



Codebook

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Headquarters:



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Structure of the Codebook

- **Contents**
- **Part I. Explanatory Notes**
- **Part II. V-Dem Democracy Indices**
 - *Section 2.1 V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices*
 - *Section 2.2 V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices*
Subcomponents of the V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices.
- **Part III. V-Dem Indicators**
All variables assembled by the Varieties of Democracy project, divided by theme.
 - *3.1 Elections*
 - *3.2 Political Parties*
 - *3.3 Direct Democracy*
 - *3.4 The Executive*
 - *3.5 The Legislature*
 - *3.6 Deliberation*
 - *3.7 The Judiciary*
 - *3.8 Civil Liberty*
 - *3.9 Sovereignty/State*
 - *3.10 Civil Society*
 - *3.11 The Media*
 - *3.12 Political Equality*
 - *3.13 Historical V-Dem*
- **Part IV. Indices Created Using V-Dem Data**
- **Part V. Other Democracy Indices and Indicators (E)**
Variables on democracy gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.
- **Part VI. Background Factors (E)**
Variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy divided into sections based on theme.
- **List of References**
- **Appendix A: Glossary**
This sections includes definitions of key terms.
- **Appendix B: Post-Survey Questionnaire**
This survey is completed by all coders. Data from the survey is not included in the V-Dem Dataset but provided on review by special request.
- **Appendix C: Background notes**
This section includes background materials and subject experts consulted in the course of developing the questionnaire.
- **Appendix D: Structure of Aggregation**
All Indices and Indicators. An overview of all high-level indices, mid-level indices, and indicators. Consult this part to see the structure of the aggregation.
- **Appendix E: Changes Between Previous Versions of the Dataset**

Contents

1	Explanatory Notes	26
1.1	What's New in Version 8 compared to Version 7.1	26
1.2	Cautionary Notes	27
1.3	Variable Types	28
1.4	Variable Versions and Suffixes	29
1.5	Aggregation	30
1.6	Variable Entries	31
1.7	Variable Tags	31
1.8	Variable Information	31
1.9	Number of Variables	34
1.10	Suggested Citation	35
1.11	Countries	36
1.12	Identifier Variables in the V-Dem Datasets	38
1.12.1	Country Name (country_name)	38
1.12.2	Time-Specific Country Name (histname)	38
1.12.3	V-Dem Country ID (country_id)	38
1.12.4	Country Name Abbreviation (country_text_id)	38
1.12.5	Year (year)	38
1.12.6	Historical Date (historical_date)	38
1.12.7	Start of Coding Period (codingstart)	38
1.12.8	Contemporary Start of Coding Period (codingstart_contemp)	38
1.12.9	Historical Start of Coding Period (codingstart_hist)	38
1.12.10	Gap in Coding Period Starts (gapstart)	39
1.12.11	Gap in Coding Period Ends (gapend)	39
1.12.12	End of Coding Period (codingend)	39
1.12.13	Historical End of Coding Period (codingend_contemp)	39
1.12.14	Historical End of Coding Period (codingend_hist)	39
1.12.15	V-Dem Project (project)	39
1.12.16	Historical V-Dem coding (historical)	39
1.12.17	COW Code (COWcode)	39
1.12.18	Number of Coders per Country, Variable and Year/Date (v2*_nr)	39
2	V-Dem Democracy Indices	40
2.1	V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices (D)	40
2.1.1	Electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy)	40
2.1.2	Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem)	40
2.1.3	Participatory democracy index (D) (v2x_partipdem)	41
2.1.4	Deliberative democracy index (D) (v2x_delibdem)	41
2.1.5	Egalitarian democracy index (D) (v2x_egaldem)	42
2.2	V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices (D)	42
2.2.1	Additive polyarchy index (D) (v2x_api)	42
2.2.2	Multiplicative polyarchy index (D) (v2x_mpi)	42
2.2.3	Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index (D) (v2x_freexp_altinf)	43
2.2.4	Freedom of association thick index (D) (v2x_frassoc_thick)	43
2.2.5	Share of population with suffrage (D) (v2x_suffr)	44
2.2.6	Clean elections index (D) (v2xel_frefair)	44

2.2.7	Elected officials index (D) (v2x_elecoff)	44
2.2.8	Liberal component index (D) (v2x_liberal)	45
2.2.9	Equality before the law and individual liberty index (D) (v2xcl_rol)	46
2.2.10	Judicial constraints on the executive index (D) (v2x_jucon)	46
2.2.11	Legislative constraints on the executive index (D) (v2xlg_legcon)	46
2.2.12	Participatory component index (D) (v2x_partip)	46
2.2.13	Civil society participation index (D) (v2x_cspart)	47
2.2.14	Direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_dd)	47
2.2.15	Local government index (D) (v2xel_locelec)	48
2.2.16	Regional government index (D) (v2xel_regelec)	49
2.2.17	Deliberative component index (D) (v2xdl_delib)	49
2.2.18	Egalitarian component index (D) (v2x_egal)	50
2.2.19	Equal protection index (D) (v2xeg_eqprotec)	50
2.2.20	Equal access index (D) (v2xeg_eqaccess)	50
2.2.21	Equal distribution of resources index (D) (v2xeg_eqdr)	51
3	V-Dem Indicators (A, B, or C)	52
3.1	Elections	52
3.1.1	Elections introduction (A,B,C) (v2elintro)	52
3.1.2	Non-election specific coding introduction (A, B, C) (v2elintro1)	52
3.1.3	Disclosure of campaign donations (C) (v2eldonate, *_osp, *_ord)	52
3.1.4	Public campaign finance (C) (v2elpubfin, *_osp, *_ord)	52
3.1.5	Resident noncitizens who cannot vote (C) (v2elnoncit)	53
3.1.6	EMB autonomy (C) (v2elembaut, *_osp, *_ord)	53
3.1.7	EMB capacity (C) (v2elembcap, *_osp, *_ord)	53
3.1.8	Election-specific questions introduction (A,B,C) (v2elintro2)	54
3.1.9	Elections multiparty (C) (v2elmulpar, *_osp, *_ord)	54
3.1.10	Executive elections multiparty (C) (v2elmulpar_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	55
3.1.11	Legislative elections multiparty (C) (v2elmulpar_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	55
3.1.12	Election voter registry (C) (v2elrgstry, *_osp, *_ord)	55
3.1.13	Executive election voter registry (C) (v2elrgstry_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	55
3.1.14	Legislative election voter registry (C) (v2elrgstry_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	55
3.1.15	Election male suffrage in practice (C) (v2elmalsuf)	55
3.1.16	Executive election male suffrage in practice (C) (v2elmalsuf_ex)	56
3.1.17	Legislative election male suffrage in practice (C) (v2elmalsuf_leg)	56
3.1.18	Election female suffrage in practice (C) (v2elfemsuf)	56
3.1.19	Executive election female suffrage in practice (C) (v2elfemsuf_ex)	56
3.1.20	Legislative election female suffrage in practice (C) (v2elfemsuf_leg)	56
3.1.21	Election vote buying (C) (v2elvotbuy, *_osp, *_ord)	56
3.1.22	Executive election vote buying (C) (v2elvotbuy_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	57
3.1.23	Legislative election vote buying (C) (v2elvotbuy_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	57
3.1.24	Election other voting irregularities (C) (v2elirreg, *_osp, *_ord)	57
3.1.25	Executive election other voting irregularities (C) (v2elirreg_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	58
3.1.26	Legislative election other voting irregularities (C) (v2elirreg_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	58
3.1.27	Election government intimidation (C) (v2elintim, *_osp, *_ord)	58
3.1.28	Executive election government intimidation (C) (v2elintim_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	58
3.1.29	Legislative election government intimidation (C) (v2elintim_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	58
3.1.30	Election other electoral violence (C) (v2elpeace, *_osp, *_ord)	59

3.1.31	Executive election other electoral violence (C) (v2elpeace_ex,*_osp, *_ord)	59
3.1.32	Legislative election other electoral violence (C) (v2elpeace_leg,*_osp, *_ord)	59
3.1.33	Election boycotts (C) (v2elboycot, *_osp, *_ord)	59
3.1.34	Executive election boycotts (C) (v2elboycot_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	60
3.1.35	Legislative election boycotts (C) (v2elboycot_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	60
3.1.36	Election free campaign media (C) (v2elfrcamp, *_osp, *_ord)	60
3.1.37	Executive election free campaign media (C) (v2elfrcamp_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	60
3.1.38	Legislative election free campaign media (C) (v2elfrcamp_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	60
3.1.39	Election paid campaign advertisements (C) (v2elpdcamp, *_osp, *_ord)	60
3.1.40	Executive election paid campaign advertisements (C) (v2elpdcamp_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	61
3.1.41	Legislative election paid campaign advertisements (C) (v2elpdcamp_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	61
3.1.42	Election paid interest group media (C) (v2elpaidig, *_osp, *_ord)	61
3.1.43	Executive election paid interest group media (C) (v2elpaidig_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	61
3.1.44	Legislative election paid interest group media (C) (v2elpaidig_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	61
3.1.45	Election free and fair (C) (v2elfrfair, *_osp, *_ord)	61
3.1.46	Executive election free and fair (C) (v2elfrfair_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	62
3.1.47	Legislative election free and fair (C) (v2elfrfair_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	62
3.1.48	Election losers accept results (C) (v2elaccept, *_osp, *_ord)	62
3.1.49	Executive election losers accept results (C) (v2elaccept_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	63
3.1.50	Legislative election losers accept results (C) (v2elaccept_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	63
3.1.51	Election assume office (C) (v2elasmoff, *_osp, *_ord)	63
3.1.52	Executive election assume office (C) (v2elasmoff_ex, *_osp, *_ord)	63
3.1.53	Legislative election assume office (C) (v2elasmoff_leg, *_osp, *_ord)	63
3.1.54	Elections comments (A,B,C) (v2elcomcom)	63
3.1.55	Introduction subnational elections and offices (C) (v2elintro4)	63
3.1.56	Regional government exists (A,C) (v2elreggov)	64
3.1.57	Regional government name (A,C) (v2elregnam)	64
3.1.58	Regional government elected (A,C) (v2elsrgel)	64
3.1.59	Regional offices relative power (C) (v2elrgpwr, *_osp, *_ord)	65
3.1.60	Local government exists (A,C) (v2ellocgov)	65
3.1.61	Local government name (A,C) (v2ellocnam)	66
3.1.62	Local government elected (A,C) (v2ellocelc)	66
3.1.63	Local offices relative power (C) (v2ellocpwr, *_osp, *_ord)	67
3.1.64	Subnational elections free and fair (C) (v2elffelr, *_osp, *_ord)	67
3.1.65	Subnational elections held (C) (v2elffelrbin, *_osp, *_ord)	68
3.1.66	Subnational election unevenness (C) (v2elsnlsff, *_osp, *_ord)	68
3.1.67	Subnational election area less free and fair name (C) (v2elsnless)	68
3.1.68	Subnational election area less free and fair population (C) (v2elsnlpop)	69
3.1.69	Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (C) (v2elsnlfc)	69
3.1.70	Subnational election area more free and fair name (C) (v2elsnmore)	70
3.1.71	Subnational election area more free and fair population (C) (v2elsnmpop)	70
3.1.72	Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (C) (v2elsnmrfc)	70
3.1.73	Comments subnational elections (A,B) (v2elcomsn)	71
3.1.74	Suffrage (A) (v2asuffrage)	71
3.1.75	Adult citizens with right to vote (A) (v2eladlvtv)	71
3.1.76	Minimum voting age (A) (v2elage)	71

