep track of such favors - to remember who you owe a favor, and who owes you a favor? [**favours\_keeptrack**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Not important at all, 5 = Very important.

*Question:* If you think about your situation right now, how many other member states owe you a favor? [**favours\_owe\_1**]

*Explanation:* Number of member states.

*Question:* Which ones? [**favours\_owe\_1\_ms1**] [**favours\_owe\_1\_ms2a**] [**favours\_owe\_1\_ms3a**]

*Explanation:* [ms]

*Question:* How many member states does your delegation owe a favor right now? [**favours\_owe\_2**]

*Explanation:* Number of member states.

*Question:* Which ones? [**favours\_owe\_2\_ms1**] [**favours\_owe\_2\_ms2**] [**favours\_owe\_2\_ms3**]

*Explanation:* [ms]

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## **lklhd\_stmnt, lklhd\_acc, frq\_stmnt\_ms**

[included in 2012]

*Question:* Think of a situation where there is an issue on which your position has been determined to a large degree by the interests of a domestic actor in your member state, for instance the parliament or an important economic interest group. This particular actor is of great importance for your government, which is therefore interested in defending this position.

One potential option here is that you would state, in contacts with the other delegates during the negotiations in your working group, that your position cannot be changed due to this domestic constraint. How likely would you say it is that you would make such a statement?  
**[lklhd\_stmnt]**

*Explanation:* 1 = Very unlikely, 2 = Fairly unlikely, 3 = Neither unlikely or likely, 4 = Fairly likely, 5 = Very likely

*Question:* If you did make such a statement - how likely would you say it is that it would be met with some kind of accommodation by the other delegates, i.e. that it would be effective?  
**[lklhd\_acc]**

*Explanation:* 1 = Very unlikely, 2 = Fairly unlikely, 3 = Neither unlikely or likely, 4 = Fairly likely, 5 = Very likely

*Question:* Are there any member states that make these kinds of statements more frequently than others in your working group/committee? Which member states? **[frq\_stmnt\_ms]**

*Explanation:* Points are assigned depending on the order in which the respondents spontaneously mentioned other member states.  
10 = 1st mentioned, 9 = 2nd mentioned, 8 = 3rd mentioned, 7 = 4th mentioned, 6 = 5th mentioned, 5 = 6th mentioned, 4 = 7th mentioned, 3 = 8th mentioned, 2 = 9th mentioned, 1 = 10th mentioned

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## **infl12\_ms**

[included in 2012]

*Question:* Please think about the influence that your member state has on other member states during the discussions and negotiations in your working group/committee. In general, which other member states do you have greatest potential to influence in terms of the positions they take?

*Explanation:* Points are assigned depending on the order in which the respondents spontaneously mentioned other member states.

10 = 1st mentioned, 9 = 2nd mentioned, 8 = 3rd mentioned, 7 = 4th mentioned, 6 = 5th mentioned, 5 = 6th mentioned, 4 = 7th mentioned, 3 = 8th mentioned, 2 = 9th mentioned, 1 = 10th mentioned

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### **ecj\_doss, ecj\_frq, ecj\_ex, ecj\_disc**

[included in 2012]

#### Only to groups dealing with legislative issues

*Question:* The next question concerns the origin of the dossiers that you are working with in your working group.

a) Does it sometimes happen that you discuss proposals that are in practice responses to judgments from the European Court of Justice, i.e. where a call for a change in legislation has arisen due to an interpretation of existing law made in an ECJ judgment? [**ecj\_doss**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Yes, 2 = No

*Question:*

b) How often does this occur? (Once a month/every 6 months/year?) [**ecj\_frq**]

*Explanation:* Number of times per year

*Question:*

c) Can you give one or a few examples of issues when this has occurred? [**ecj\_ex**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Gave example

*Question:*

d) In your experience, are the discussions and negotiations in any way affected by the fact that the proposal is a response to an ECJ judgment? How? [**ecj\_disc**]

*Explanation:* 1 = Gave comment

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## **empathy**

[included in 2015]

*Question:* Now, I would like you to think about a situation where a representative from another MS contacts you concerning a particular proposal, which is of high importance to this member state.