3.1.77	Compulsory voting (A) (v2elcomvot)	72
3.1.78	Election domestic election monitors (B) (v2eldommon)	72
3.1.79	Executive election domestic election monitors (B) (v2eldommon_ex)	72
3.1.80	Legislative election domestic election monitors (B) (v2eldommon_leg)	72
3.1.81	Female suffrage restricted (A) (v2elfemrst)	72
3.1.82	Suffrage level (A) (v2elgvsuffvl)	73
3.1.83	Election international monitors (A) (v2elintmon)	73
3.1.84	Executive election international monitors (A) (v2elintmon_ex)	74
3.1.85	Legislative election international monitors (A) (v2elintmon_leg)	74
3.1.86	Lower chamber election introduction (A,B) (v2elintro3)	74
3.1.87	Lower chamber election consecutive (D) (v2ellocons)	74
3.1.88	Lower chamber election cumulative (D) (v2ellocumul)	74
3.1.89	Lower chamber election district magnitude (A) (v2elloeldm)	74
3.1.90	Lower chamber electoral system — 13 categories (A) (v2elloelsy)	75
3.1.91	Lower chamber election seats (A) (v2elloseat)	76
3.1.92	Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v2ellostlg)	76
3.1.93	Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (A) (v2ellostsl)	76
3.1.94	Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v2ellostsm)	77
3.1.95	Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (A) (v2ellostss)	77
3.1.96	Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovtlg)	77
3.1.97	Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovtsm)	77
3.1.98	Election international monitors denied (A) (v2elmonden)	78
3.1.99	Executive election international monitors denied (A) (v2elmonden_ex)	78
3.1.100	Legislative election international monitors denied (A) (v2elmonden_leg)	78
3.1.101	Monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref)	78
3.1.102	Executive monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref_ex)	78
3.1.103	Legislative monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref_leg)	78
3.1.104	Effective number of cabinet parties (B) (v2elncbpr)	78
3.1.105	Lower chamber electoral system (A) (v2elparlel)	79
3.1.106	Presidential elections consecutive (D) (v2elprescons)	79
3.1.107	Presidential elections cumulative (D) (v2elprescumul)	79
3.1.108	HOG restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrsthog)	80
3.1.109	HOS restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrsthos)	80
3.1.110	Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrstrct)	80
3.1.111	Percentage of population with suffrage (A) (v2elsuffrage)	80
3.1.112	Lower chamber election statutory threshold (B) (v2elthresh)	81
3.1.113	Election turnout (A) (v2eltrnout)	81
3.1.114	Executive election turnout (A) (v2eltrnout_ex)	81
3.1.115	Legislative election turnout (A) (v2eltrnout_leg)	82
3.1.116	Election HOG turnover ordinal (A) (v2eltturnhog)	82
3.1.117	Election HOS turnover ordinal (A) (v2eltturnhos)	82
3.1.118	Election executive turnover nominal (B) (v2eltvrexn)	83
3.1.119	Election executive turnover ordinal (A) (v2eltvrexo)	83
3.1.120	Lower chamber election turnover (A) (v2eltvrig)	84
3.1.121	Election type (A*) (v2eltype)	84
3.1.122	Election VAP turnout (A) (v2elvaptrn)	85
3.1.123	Executive election VAP turnout (A) (v2elvaptrn_ex)	85
3.1.124	Legislative election VAP turnout (A) (v2elvaptrn_leg)	85

3.1.125	Fraud allegations by Western monitors (A) (v2elwestmon)	85
3.1.126	Executive election fraud allegations by Western monitors (A) (v2elwestmon_ex)	86
3.1.127	Legislative election fraud allegations by Western monitors (A) (v2elwestmon_leg)	86
3.1.128	Election women in the cabinet (B) (v2elwomcab)	86
3.1.129	Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v2elvotlrg)	86
3.1.130	Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v2elvotsm)	86
3.1.131	Female suffrage (A) (v2fsuffrage)	87
3.1.132	Male suffrage (A) (v2msuffrage)	87
3.2	Political Parties	88
3.2.1	Parties introduction (C) (v2psintro)	88
3.2.2	Party ban (C) (v2psparban, *_osp, *_ord)	88
3.2.3	Party ban target (C) (v2psbantar)	89
3.2.4	Barriers to parties (C) (v2psbars, *_osp, *_ord)	89
3.2.5	Opposition parties autonomy (C) (v2psoppaut, *_osp, *_ord)	90
3.2.6	Party organizations (C) (v2psorgs, *_osp, *_ord)	90
3.2.7	Party branches (C) (v2psprbrch, *_osp, *_ord)	90
3.2.8	Party linkages (C) (v2psprlnks, *_osp, *_ord)	91
3.2.9	Distinct party platforms (C) (v2psplats, *_osp, *_ord)	91
3.2.10	Candidate selection-national/local (C) (v2pscnslnl, *_osp, *_ord)	92
3.2.11	Legislative party cohesion (C) (v2pscohesv, *_osp, *_ord)	92
3.2.12	Party switching (C) (v2psswitch)	92
3.2.13	Party competition across regions (C) (v2pscomprg, *_osp, *_ord)	93
3.2.14	National party control (C) (v2psnatpar)	93
3.2.15	Subnational party control (C) (v2pssunpar, *_osp, *_ord)	93
3.2.16	Parties comments (C) (v2pscommnt)	94
3.3	Direct democracy	95
3.3.1	Initiatives administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmci)	95
3.3.2	Obligatory referendum administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmor)	95
3.3.3	Plebiscite administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmpl)	95
3.3.4	Referendums administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmrf)	95
3.3.5	Obligatory referendum approval threshold (A) (v2ddappor)	96
3.3.6	Initiatives approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprci)	96
3.3.7	Plebiscite approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprpl)	96
3.3.8	Referendums approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprrf)	96
3.3.9	Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (A) (v2ddcredal)	97
3.3.10	Direct democracy introduction (A) (v2ddintro)	97
3.3.11	Initiatives level (A) (v2ddlevci)	97
3.3.12	Plebiscite level (A) (v2ddlevpl)	98
3.3.13	Referendums level (A) (v2ddlevrf)	98
3.3.14	Initiatives permitted (A) (v2ddlexci)	98
3.3.15	Constitutional changes popular vote (A) (v2ddlexor)	98
3.3.16	Plebiscite permitted (A) (v2ddlexpl)	99
3.3.17	Referendums permitted (A) (v2ddlexrf)	99
3.3.18	Initiatives participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartci)	99
3.3.19	Obligatory referendum participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartor)	100
3.3.20	Plebiscite participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartpl)	100
3.3.21	Referendums participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartrf)	100
3.3.22	Initiatives signature-gathering period (A) (v2ddsigdci)	100

3.3.23	Referendums signature-gathering period (A) (v2ddsigdrf)	101
3.3.24	Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (A) (v2ddsiglci)	101
3.3.25	Referendums signature-gathering limit (A) (v2ddsiglr)	101
3.3.26	Initiatives signatures (A) (v2ddsignci)	101
3.3.27	Referendums signatures (A) (v2ddsignrf)	101
3.3.28	Initiatives signatures % (A) (v2ddsigpci)	102
3.3.29	Referendums signatures % (A) (v2ddsigprf)	102
3.3.30	Initiatives super majority (A) (v2ddspmci)	102
3.3.31	Obligatory referendum super majority (A) (v2ddspmor)	102
3.3.32	Plebiscite super majority (A) (v2ddspmpl)	103
3.3.33	Referendums super majority (A) (v2ddspmrf)	103
3.3.34	Popular initiative credible threat (A) (v2ddthreci)	103
3.3.35	Obligatory referendum credible threat (A) (v2ddthreor)	103
3.3.36	Plebiscite credible threat (A) (v2ddthrepl)	104
3.3.37	Popular referendum credible threat (A) (v2ddthref)	104
3.3.38	Number of popular votes this year (A) (v2ddyral)	104
3.3.39	Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year (A) (v2ddyrci)	104
3.3.40	Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (A) (v2ddyror)	105
3.3.41	Occurrence of plebiscite this year (A) (v2ddyrl)	105
3.3.42	Occurrence of referendum this year (A) (v2ddyrrf)	105
3.4	The Executive	106
3.4.1	Executive introduction (A,B,C) (v2exintro1)	106
3.4.2	HOS name (A*) (v2exnamhos)	107
3.4.3	HOS title (A*) (v2extithos)	107
3.4.4	HOS removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhsp, *_osp, *_ord)	108
3.4.5	HOS removal by other in practice (C) (v2exrmhsol)	108
3.4.6	HOS other body remove HOS in practice (C) (v2exrmhsnl)	109
3.4.7	HOS control over (C) (v2exctlhs)	109
3.4.8	HOS other body controls (C) (v2exctlhos)	109
3.4.9	HOS dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdfdshs, *_osp, *_ord)	110
3.4.10	HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs, *_osp, *_ord)	110
3.4.11	HOS veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvths, *_osp, *_ord)	111
3.4.12	HOS dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdmhs, *_osp, *_ord)	111
3.4.13	HOS proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpphs, *_osp, *_ord)	111
3.4.14	HOS comments (A,B,C) (v2excommhs)	112
3.4.15	HOS = HOG (A*) (v2exhoshog)	112
3.4.16	HOG introduction (A,B,C) (v2exintro2)	112
3.4.17	HOG name (A*) (v2exnamhog)	114
3.4.18	HOG title (A*) (v2extithog)	114
3.4.19	HOG removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhog, *_osp, *_ord)	114
3.4.20	HOG removal by other in practice (C) (v2exrmhgnp)	115
3.4.21	HOG other body remove HOG in practice (C) (v2exrmhgop)	115
3.4.22	HOG control over (C) (v2exctlhg)	115
3.4.23	HOG other body controls (C) (v2exctlhog)	116
3.4.24	HOG dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdjdshg, *_osp, *_ord)	116
3.4.25	HOG appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdjcbhg, *_osp, *_ord)	117
3.4.26	HOG dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdshg, *_osp, *_ord)	117
3.4.27	HOG veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvthg, *_osp, *_ord)	117

3.4.28	HOG proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpphg, *_osp, *_ord)	118
3.4.29	HOG comments (C) (v2excommhg)	118
3.4.30	Executive as a whole introduction (A, B, C) (v2exintro3)	119
3.4.31	Executive respects constitution (C) (v2exrescon, *_osp, *_ord)	119
3.4.32	Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (C) (v2exbribe, *_osp, *_ord)	119
3.4.33	Executive embezzlement and theft (C) (v2exembez, *_osp, *_ord)	119
3.4.34	Public sector corrupt exchanges (C) (v2excrptps, *_osp, *_ord)	120
3.4.35	Public sector theft (C) (v2exthftps, *_osp, *_ord)	120
3.4.36	Entire executive comments (A,B,C) (v2excomex)	121
3.4.37	HOG directly elected (D) (v2ex_elechog)	121
3.4.38	HOS directly elected (D) (v2ex_elechos)	121
3.4.39	Relative power of the HOG (D) (v2ex_hogw)	122
3.4.40	HOG appointed by HOS (D) (v2ex_hosconhog)	122
3.4.41	HOG age (A) (v2exagehog)	122
3.4.42	HOS age (A) (v2exagehos)	122
3.4.43	HOG selection by legislature in practice (A) (v2exaphogp)	122
3.4.44	HOS selection by legislature in practice (A) (v2exaphos)	123
3.4.45	Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (A) (v2exapup)	123
3.4.46	Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (A) (v2exapupap)	124
3.4.47	HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs_rec, *_osp, *_ord)	124
3.4.48	HOG disadvantaged social group (B) (v2exdighog)	124
3.4.49	HOS disadvantaged social group (B) (v2exdighos)	125
3.4.50	HOG female (A) (v2exfemhog)	125
3.4.51	HOS female (A) (v2exfemhos)	125
3.4.52	HOG term length by law (A) (v2exfxtmhg)	126
3.4.53	HOS term length by law (A) (v2exfxtmhs)	126
3.4.54	HOG other appointing body in practice (A) (v2exothhgl)	126
3.4.55	HOS other appointing body in practice (A) (v2exothhs)	127
3.4.56	HOG appointment in practice (A) (v2expathhg)	127
3.4.57	HOS appointment in practice (A) (v2expathhs)	127
3.5	The Legislature	129
3.5.1	Legislature introduction (A,B,C) (v2lgintro1)	129
3.5.2	Legislature bicameral (A*) (v2lgbicam)	129
3.5.3	Upper chamber introduction (A,B,C) (v2lgintro3)	129
3.5.4	Upper chamber name (A*) (v2lgnameup)	130
3.5.5	Upper chamber legislates in practice (C) (v2lglegpup, *_osp, *_ord)	130
3.5.6	Legislature dominant chamber (C) (v2lgdomchm, *_osp, *_ord)	130
3.5.7	Legislature introduction one or both houses (A,B,C) (v2lgintro4)	131
3.5.8	Legislature questions officials in practice (C) (v2lgqstexp, *_osp, *_ord)	131
3.5.9	Legislature investigates in practice (C) (v2lginvstp, *_osp, *_ord)	131
3.5.10	Executive oversight (C) (v2lgotovst, *_osp, *_ord)	132
3.5.11	Legislature corrupt activities (C) (v2lgcrpt, *_osp, *_ord)	132
3.5.12	Legislature opposition parties (C) (v2lgoppart, *_osp, *_ord)	132
3.5.13	Legislature controls resources (C) (v2lgfunds, *_osp, *_ord)	133
3.5.14	Representation of disadvantaged social groups (C) (v2lgdsadlo, *_osp, *_ord)	133
3.5.15	Representation of disadvantaged social groups binary (C) (v2lgdsadlobin, *_osp, *_ord)	133
3.5.16	Introduction lower chamber (A,B,C) (v2lgintro2)	134

3.5.17	Lower chamber legislature name (A*) (v2lgnamelo)	134
3.5.18	Lower chamber legislates in practice (C) (v2lglegplo, *_osp, *_ord)	134
3.5.19	Lower chamber committees (C) (v2lgcomslo, *_osp, *_ord)	135
3.5.20	Lower chamber members serve in government (C) (v2lgsrvlo, *_osp, *_ord)	135
3.5.21	Lower chamber staff (C) (v2lgstafflo, *_osp, *_ord)	135
3.5.22	Legislature comments (A,B,C) (v2lgcommnt)	136
3.5.23	Relative power of the HOS (D) (v2ex_hosw)	136
3.5.24	HOG appointed by legislature (D) (v2ex_legconhog)	136
3.5.25	HOS appointed by legislature (D) (v2ex_legconhos)	136
3.5.26	Legislature amends constitution (B) (v2lgamend)	137
3.5.27	Legislature amnesties (B) (v2lgamnsty)	137
3.5.28	Upper chamber elected (A) (v2lgelecup)	137
3.5.29	Lower chamber elected (A) (v2lgello)	137
3.5.30	Lower chamber female legislators (A) (v2lgfemleg)	138
3.5.31	Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber (A) (v2lginello)	138
3.5.32	Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber (A) (v2lginelup)	138
3.5.33	Lower chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintblo)	139
3.5.34	Upper chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintbup)	139
3.5.35	Lower chamber legislates by law (B) (v2lglegllo)	139
3.5.36	Upper chamber legislates by law (B) (v2lgleglup)	139
3.5.37	Lower chamber gender quota (A) (v2lgqugen)	140
3.5.38	Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (A) (v2lgqugens)	140
3.5.39	Lower chamber gender quota threshold (A) (v2lgqugent)	141
3.5.40	Lower chamber quota for social groups (A,B) (v2lgqumin)	141
3.5.41	Legislature approval of treaties by law (A) (v2lgtreaty)	141
3.5.42	Lower chamber term limits (A) (v2lgtrmlup)	142
3.5.43	Upper chamber term limits (A) (v2lguchatrmlim)	142
3.5.44	Legislature declares war by law (A) (v2lgwarlaw)	143
3.6	Deliberation	144
3.6.1	Deliberation introduction (C) (v2dlintro)	144
3.6.2	Reasoned justification (C) (v2dlreason, *_osp, *_ord)	144
3.6.3	Common good (C) (v2dlcommon, *_osp, *_ord)	144
3.6.4	Respect counterarguments (C) (v2dlcountr, *_osp, *_ord)	145
3.6.5	Range of consultation (C) (v2dlconslt, *_osp, *_ord)	145
3.6.6	Engaged society (C) (v2dlengage, *_osp, *_ord)	146
3.6.7	Particularistic or public goods (C) (v2dlencmps, *_osp, *_ord)	146
3.6.8	Means-tested v. universalistic policy (C) (v2dlunivl)	147
3.6.9	Comments deliberation (C) (v2dlcommnt)	147
3.7	The Judiciary	148
3.7.1	Judiciary introduction (A, C) (v2juintro1)	148
3.7.2	Judicial reform (C) (v2jureform, *_osp, *_ord)	149
3.7.3	Judicial purges (C) (v2jupurge, *_osp, *_ord)	149
3.7.4	Government attacks on judiciary (C) (v2jupoatck, *_osp, *_ord)	149
3.7.5	Court packing (C) (v2jupack, *_osp, *_ord)	150
3.7.6	Judicial accountability (C) (v2juacct, *_osp, *_ord)	150
3.7.7	Judicial corruption decision (C) (v2jucorrdc, *_osp, *_ord)	151
3.7.8	High court name (A) (v2juhname)	151
3.7.9	High court size (by law) (C) (v2juhcsizl)	151