Only if **empathy\_rand** = 1 or 2: This colleague turns to you for support, in what [**empathy\_rand** = 1/2] describes as a very problematic situation. [**empathy\_rand** = 1/2] is very concerned about being unsuccessful on this particular proposal, as [**empathy\_rand** = 1/2] fears strong negative reactions in case of failure.

Now, suppose that this person proposes that you give your support to this proposal, and in exchange promises to support your member state on another occasion. How likely would you say it is that you would accept the proposal?

Only if **empathy\_rand** = 3: Now, suppose that this person proposes that you give your support to this proposal, and in exchange promises to support your member state on another occasion. How likely would you say it is that you would accept the proposal?

*Explanation:* 0 = Very unlikely, 10 = Very likely

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## **empathy\_rand**

[included in 2015]

*Explanation:* 1 = She, 2 = He, 3 = Non-specified

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## **information\_sharing**

[included in 2015]

*Question:* I have a question about sharing information with other representatives in your committee/working group. This may concern technical information, political information or other types of information that may be relevant for the negotiations. Some negotiators may share such information broadly, while others may be more careful and reluctant to share information. How would you describe yourself in this respect?

*Explanation:* 0 = You are always very careful about when and to whom you share information, 10 = You always share broadly all relevant information that you have.

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## **risk\_aversion1**

[included in 2015]

*Question:*

Only if **risk\_aversion1\_rand** = 1: I have one final scenario that I would like you to think about. Imagine that you are in a situation where the proposal that you are negotiating is of high importance to your member state. This is a situation where the stakes are very high. You have a lot to win if the decision goes your way, but also a lot to lose if negotiations do not go your way. Now, imagine that the Presidency suggests a compromise proposal, which partly goes your way.

Only if **risk\_aversion1\_rand** = 2: I have one final scenario that I would like you to think about. Imagine that you are in a situation where the proposal that you are negotiating is of high importance to your member state. Imagine that the Presidency suggests a compromise proposal, which partly goes your way.

What do you think would be your likely response to such a proposal – would you accept the compromise proposal, or would you reject it?

*Explanation:* 0 = Would absolutely reject the compromise proposal, 10 = Would absolutely accept the compromise proposal.

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## **risk\_aversion1\_rand**

[included in 2015]

*Explanation:* 1 = treatment group, 2 = control group

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## **compliance\_risk1, compliance\_risk2, compliance\_risk3**

[included in 2018]

*Question:* Imagine a scenario where one of the other member states signal that there is [**compliance\_risk\_rand**] that it will be unable to fully comply with the decision that is to be made. You are currently satisfied with the content of the decision, and the issue is of average importance to you.

Based on this information, how likely would you say it is that you would act in the following three ways?

First; You would work for adjusting the decision to meet this concern, and thereby make it possible for the member state to comply. [**compliance\_risk1**]

Second; You would not work to incorporate this concern, since compliance is a domestic problem for the member state in question. [**compliance\_risk2**]

Third; You would seek to avoid taking a decision on the proposal. [**compliance\_risk3**]

*Explanation:* 10 = very likely, 0 = not very likely, 5 = neither likely nor unlikely

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## **compliance\_risk\_rand**

[included in 2018]

*Explanation:* 1 = a slight risk – about 20 %, 0 = a significant risk – about 50 %

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## **risk\_aversion2**

[included in 2018]

[if **risk\_aversion2\_rand** = 1] I now have a new scenario that I would like you to think about. Imagine that you are in a situation where the proposal that you are negotiating is of high importance to your member state. *This is a situation where the stakes are extraordinarily high. You have very much to win if the decision goes your way, but also very much to lose if negotiations do not go your way.*

Now, imagine that the Presidency suggests a compromise proposal, which partly goes your way.

What do you think would be your likely response to such a proposal – would you accept the compromise proposal to be safe, or would you reject it in order not to miss an opportunity?

[if **risk\_aversion2\_rand** = 0] I now have a new scenario that I would like you to think about. Imagine that you are in a situation where the proposal that you are negotiating is of high importance to your member state.

Imagine that the Presidency suggests a compromise proposal, which partly goes your way.

What do you think would be your likely response to such a proposal – would you accept the compromise proposal to be safe, or would you reject it in order not to miss an opportunity?

*Explanation:* 10 = you would absolutely accept the compromise proposal, 0 = you would absolutely reject the compromise proposal.