3.7.10	High court size (in practice) (C) (v2juhcsizp)	152
3.7.11	Female judges (C) (v2jufemjdg)	152
3.7.12	First woman appointed (C) (v2jufrstfm)	152
3.7.13	High court independence (C) (v2juhcind, *_osp, *_ord)	153
3.7.14	Lower court independence (C) (v2juncind, *_osp, *_ord)	153
3.7.15	Compliance with high court (C) (v2juhccomp, *_osp, *_ord)	154
3.7.16	Compliance with judiciary (C) (v2jucomp, *_osp, *_ord)	154
3.7.17	Judicial review (C) (v2jureview, *_osp, *_ord)	154
3.7.18	Judiciary comments (C) (v2jucommnt)	155
3.7.19	Codeable (A) (v2jucodable)	155
3.7.20	Corresponding flowchart (A) (v2juflow)	155
3.7.21	Language (A) (v2julanguage)	155
3.7.22	Team translated (A) (v2juteamtr)	156
3.8	Civil Liberty	157
3.8.1	Civil liberties introduction (C) (v2clintro)	157
3.8.2	Freedom of academic and cultural expression (C) (v2clacfree, *_osp, *_ord) .	157
3.8.3	Freedom of religion (C) (v2clrelig, *_osp, *_ord)	157
3.8.4	Freedom from torture (C) (v2cltort, *_osp, *_ord)	158
3.8.5	Freedom from political killings (C) (v2clkill, *_osp, *_ord)	158
3.8.6	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (C) (v2cltrnslw, *_osp, *_ord)	159
3.8.7	Rigorous and impartial public administration (C) (v2clrspct, *_osp, *_ord) .	159
3.8.8	Freedom of foreign movement (C) (v2clfmov, *_osp, *_ord)	160
3.8.9	Freedom of domestic movement for men (C) (v2cldmovm, *_osp, *_ord) . .	160
3.8.10	Freedom of domestic movement for women (C) (v2cldmovw, *_osp, *_ord) .	161
3.8.11	Freedom of discussion for men (C) (v2cldiscm, *_osp, *_ord)	161
3.8.12	Freedom of discussion for women (C) (v2cldiscw, *_osp, *_ord)	162
3.8.13	Freedom from forced labor for men (C) (v2clslavem, *_osp, *_ord)	162
3.8.14	Freedom from forced labor for women (C) (v2clslavew, *_osp, *_ord)	163
3.8.15	State ownership of economy (C) (v2clstown, *_osp, *_ord)	163
3.8.16	Property rights for men (C) (v2clprptym, *_osp, *_ord)	164
3.8.17	Property rights for women (C) (v2clprptyw, *_osp, *_ord)	164
3.8.18	Access to justice for men (C) (v2clacjstm, *_osp, *_ord)	165
3.8.19	Access to justice for women (C) (v2clacjstw, *_osp, *_ord)	165
3.8.20	Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (C) (v2clacjust, *_osp, *_ord)	166
3.8.21	Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clsocgrp, *_osp, *_ord)	166
3.8.22	Subnational civil liberties unevenness (C) (v2clrgunev, *_osp, *_ord)	167
3.8.23	Stronger civil liberties population (C) (v2clsnmpct)	167
3.8.24	Stronger civil liberties characteristics (C) (v2clrgstch)	167
3.8.25	Weaker civil liberties population (C) (v2clsnlpct)	168
3.8.26	Weaker civil liberties characteristics (C) (v2clrgwkch)	168
3.8.27	Civil liberties comments (C) (v2clcommnt)	169
3.9	Sovereignty/State	170
3.9.1	Sovereignty introduction (C) (v2svintro)	170
3.9.2	Domestic autonomy (C) (v2svdomaut, *_osp, *_ord)	170
3.9.3	International autonomy (C) (v2svinlaut, *_osp, *_ord)	171
3.9.4	State authority over territory (C) (v2svstterr)	171
3.9.5	State authority over population (C) (v2svstpop)	172
3.9.6	State fiscal capacity (C) (v2stfiscap)	172

3.9.7	Bureaucratic remuneration (C) (v2strenadm)	173
3.9.8	Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (C) (v2stcritrecadm)	173
3.9.9	Sovereignty comments (A,B) (v2svcommnt)	173
3.9.10	Independent states (A) (v2svindep)	174
3.10	Civil Society	175
3.10.1	CSOs introduction (C) (v2csintro)	175
3.10.2	CSO entry and exit (C) (v2cseeorgs, *_osp, *_ord)	175
3.10.3	CSO repression (C) (v2csreprss, *_osp, *_ord)	176
3.10.4	CSO consultation (C) (v2cscnsult, *_osp, *_ord)	176
3.10.5	CSO structure (C) (v2csstruc)	177
3.10.6	CSO participatory environment (C) (v2csprtcept, *_osp, *_ord)	177
3.10.7	CSO women’s participation (C) (v2csgender, *_osp, *_ord)	177
3.10.8	CSO anti-system movements (C) (v2csantimv, *_osp, *_ord)	178
3.10.9	CSO anti-system movement character (C) (v2csanmvch)	178
3.10.10	Religious organization introduction (C) (v2csintro2)	179
3.10.11	Religious organization repression (C) (v2csrlgrep, *_osp, *_ord)	179
3.10.12	Religious organization consultation (C) (v2csrlgcon, *_osp, *_ord)	180
3.10.13	Civil society comments (C) (v2cscommnt)	180
3.11	The Media	181
3.11.1	Media introduction (A,B) (v2meintro)	181
3.11.2	Government censorship effort — Media (C) (v2mecenefm, *_osp, *_ord)	181
3.11.3	Internet censorship effort (C) (v2mecenefi, *_osp, *_ord)	181
3.11.4	Internet binary (C) (v2mecenefibin, *_osp, *_ord)	182
3.11.5	Print/broadcast media critical (C) (v2mecrit, *_osp, *_ord)	182
3.11.6	Print/broadcast media perspectives (C) (v2merange, *_osp, *_ord)	182
3.11.7	Female journalists (C) (v2mefemjrn)	183
3.11.8	Harassment of journalists (C) (v2meharjrn, *_osp, *_ord)	183
3.11.9	Media self-censorship (C) (v2meslfcen, *_osp, *_ord)	183
3.11.10	Media access (C) (v2meaccess)	184
3.11.11	Media bias (C) (v2mebias, *_osp, *_ord)	184
3.11.12	Media corrupt (C) (v2mecorrpt, *_osp, *_ord)	185
3.11.13	Media comments (C) (v2mecommnt)	185
3.12	Political Equality	186
3.12.1	Political equality introduction (C) (v2peintro)	186
3.12.2	Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C) (v2pepwrres, *_osp, *_ord)	186
3.12.3	Power distributed by social group (C) (v2pepwrsoc, *_osp, *_ord)	186
3.12.4	Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrgen, *_osp, *_ord)	187
3.12.5	Power distributed by sexual orientation (C) (v2pepwrort, *_osp, *_ord)	187
3.12.6	Educational equality (C) (v2peedueq, *_osp, *_ord)	188
3.12.7	Health equality (C) (v2pehealth, *_osp, *_ord)	188
3.12.8	Political equality comments (C) (v2pecommnt)	189
3.12.9	Primary school enrollment (A) (v2peprisch)	189
3.12.10	Secondary school enrollment (A) (v2pesecsch)	189
3.12.11	Secondary tertiary enrollment (A) (v2petersch)	190
3.13	Historical V-Dem	191
3.13.1	Minimum candidate age lower chamber (A) (v3canagelc)	191
3.13.2	Minimum candidate age upper chamber (A) (v3canageuc)	192
3.13.3	Slavery (A) (v3clslavery)	192

3.13.4	Minimum voting age presidency (A) (v3elagepr)	192
3.13.5	Minimum voting age upper chamber (A) (v3elageuc)	193
3.13.6	Direct lower chamber (unicameral) elections (A) (v3eldirelc)	193
3.13.7	Direct presidential elections (A) (v3eldirepr)	193
3.13.8	Direct upper chamber elections (A) (v3eldireuc)	193
3.13.9	Lower chamber election seats won by third largest party (A) (v3ellosttm)	194
3.13.10	Lower chamber election seat share won by third largest party (A) (v3ellostts)	194
3.13.11	Lower chamber election vote share of third-largest vote-getter (A) (v3ellovtm)	194
3.13.12	Minority or majority government (A) (v3elncbmaj)	195
3.13.13	Candidate exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (A) (v3elstrlc)	195
3.13.14	Candidate exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (A) (v3elstrpr)	196
3.13.15	Candidate exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (A) (v3elstrup)	196
3.13.16	De jure ballot secrecy (A) (v3elsec)	197
3.13.17	Upper chamber election turnover (A) (v3eltvriguc)	197
3.13.18	Upper chamber election seats (A) (v3elupseat)	197
3.13.19	Upper chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v3elupstsl)	198
3.13.20	Upper chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v3elupstsm)	198
3.13.21	Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v3elupvtlg)	198
3.13.22	Upper chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v3elupvtsm)	199
3.13.23	Suffrage exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (A) (v3elvstrlc)	199
3.13.24	Suffrage exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (A) (v3elvstrpr)	199
3.13.25	Suffrage exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (A) (v3elvstruc)	200
3.13.26	HOG year of death (A) (v3exdeathog)	201
3.13.27	HOS year of death (A) (v3exdeathos)	201
3.13.28	Legislature other than uni- or bicameral (A) (v3lgcamoth)	201
3.13.29	Name of largest party (A) (v3lpname)	201
3.13.30	Child labor laws (A) (v3pechilabl)	202
3.13.31	Minimum wage (A) (v3peminwage)	202
3.13.32	Minimum wage restriction (A) (v3peminwagerestr)	202
3.13.33	Party age largest (A) (v3psagefirst)	203
3.13.34	Party age executive (A) (v3psagepm)	203
3.13.35	Party age second largest (A) (v3psagesecond)	203
3.13.36	Party age third largest (A) (v3psagethird)	204
3.13.37	Regime end type, multiple selection version (A) (v3regendtypems)	204
3.13.38	Regime interregnum (A) (v3regint)	204
3.13.39	Serfdom de jure/slavery de jure (A) (v3serfdeju)	205
3.13.40	Name of second largest party (A) (v3slpname)	205
3.13.41	Census (A) (v3stcensus)	205
3.13.42	Citizenship laws (A) (v3stcitlaw)	206
3.13.43	Flag (A) (v3stflag)	206
3.13.44	National anthem (A) (v3stnatant)	206
3.13.45	National bank (A) (v3stnatbank)	207
3.13.46	Statistical agency (A) (v3ststatag)	207
3.13.47	Statistical yearbook covered (A) (v3ststybcov)	207
3.13.48	Statistical yearbook published (A) (v3ststybpub)	207
3.13.49	Name of third largest party (A) (v3tlpname)	208
3.13.50	Total votes (A) (v3ttlvote)	208
3.13.51	Election type (A*) (v3eltype)	208

3.13.52	High court existence (A*) (v3juhcourt)	209
3.13.53	Legislature bicameral (A*) (v3lgbicam)	209
3.13.54	Regime end type (A*) (v3regendtype)	210
3.13.55	Regime information (A*) (v3reginfo)	210
3.13.56	Labor rights (C) (v3cllabrig)	211
3.13.57	Voting, voice or ballot (C) (v3elbalpap)	211
3.13.58	Ballot printing (C) (v3elbalstat)	211
3.13.59	Compulsory voting (C) (v3elcomvot)	212
3.13.60	Secret ballot, <i>de facto</i> (C) (v3elecsedf)	212
3.13.61	Malapportionment legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3elmalalc)	212
3.13.62	Malapportionment upper chamber (C) (v3elmalauc)	213
3.13.63	Reapportionment legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3elreapplc)	213
3.13.64	Reapportionment upper chamber (C) (v3elreappuc)	214
3.13.65	Equal vote legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3equavolc)	214
3.13.66	Equal vote upper chamber (C) (v3equavouc)	214
3.13.67	Lower chamber budget (C) (v3lgbudglo)	215
3.13.68	Upper chamber budget (C) (v3lgbudgup)	215
3.13.69	Lower chamber in session (C) (v3lginse)	216
3.13.70	Upper chamber in session (C) (v3lginseup)	216
3.13.71	Party identification (C) (v3partyid)	216
3.13.72	Regime most important support group (C) (v3regimpgroup)	217
3.13.73	Regime support groups (C) (v3regsupgroups)	217
3.13.74	Regime support groups size (C) (v3regsupgroupssize)	218
3.13.75	Regime support location (C) (v3regsuploc)	219
3.13.76	Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (C) (v3stcritapparm)	219
3.13.77	Remuneration in the Armed Forces (C) (v3strenarm)	220
3.13.78	Rulers' involvement in the state administration (C) (v3struinvadm)	220
3.13.79	State steering capacity (C) (v3ststeecap)	220
3.13.80	Regime introduction (I) (v3exintro4)	221

4 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data 222

4.0.1	Regimes of the world – the RoW measure (D) (v2x_regime)	222
4.0.2	Regimes of the world – the RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases (D) (v2x_regime_amb)	222
4.0.3	Accountability index (D) (v2x_accountability)	223
4.0.4	Vertical accountability index (D) (v2x_veracc)	224
4.0.5	Diagonal accountability index (D) (v2x_diagacc)	224
4.0.6	Horizontal accountability index (D) (v2x_horacc)	225
4.0.7	Neopatrimonial Rule Index (D) (e_v2x_neopat)	226
4.0.8	Clientelism Index (D) (e_v2xnp_client)	226
4.0.9	Presidentialism Index (D) (e_v2xnp_pres)	227
4.0.10	Regime corruption (D) (e_v2xnp_regcorr)	227
4.0.11	Election suffrage in practice (D) (v2elprasuf)	228
4.0.12	Executive election suffrage in practice (D) (v2elprasuf_ex)	228
4.0.13	Legislative election suffrage in practice (D) (v2elprasuf_leg)	228
4.0.14	Legislature directly elected (D) (v2ex_elecleg)	228
4.0.15	Civil liberties index (D) (v2x_civlib)	229
4.0.16	Physical violence index (D) (v2x_clphy)	229
4.0.17	Political civil liberties index (D) (v2x_clpol)	229

4.0.18	Private civil liberties index (D) (v2x_clpriv)	230
4.0.19	Political corruption index (D) (v2x_corr)	230
4.0.20	Divided party control index (D) (v2x_divparctrl)	230
4.0.21	Electoral component index (D) (v2x_EDcomp_thick)	231
4.0.22	Electoral regime index (D) (v2x_elecreg)	231
4.0.23	Executive corruption index (D) (v2x_execorr)	232
4.0.24	Division of power index (D) (v2x_feduni)	232
4.0.25	Freedom of expression index (D) (v2x_freexp)	233
4.0.26	Women civil liberties index (D) (v2x_gencl)	233
4.0.27	Women civil society participation index (D) (v2x_gencs)	233
4.0.28	Women political empowerment index (D) (v2x_gender)	234
4.0.29	Women political participation index (D) (v2x_genpp)	234
4.0.30	Presidential election aborted (D) (v2x_hosabort)	234
4.0.31	Chief executive no longer elected (D) (v2x_hosinter)	235
4.0.32	Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted (D) (v2x_legabort)	235
4.0.33	Public sector corruption index (D) (v2x_pubcorr)	235
4.0.34	Rule of law index (D) (v2x_rule)	235
4.0.35	Access to justice (D) (v2xcl_acjst)	236
4.0.36	Freedom of discussion (D) (v2xcl_disc)	236
4.0.37	Freedom of domestic movement (D) (v2xcl_dmove)	236
4.0.38	Property rights (D) (v2xcl_prpty)	237
4.0.39	Freedom from forced labor (D) (v2xcl_slave)	237
4.0.40	Core civil society index (D) (v2xcs_ccsi)	237
4.0.41	Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_cic)	238
4.0.42	Obligatory referendum index (D) (v2xdd_i_or)	238
4.0.43	Popular initiative index (D) (v2xdd_i_pi)	239
4.0.44	Plebiscite index (D) (v2xdd_i_pl)	240
4.0.45	Popular referendum index (D) (v2xdd_i_rf)	240
4.0.46	Top-Down component of direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_toc)	241
4.0.47	Legislative or constituent assembly election (D) (v2xel_elecparl)	241
4.0.48	Presidential election (D) (v2xel_elecpres)	242
4.0.49	Executive electoral regime index (D) (v2xex_elecreg)	242
4.0.50	Legislative electoral regime index (D) (v2xlg_elecreg)	242
4.0.51	Legislature closed down or aborted (D) (v2xlg_leginter)	243
4.0.52	Alternative sources of information index (D) (v2xme_altinf)	243
4.0.53	Party institutionalization index (D) (v2xps_party)	243
5	Other Democracy Indices and Indicators (E)	244
5.1	Ordinal Versions of Indices	244
5.1.1	Additive polyarchy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_api_3C /_4C /_5C)	244
5.1.2	Civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_civlib_3C /_4C /_5C)	245
5.1.3	Physical violence index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clphy_3C /_4C /_5C)	245
5.1.4	Political civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clpol_3C /_4C /_5C)	245
5.1.5	Private liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clpriv_3C /_4C /_5C)	245
5.1.6	Political corruption index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_corr_3C /_4C /_5C)	246
5.1.7	Civil society participation index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_cspart_3C /_4C /_5C)	246
5.1.8	Deliberative democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_delibdem_3C /_4C /_5C)	246
5.1.9	Electoral component index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_EDcomp_thick_3C /_4C /_5C)	246

5.1.10	Egalitarian component index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_egal_3C /_4C /_5C) . . .	247
5.1.11	Egalitarian democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_egaldem_3C /_4C /_5C) .	247
5.1.12	Elected officials index (<i>de jure</i>) ordinal (E) (e_v2x_elecoff_3C /_4C /_5C) .	247
5.1.13	Executive corruption index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_execorr_3C /_4C /_5C) . .	248
5.1.14	Division of power index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_feduni_3C /_4C /_5C)	248
5.1.15	Freedom of association (thick) index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_frassoc_thick_3C /_4C /_5C)	248
5.1.16	Freedom of expression index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_freexp_3C /_4C /_5C) . .	248
5.1.17	Expanded freedom of expression index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_freexp_altinf_3C /_4C /_5C)	249
5.1.18	Women civil liberties index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_gencl_3C /_4C /_5C)	249
5.1.19	Women civil society participation index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_gencs_3C /_4C /_5C)	249
5.1.20	Women political empowerment index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_gender_3C /_4C /_5C)	249
5.1.21	Women political participation index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_genpp_3C /_4C /_5C)	250
5.1.22	Judicial constraints on the executive index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_jucon_3C /_4C /_5C)	250
5.1.23	Divided party control index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_lgdivparctrl_3C /_4C /_5C)	250
5.1.24	Liberal democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_libdem_3C /_4C /_5C)	250
5.1.25	Liberal component index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_liberal_3C /_4C /_5C)	251
5.1.26	Multiplicative polyarchy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_mpi_3C /_4C /_5C) . .	251
5.1.27	Participatory component index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_partip_3C /_4C /_5C) .	252
5.1.28	Participatory democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_partipdem_3C /_4C /_5C)	252
5.1.29	Electoral democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_polyarchy_3C /_4C /_5C) .	253
5.1.30	Public sector corruption index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_pubcorr_3C /_4C /_5C)	254
5.1.31	Share of population with suffrage ordinal (E) (e_v2x_suffr_3C /_4C /_5C)	254
5.1.32	Equality before the law and individual liberty index ordinal (E) (e_v2xclrol_3C /_4C /_5C)	254
5.1.33	Core civil society index ordinal (E) (e_v2xcs_ccsi_3C /_4C /_5C)	255
5.1.34	Direct popular vote index ordinal (E) (e_v2xdd_dd_3C /_4C /_5C)	255
5.1.35	Deliberative component index ordinal (E) (e_v2xdl_delib_3C /_4C /_5C) .	255
5.1.36	Equal distribution of resources index ordinal (E) (e_v2xeg_eqdr_3C /_4C /_5C)	255
5.1.37	Equal protection index ordinal (E) (e_v2xeg_eqprotec_3C /_4C /_5C) . . .	256
5.1.38	Clean elections index ordinal (E) (e_v2xel_frefair_3C /_4C /_5C)	256
5.1.39	Local government index ordinal (E) (e_v2xel_locelec_3C /_4C /_5C)	256
5.1.40	Regional government index ordinal (E) (e_v2xel_regelec_3C /_4C /_5C) . .	256
5.1.41	Legislative constraints on the executive index ordinal (E) (e_v2xlg_legcon_3C /_4C /_5C)	257
5.1.42	Alternative sources of information index ordinal (E) (e_v2xme_altinf_3C /_4C /_5C)	257
5.1.43	Party institutionalization index ordinal (E) (e_v2xps_party_3C /_4C /_5C)	257
5.2	Database of Political Institutions	257
5.2.1	State government authority over taxing, spending, or legislating (E) (e_dpi_author)	257
5.2.2	Autonomous regions (E) (e_dpi_auton)	258
5.2.3	Is chief executive a military officer? (E) (e_dpi_cemo)	258
5.2.4	Checks and balances (E) (e_dpi_checks)	258
5.2.5	Closed list (E) (e_dpi_cl)	258