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## **risk\_aversion2\_rand**

[included in 2018]

*Explanation:* 1 = treatment group, 0 = control group

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### **compliance\_reason1, compliance\_reason2, compliance\_reason3**

[included in 2018]

*Question:* Imagine one final scenario where one of the other member states signal that there is a significant risk – around 50 % – that it will be unable to fully comply with the decision that is to be made because of [compliance\_reason\_rand]. You are currently satisfied with the content of the decision, and the issue is of average importance to you.

Based on this information, how likely would you say it is that you would act in the following three ways?

First; You would work for adjusting the decision to meet this concern, and thereby make it possible for the member state to comply. [compliance\_reason1]

Second; You would not work to incorporate this concern, since compliance is a domestic problem for the member state in question. [compliance\_reason2]

Third; You would seek to avoid taking a decision on the proposal. [compliance\_reason3]

*Explanation:* 10 = very likely, 0 = not very likely, 5 = neither likely nor unlikely

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### **compliance\_reason\_rand**

[included in 2018]

*Explanation:* 1 = high adjustment costs, either in administrative or economic terms, 0 = political pressure on the government, and potential political costs

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### **com\_int\_ms**

[included in 2021]

*Question:* Now, if thinking about your member states' interests in the policy area of your working group/committee, which other member states do you most often have common interests with?

*Explanation:* Points are assigned depending on the order in which the member states are mentioned.

10 = 1st mentioned, 9 = 2nd mentioned, 8 = 3rd mentioned, 7 = 4th mentioned, 6 = 5th mentioned, 5 = 6th mentioned, 4 = 7th mentioned, 3 = 8th mentioned, 2 = 9th mentioned, 1 = 10th mentioned



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**non\_comp\_past\_compromise, non\_comp\_present\_compromise,  
non\_comp\_present\_decision**

[included in 2021]

*Question:* I now want you to imagine a scenario where you are negotiating an issue within your working group/committee. You know that one of the other member states in the past has **[non\_comp\_eff\_rand]** comply with decisions on issues similar to the one that is now being discussed.

a) To what extent will this increase or decrease your willingness to make compromises with that member state? **[non\_comp\_past\_compromise]**

*Explanation:* 0 = it will significantly decrease your willingness, 10 = it will significantly increase your willingness, 5 = it will not have an impact

*Question:*

Now, during the discussions, this same member state makes a few suggestions on how to change the proposal in ways that you dislike, and explicitly states that it will otherwise **[non\_comp\_eff\_rand]** comply with the decision.

b) Based on this warning about non-compliance, will you be more or less willing to compromise with that member state (compared to if there was no warning about non-compliance)? **[non\_comp\_present\_compromise]**

*Explanation:* 0 = it will significantly decrease your willingness, 10 = it will significantly increase your willingness, 5 = it will not have an impact

*Question:*

c) Based on this warning about non-compliance, how likely is it that you would try to get the group to avoid taking a decision at all on the matter? **[non\_comp\_present\_decision]**

*Explanation:* 0 = very unlikely, 10 = very likely, 5 = neither likely nor unlikely

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**non\_comp\_eff\_rand**

[included in 2021]

*Explanation:* 1 = refused to, 2 = not been able to

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## **brexit\_influence**

[included in 2021]

*Question:* Do you believe that Brexit has affected your member states' influence in your working group/committee?

*Explanation:* 0 = it has significantly decreased your influence, 10 = it has significantly increased your influence, 5 = it has not had an impact at all

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## **rule\_precision, activism\_risk**

[included in 2021]

*Question:*

a) In negotiations and decision-making, a negotiation text can vary in precision on different points, from, on the one end, what can be called vague principles that can be interpreted in different ways, to, on the other end, precise and elaborated rules with less room for interpretation. Thinking about the negotiations in your working group/committee, how often do you face issues where the precision of the rules is a point of contention? [**rule\_precision**]

*Explanation:* 0 = very seldom, 10 = very often, 5 = neither seldom nor often

*Question:*

b) Now, when you consider the choice between vague and precise rules, to what extent do you take into consideration the possibility that the Commission, the Court of Justice, or other EU institutions will interpret the text in an unintended way? [**activism\_risk**]

*Explanation:* 0 = to a very small extent, 10 = to a very large extent, 5 = neither small nor large extent

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