5.2.6	Executive electoral competitiveness (E) (e_dpi_eipe)	259
5.2.7	Chief executive party orientation (E) (e_dpi_erlc)	259
5.2.8	Presidential election held (E) (e_dpi_exelec)	260
5.2.9	Finite term in office (E) (e_dpi_finter)	260
5.2.10	Vote fraud (E) (e_dpi_fraud)	260
5.3	Bilinski	261
5.3.1	Percentage of elected MPs (E) (e_electedper)	261
5.3.2	Elected institutions (E) (e_electinst)	261
5.3.3	Notes (E) (e_notes_srcs)	261
5.3.4	Electoral pluralism (E) (e_pluralism)	261
5.3.5	<i>De facto</i> sovereignty (E) (e_sovdefacto)	261
5.3.6	<i>De jure</i> sovereignty (E) (e_sovdejure)	262
5.3.7	Uncertainty 1 (E) (e_uncertainty1)	262
5.3.8	Uncertainty 2 (E) (e_uncertainty2)	262
5.4	Comparative Constitutional Project	263
5.4.1	Amparo (E) (e_ccp_amparo)	263
5.4.2	Cabinet approval by law (E) (e_ccp_cabappr)	263
5.4.3	Cabinet appointment by law (E) (e_ccp_cabappt)	263
5.4.4	Cabinet dismissal by law (E) (e_ccp_cabdiss)	264
5.4.5	Cabinet regulated by law (E) (e_ccp_cabinet)	264
5.4.6	Standing — constitutional review (E) (e_ccp_challeg)	265
5.4.7	Type of constitutional review (E) (e_ccp_chalstag)	265
5.4.8	Effects of constitutional review (E) (e_ccp_chaluncn)	265
5.4.9	CJ term (E) (e_ccp_chfterm)	266
5.4.10	CJ restrictions (E) (e_ccp_chftrnm)	266
5.4.11	CJ approval (E) (e_ccp_chiefap)	267
5.4.12	CJ nomination (E) (e_ccp_chiefnom)	267
5.4.13	Approval of constitutional court nominations (E) (e_ccp_conap)	268
5.4.14	Restrictions on constitutional judge terms (E) (e_ccp_conlim)	268
5.4.15	Constitutional court nominations (E) (e_ccp_connom)	268
5.4.16	Special procedures for removing constitutional judges (E) (e_ccp_conrem)	269
5.4.17	Procedures for removing constitutional judges (E) (e_ccp_conremp)	269
5.4.18	Term for constitutional judges (E) (e_ccp_conterm)	269
5.4.19	Chief justice (CJ) highest ordinary court (E) (e_ccp_hoccj)	270
5.4.20	HOG removal body by law (E) (e_ccp_hogadiss)	270
5.4.21	HOG approval by law (E) (e_ccp_hogapp)	271
5.4.22	HOG removal grounds by law (E) (e_ccp_hogdcond)	271
5.4.23	HOG removal regulated by law (E) (e_ccp_hogdiss)	272
5.4.24	HOG appointment by law (E) (e_ccp_hogelect)	272
5.4.25	HOG nomination by law (E) (e_ccp_hognom)	272
5.4.26	HOG term limit by law (E) (e_ccp_hogterm)	273
5.4.27	HOS removal body by law (E) (e_ccp_hosadiss)	273
5.4.28	HOS removal grounds by law (E) (e_ccp_hosdcond)	274
5.4.29	HOS removal regulated by law (E) (e_ccp_hosdiss)	274
5.4.30	HOS appointment by other (E) (e_ccp_hoselctr)	275
5.4.31	HOS appointment by law (E) (e_ccp_hoselect)	275
5.4.32	HOS term limit by law (E) (e_ccp_hosterml)	275
5.4.33	Legislature immunity in practice (E) (e_ccp_immunity)	276

5.4.34	Constitutional review (E) (e_ccp_interp)	276
5.4.35	Legislature questions officials by law (E) (e_ccp_intexec)	277
5.4.36	Legislature investigates by law (E) (e_ccp_invexe)	277
5.4.37	Dismissal procedures (E) (e_ccp_jrem)	277
5.4.38	Dismissal approval (E) (e_ccp_jremap)	278
5.4.39	Dismissal approval vote 3 (E) (e_ccp_jrembota)	278
5.4.40	Dismissal vote 3 (E) (e_ccp_jrembotp)	279
5.4.41	Dismissal rationale (E) (e_ccp_jremcon)	279
5.4.42	Dismissal approval vote 1 (E) (e_ccp_jremfira)	280
5.4.43	Dismissal vote (E) (e_ccp_jremfirp)	280
5.4.44	Dismissal proposal (E) (e_ccp_jrempro)	280
5.4.45	Dismissal approval vote 2 (E) (e_ccp_jremseca)	281
5.4.46	Dismissal vote 2 (E) (e_ccp_jremsecp)	281
5.4.47	Specialized courts (E) (e_ccp_judcrts)	282
5.4.48	Judicial salaries (E) (e_ccp_judsal)	282
5.4.49	Propose legislation by law (E) (e_ccp_leg_in)	282
5.4.50	Veto legislation by law (E) (e_ccp_legapp)	283
5.4.51	Dissolution of legislature by law (E) (e_ccp_legdiss)	283
5.4.52	Legislature supermajority (E) (e_ccp_legsupr)	284
5.4.53	Legislature super-majority types (E) (e_ccp_legsuprw)	284
5.4.54	Type of courts (E) (e_ccp_levjud)	285
5.4.55	Ordinary court name (E) (e_ccp_ordname)	285
5.4.56	Nomination of ordinary judges (E) (e_ccp_ordnom)	285
5.4.57	Approval of ordinary court nominations (E) (e_ccp_ornap)	286
5.4.58	Lower chamber regular sessions (E) (e_ccp_session)	286
5.4.59	Highest ordinary court approval (E) (e_ccp_supap)	286
5.4.60	Supreme court name (E) (e_ccp_supname)	287
5.4.61	Highest ordinary court judge nominations (E) (e_ccp_supnom)	287
5.4.62	Highest ordinary court terms (E) (e_ccp_supterm)	288
5.4.63	Highest ordinary court restrictions (E) (e_ccp_suptermm)	288
5.5	Political Regimes	288
5.5.1	Democracy (BMR) (E) (e_boix_regime)	288
5.5.2	Democratic breakdowns (E) (e_democracy_breakdowns)	289
5.5.3	Duration of regime (E) (e_democracy_duration)	289
5.5.4	Omitted data (E) (e_democracy_omitteddata)	289
5.5.5	Democratic transition (E) (e_democracy_trans)	289
5.5.6	Sovereignty (E) (e_sovereignty)	289
5.6	Freedom House	290
5.6.1	Civil liberties (E) (e_fh_cl)	290
5.6.2	Freedom House/Imputed Polity (E) (e_fh_ipolity2)	290
5.6.3	Personal autonomy and individual rights (E) (e_fh_pair)	290
5.6.4	Freedom House/Polity (E) (e_fh_polity2)	290
5.6.5	Political rights (E) (e_fh_pr)	291
5.6.6	Rule of law (E) (e_fh_rol)	291
5.6.7	Status (E) (e_fh_status)	291
5.7	World Bank Governance Indicators	291
5.7.1	Control of corruption — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_cce)	291
5.7.2	Control of corruption — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_ccs)	292

5.7.3	Government effectiveness (E) (e_wbgi_gee)	292
5.7.4	Government effectiveness — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_ges)	292
5.7.5	Political stability — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_pve)	292
5.7.6	Political stability — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_pvs)	292
5.7.7	Rule of law — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_rle)	292
5.7.8	Rule of law — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_rls)	292
5.7.9	Regulatory quality — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_rqe)	293
5.7.10	Regulatory quality — number of sources (E) (e_wbgi_rqn)	293
5.7.11	Voice and accountability — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_vae)	293
5.7.12	Voice and accountability — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_vas)	293
5.8	Election Quality and International Observation	293
5.8.1	Month of executive election (E) (e_Dateexec)	293
5.8.2	Month of legislative election (E) (e_Dateleg)	294
5.8.3	Executive election (E) (e_Exelec)	294
5.8.4	Intercoder (E) (e_INTERCODER)	294
5.8.5	Legislative election (E) (e_Legelec)	294
5.8.6	Problems (E) (e_Problems)	295
5.8.7	Rec_Score (E) (e_Rec_Score)	295
5.8.8	Overall election quality (E) (e_SA1)	295
5.8.9	Extent of election problems (E) (e_SA2)	295
5.8.10	Run-off election (E) (e_Selrunoff)	296
5.8.11	Transitional election (E) (e_Seltrans)	296
5.8.12	Freedom to change government (E) (e_SF1)	296
5.8.13	Freedom of association (E) (e_SF2)	296
5.8.14	Freedom of speech (E) (e_SF3)	296
5.8.15	International observers (E) (e_Siemaass)	297
5.8.16	Domestic observers (E) (e_Sobsdom)	297
5.8.17	Number of pages in the report (E) (e_SP1)	297
5.8.18	Number of paragraphs in the report (E) (e_SP2)	297
5.8.19	Structural environment (E) (e_SR0STR)	297
5.8.20	Overall pre-election political conditions (E) (e_SR11CHEAT)	298
5.8.21	Overall pre-election administrative capacity (E) (e_SR12CAP)	298
5.8.22	Pre-election violence and unrest (E) (e_SR13VIOL)	298
5.8.23	Indicator of whether SA1 and SA2 variables had to be reconciled by coders (E) (e_SREC)	298
5.9	Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy	299
5.9.1	Minimally competitive elections (E) (e_competition)	299
5.9.2	Selection of the executive (E) (e_exselec)	299
5.9.3	Selection of the legislature (E) (e_legselec)	299
5.9.4	Lexical index (E) (e_lexical_index)	299
5.9.5	Multi-party legislative elections (E) (e_multiparty_elections)	300
5.10	Haber and Menaldo	300
5.10.1	Elections NELDA id-number (E) (e_nelda_electionid)	300
5.10.2	Normalized polity score (E) (e_polity_s)	300
5.10.3	Binary regime score (E) (e_Regime)	300
5.10.4	Share of democracies in the region (E) (e_region_dem_diffuse)	300
5.10.5	Share of democracies in the world (E) (e_world_dem_diffuse)	301
5.11	Nelda	301

5.11.1	Prior elections suspended (E) (e_nelda_1_ex)	301
5.11.2	Prior elections suspended (E) (e_nelda_1_leg)	301
5.11.3	Prior elections suspended (E) (e_nelda_1_notes_ex)	301
5.11.4	Prior elections suspended (E) (e_nelda_1_notes_leg)	301
5.11.5	Harassment of the opposition (E) (e_nelda_15_ex)	301
5.11.6	Harassment of the opposition (E) (e_nelda_15_leg)	301
5.11.7	Harassment of the opposition (E) (e_nelda_15_notes_ex)	301
5.11.8	Harassment of the opposition (E) (e_nelda_15_notes_leg)	301
5.11.9	Media bias in elections (E) (e_nelda_16_ex)	301
5.11.10	Media bias in elections (E) (e_nelda_16_leg)	301
5.11.11	Media bias in elections (E) (e_nelda_16_notes_ex)	302
5.11.12	Media bias in elections (E) (e_nelda_16_notes_leg)	302
5.11.13	Opposition (E) (e_nelda_3_ex)	302
5.11.14	Opposition (E) (e_nelda_3_leg)	302
5.11.15	Opposition (E) (e_nelda_3_notes_ex)	302
5.11.16	Opposition (E) (e_nelda_3_notes_leg)	302
5.11.17	Elections canceled (E) (e_nelda_32_ex)	302
5.11.18	Elections canceled (E) (e_nelda_32_leg)	302
5.11.19	Elections canceled (E) (e_nelda_32_notes_ex)	302
5.11.20	Elections canceled (E) (e_nelda_32_notes_leg)	302
5.11.21	Violence during elections (E) (e_nelda_33_ex)	302
5.11.22	Violence during elections (E) (e_nelda_33_leg)	302
5.11.23	Violence during elections (E) (e_nelda_33_notes_ex)	302
5.11.24	Violence during elections (E) (e_nelda_33_notes_leg)	302
5.11.25	Western monitors present (E) (e_nelda_46_ex)	303
5.11.26	Western monitors present (E) (e_nelda_46_leg)	303
5.11.27	Western monitors present (E) (e_nelda_46_notes_ex)	303
5.11.28	Western monitors present (E) (e_nelda_46_notes_leg)	303
5.11.29	Elections NELDA id-number (E) (e_nelda_electionid_ex)	303
5.11.30	Elections NELDA id-number (E) (e_nelda_electionid_leg)	303
5.11.31	Type of election (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda_types)	303
5.11.32	Prior elections suspended (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda1)	303
5.11.33	Harassment of the opposition (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda15)	304
5.11.34	Media bias in elections (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda16)	304
5.11.35	Opposition (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda3)	304
5.11.36	Elections canceled (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda32)	304
5.11.37	Violence during elections (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda33)	305
5.11.38	Western monitors present (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda46)	305
5.12	Unified Democracy Score	305
5.12.1	Democracy score posterior (mean) (E) (e_uds_mean)	305
5.12.2	Unified democracy score posterior (median) (E) (e_uds_median)	305
5.12.3	Unified democracy score posterior (2.5 percentile) (E) (e_uds_pct025)	305
5.12.4	Unified democracy score posterior (97.5 percentile) (E) (e_uds_pct975)	305
5.13	Political Institutions and Political Events	305
5.13.1	Autocoups (E) (e_autocoups)	305
5.13.2	Number of houses in legislature (E) (e_bicam)	306
5.13.3	Compulsory voting (E) (e_compulsory)	306
5.13.4	Coups (E) (e_coups)	306

5.13.5	Lower house dissolution (E) (e_dissolution)	307
5.13.6	HOS dissolution power (E) (e_dissolution_power)	307
5.13.7	Lists in elections (E) (e_elecparty_leg)	307
5.13.8	Candidates in elections (E) (e_elecparty_pres)	307
5.13.9	Chief executive elected (E) (e_exselec_pipe)	308
5.13.10	Franchise age (E) (e_franchise_age)	308
5.13.11	Legislature composition (E) (e_leg_composition)	308
5.13.12	Legislature direct election (E) (e_legdirect)	308
5.13.13	Parties in legislature (E) (e_legparty)	309
5.13.14	Legislature elected (E) (e_legselec_pipe)	309
5.13.15	Legislature exist (E) (e_openl)	309
5.13.16	Opposition (E) (e_opposition)	309
5.13.17	Exclusions (E) (e_oth_exclusions)	310
5.13.18	President direct election (E) (e_presdirect)	310
5.13.19	Secrecy of the vote (E) (e_secret)	311
5.13.20	Upper house block (E) (e_upper_block)	311
5.13.21	Upper house (E) (e_upper_house)	311
5.14	Polity IV	312
5.14.1	Institutionalized autocracy (E) (e_autoc)	312
5.14.2	Institutionalized democracy (E) (e_democ)	312
5.14.3	Executive constraints (E) (e_exconst)	312
5.14.4	Executive recruitment (E) (e_exec)	313
5.14.5	Polity combined score (E) (e_p_polity)	313
5.14.6	The competitiveness of participation (E) (e_parcomp)	314
5.14.7	Regulation of participation (E) (e_parreg)	314
5.14.8	Political competition (E) (e_polcomp)	315
5.14.9	Polity revised combined score (E) (e_polity2)	316
5.14.10	Regime transition (E) (e_regtrans)	316
5.14.11	Competitiveness of executive recruitment (E) (e_xrcomp)	316
5.14.12	Openness of executive recruitment (E) (e_xropen)	317
5.14.13	Regulation of executive recruitment (E) (e_xrreg)	317
5.15	Others	317
5.15.1	Democratic breakdown (E) (e_bnr_dem)	317
5.15.2	Democracy (E) (e_chga_demo)	318
5.15.3	Lower chamber effective number of electoral parties (E) (e_ellonmpe)	318
5.15.4	Lower chamber effective number of legislative parties (E) (e_ellonmpl)	318
5.15.5	Political constraints index III (E) (e_h_polcon3)	318
5.15.6	Political constraints index V (E) (e_h_polcon5)	319
5.15.7	Media freedom (E) (e_mefree)	319
5.15.8	Party system nationalization Cox Inflation Score (E) (e_pssnacois)	319
5.15.9	Party system nationalization Standardized and weighted Score (E) (e_pssnas-trdwsc)	320
5.15.10	Corruption perception index (E) (e_ti_cpi)	320
5.15.11	Competition (E) (e_van_comp)	320
5.15.12	Index of democratization (E) (e_van_index)	321
5.15.13	Participation (E) (e_van_part)	321
5.15.14	Index of power resources (multiplicative) (E) (e_van_powres)	321
5.15.15	Non-autocracy (E) (e_wr_nonautocracy)	321

5.15.16	Regime type (E) (e_wr_regtype)	322
6	Background Factors (E)	323
6.1	Education	323
6.1.1	Education 15+ (E) (e_peaveduc)	323
6.1.2	Educational inequality, Gini (E) (e_peedgini)	323
6.1.3	Index of knowledge distribution (E) (e_Vanhanen_knowl_ipo)	324
6.1.4	Literate population (%) (E) (e_Vanhanen_literate_ipo)	324
6.1.5	University students per 100,000 (E) (e_Vanhanen_studentpercent_ipo)	324
6.1.6	Number of students (E) (e_Vanhanen_students_ipo)	324
6.2	Geography	324
6.2.1	Land area (E) (e_area)	324
6.2.2	World regions (E) (e_region_world_2)	325
6.2.3	Region (geographic) (E) (e_regiongeo)	325
6.2.4	Region (politico-geographic) (E) (e_regionpol)	326
6.3	Economics	326
6.3.1	Exports (E) (e_cow_exports)	326
6.3.2	Imports (E) (e_cow_imports)	326
6.3.3	Total imports (E) (e_cow_imports)	326
6.3.4	Real GDP per capita (E) (e_GDP_Per_Cap_Haber_Men_2)	327
6.3.5	Exchange rate to US dollar (E) (e_miexraus)	327
6.3.6	Food supply (E) (e_mifood)	327
6.3.7	GDP growth (E) (e_migdpgro)	327
6.3.8	GDP growth (rescaled) (E) (e_migdpgrlns)	327
6.3.9	GDP per capita (E) (e_migdppc)	327
6.3.10	GDP per capita, logged, base 10 (E) (e_migdppln)	328
6.3.11	Government bond yield (E) (e_migovbon)	328
6.3.12	Central government debt, gross (E) (e_migovdeb)	328
6.3.13	Inflation (E) (e_miinflat)	328
6.3.14	Family farms (E) (e_Vanhanen_familyfarm_ipo)	328
6.4	Socioeconomic Status	328
6.4.1	High inequality, capital share of GDP (E) (e_cap_share_extreme_unequal)	328
6.4.2	Inequality, capital as share of GDP (E) (e_cap_share_unequal)	329
6.4.3	Income inequality, Gini (E) (e_peginiwi)	329
6.4.4	Income inequality, Gini (E) (e_Unequal_UTIP)	329
6.4.5	Degree of decentralization of non-agricultural economic resources (E) (e_Vanhanen_decentr_ipo)	329
6.4.6	Index of distribution of economic power resources (E) (e_Vanhanen_epower_ipo)	330
6.4.7	The mean of index of power resources (E) (e_Vanhanen_mean_ipo)	330
6.4.8	Index of occupational diversification (E) (e_Vanhanen_occupation_ipo)	330
6.4.9	Index of power resources (E) (e_Vanhanen_power_ipo)	330
6.4.10	High income inequality, Gini (E) (e_Very_Unequal_UTIP)	331
6.5	Natural Resource Wealth	331
6.5.1	Government revenues from oil, gas, and minerals (E) (e_Fiscal_Reliance)	331
6.5.2	Coal production per capita (E) (e_Coal_Income_PC)	331
6.5.3	Oil production shock for poor countries (E) (e_gdp_low_firstoil_year)	331
6.5.4	Oil production shock for very poor countries (E) (e_gdp_verylow_firstoil_year)	331
6.5.5	Metal minerals production per capita (E) (e_metals_income_PC)	332

6.5.6	Natural gas production per capita (E) (e_natural_gas_income_PC)	332
6.5.7	Oil reserves (E) (e_reserves_billions)	332
6.5.8	Interpolated oil reserves per square kilometer (E) (e_reserves_interp_area)	332
6.5.9	Oil reserves per square kilometer (E) (e_reserves_over_area)	332
6.5.10	Petroleum, coal, and natural gas production per capita (E) (e_Total_Fuel_Income_PC)	333
6.5.11	Petroleum production per capita (E) (e_Total_Oil_Income_PC)	333
6.5.12	Petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production per capita (E) (e_Total_Resources_Income_PC)	333
6.5.13	Protected areas: Percentage of total land area (E) (e_wri_pa)	333
6.6	Infrastructure	333
6.6.1	Air cargo, ton/km (E) (e_miaircar)	333
6.6.2	Air travel, passenger km (E) (e_miairpas)	334
6.6.3	Motor vehicles (E) (e_mimotveh)	334
6.6.4	Postal items (E) (e_mipostit)	334
6.6.5	Railroad freight (E) (e_mirafрто)	334
6.6.6	Railroads freight traffic (E) (e_mirailfr)	334
6.6.7	Railroad passenger km (E) (e_mirailkm)	335
6.6.8	Railroads length (E) (e_miraille)	335
6.6.9	Railroad passengers (E) (e_mirailpa)	335
6.6.10	Ships (E) (e_mishiall)	335
6.6.11	Steamships, tonnage (E) (e_mishimto)	335
6.6.12	Steamships (E) (e_mishiste)	335
6.6.13	Ships, tonnage (E) (e_mishiton)	336
6.6.14	Telegrams sent (E) (e_mitelsen)	336
6.6.15	Radios (E) (e_radio_n)	336
6.6.16	Televisions (E) (e_television_n)	336
6.7	Demography	336
6.7.1	Fertility rate (E) (e_miferrat)	336
6.7.2	Population total (E) (e_mipopula)	336
6.7.3	Urbanization (E) (e_miurbani)	337
6.7.4	Urban population (E) (e_miurbpop)	337
6.7.5	Life expectancy, female (E) (e_pefeliex)	337
6.7.6	Height (E) (e_peheight)	337
6.7.7	Infant mortality rate (E) (e_peinfmor)	337
6.7.8	Life expectancy (E) (e_pelifeex)	338
6.7.9	Life expectancy, male (E) (e_pemaliex)	338
6.7.10	Maternal mortality rate (E) (e_pematmor)	338
6.7.11	Population size (E) (e_population)	338
6.7.12	Non-agricultural population % (E) (e_Vanhanen_nonag_ipo)	339
6.7.13	Urban population % (E) (e_Vanhanen_urban_ipo)	339
6.8	Conflict	339
6.8.1	Civil war (E) (e_Civil_War)	339
6.8.2	Country code (E) (e_cowcode)	339
6.8.3	Armed conflict, international (E) (e_miinteco)	339
6.8.4	Armed conflict, internal (E) (e_miinterc)	339

8	Appendix B: Post-Survey Questionnaire	360
8.0.1	Post-survey questionnaire introduction (A,B,C) (v2zzint1)	360
8.0.2	Today's date (A,B,C) (v2zzdate)	360
8.0.3	Gender (A,B,C) (v2zzgender)	360
8.0.4	Education (A,B,C) (v2zzedlev)	360
8.0.5	Current educational status (A,B,C) (v2zzcurred)	360
8.0.6	Country of education (A,B,C) (v2zzedcnt)	361
8.0.7	Year of birth (A,B,C) (v2zzborn)	361
8.0.8	Country of birth (A,B,C) (v2zzbornin)	361
8.0.9	Country of residence (A,B,C) (v2zzreside)	361
8.0.10	Years in country (B,C) (v2zztimein)	361
8.0.11	Years away from country (B,C) (v2zzyrout)	361
8.0.12	Country of employer or university (B,C) (v2zzempcnt)	362
8.0.13	Employer (A,B,C) (v2zzemploy)	362
8.0.14	Role in project (A,B,C) (v2zzrole)	362
8.0.15	Democracy Scores (B,C) (v2zzdemsc)	362
8.0.16	Free markets (A,B,C) (v2zzfremrk)	363
8.0.17	Principles of democracy introduction (A,B,C) (v2zzint2)	364
8.0.18	Electoral democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzelcdem)	364
8.0.19	Liberal democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzlibdem)	364
8.0.20	Majoritarian democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzmajdem)	365
8.0.21	Consensus democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzcondem)	365
8.0.22	Participatory democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzprt-dem)	365
8.0.23	Deliberative democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzdeldem)	366
8.0.24	Egalitarian democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzegldem)	366
8.0.25	Time spent for coding (B,C) (v2zztimespent)	366
8.0.26	Coding experience (B,C) (v2zzsatisf)	367
8.0.27	Reason of satisfaction (B,C) (v2zzreasatisf)	367
8.0.28	Post-survey questionnaire comments (A,B,C) (v2zzcoment)	367
8.0.29	Another reason for coding (B,C) (v2zzanfirstreas)	367
8.0.30	Another second reason for coding (B,C) (v2zzansecreas)	367
8.0.31	Reason for coding (B,C) (v2zzfirstreas)	367
8.0.32	Materials used (B,C) (v2zzmaterials)	368
8.0.33	Second reason for coding (B,C) (v2zzsecreas)	368
9	Appendix C: Background Notes	370
9.1	Civil Liberty	370
9.2	Civil Society Organizations	370
9.3	Deliberation	370
9.4	Direct Democracy	371
9.5	Elections	371
9.6	Executive	371
9.7	Judiciary	371
9.8	Legislature	372
9.9	Media	372
9.10	Political Parties	372
9.11	Political Equality	372
9.12	Sovereignty	372

9.13 Subnational Democracy	372
9.14 Voting and Representation	373
10 Appendix D: Structure of Aggregation	375
10.1 V-Dem Democracy Indices and Indicators	375
10.2 Indices Created Using V-Dem Data	379
11 Appendix E: Changes Between Previous Versions of the Dataset	385
11.1 New in Version 7.1 Compared to Version 7	385
11.2 New in Version 7 Compared to Version 6	385
11.3 New in Version 6 Compared to Version 5	387

1 Explanatory Notes

1.1 What's New in Version 8 compared to Version 7.1

- *Historical V-Dem*

For this version of the dataset we are for the first time including Historical V-Dem. The integration of Historical V-Dem with V-Dem means that many countries have data coverage on numerous V-Dem indicators from 1789 to the present. Historical V-Dem also contains several extra, historical polities that have ceased to exist, such as Bavaria and the Two Sicilies. To find more details about which countries are coded for historical V-Dem please refer to the country table (p. 15) or the *Country Coding Units* document.

Further, Historical V-Dem introduces several new indicators on various institutional features, some of which were particularly relevant for 19th century polities. To find more details on the Historical V-Dem variables please refer to the Historical V-Dem section of the codebook (p. 33).

To read more about Historical V-Dem visit v-dem.net

- New indices and indicators

- Neopatrimonialism index (e_v2x_neopat)
- Clientelism index (e_v2xnp_client)
- Presidentialism index (e_v2xnp_pres)
- Regime Corruption (e_v2xnp_regcorr)
- Rule of law index (v2x_rule)
- State fiscal capacity (v2stfisccap)
- Bureaucratic remuneration (v2strenadm)
- Bureaucratic recruitment criteria (v2stcritrecadm)
- Time-specific country name (histname), identifier variable
- Judicial variables:
 - * Codeable (v2jucodable)
 - * Corresponding flowchart (v2juflow)
 - * Language (v2julanguage)
 - * Team translated (v2juteamtr)

- Modified indices and indicators

- The aggregation formula for v2x_delibdem was changed to match the rest of the High-Level Democracy Indices. Previously, v2x_delib was erroneously being aggregated by a straight multiplication of v2x_polyarchy and v2x_delib.
- The "Regimes in the World - the RIW measure" (e_v2x_regime) has been renamed to the "Regimes of the World index" (v2x_regime) and modified.
- "Expanded freedom of expression index" (v2x_freexp_thick) has been renamed to "Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index" (v2x_freexp_altinf).
- The post-survey questionnaire has been updated.
- "Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval" (v2exapupap) has been corrected.
- Updated aggregation rules for A, C variables, and indices. See Section 1.5 Aggregation.
- The "Elected officials index" (v2xelecoff) has been modified.
- The "Legislature directly elected index" (v2ex_elecleg) has been modified.
- The following quota variables has been corrected and reintroduced, however we advice you to not use any earlier version of these variables:
 - * Lower chamber gender quota (v2lgqugen)

- * Lower chamber gender quota threshold (v2lgqgent)
- * Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (v2lgqgens)
- Other new or modified information
 - Updated list of countries.
 - Updated list of variables.
 - Updated citations for V-Dem’s reference materials.
 - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.

To find more details about changes to previous versions of the dataset, please visit Appendix E or the specific version of the codebook. All codebook versions are available at v-dem.net under "Reference."

1.2 Cautionary Notes

- V-Dem is firmly committed to full transparency and release of the data we have. Yet, please note this: The *V-Dem Methodology* assumes five or more coders for the "contemporary" period starting from 1900, originally coded to 2012. With the updates covering 2013–2017, it has for a few country-variable combinations, been impossible to achieve that target. We have found that this at times result in significant changes in point estimates as a consequence of self-selected attrition of Country Experts, rather than actual changes in the country. We therefore strongly advise against using point estimates for country-variable-years with three or fewer (≤ 3) ratings for the period 2013-2017. We suggest to filter these out before conducting any type of analysis. For this purpose, a special count-variable for each Country-Expert coded variable, which is suffixed with "_nr", is included in the dataset from v7 and onwards.
- While the country-date estimates for Disclosure of campaign donations (v2eldonate), Election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), and Party branches (v2psrbrch) reached a stationary distribution according to our standard diagnostic procedures, population-level thresholds (γ_{μ}) did not. As a result, all estimates from these variables should be treated with caution. In particular, `_osp` and `_ord` values are potentially misleading, as they incorporate population thresholds in their estimation procedure.
- While the country-date estimates converged in the factor models for the following Mid-Level indices: Freedom of Association (thick) index (v2x_frassoc_thick), Political Civil Liberties index (v2x_clpol), and Core civil society index (v2xcs_ccsi), some of the parameters, although near convergence, did not converge according to the standard V-Dem criteria.
- While estimates of the latent variable Vertical Accountability (v2x_veracc) converged according to standard V-Dem criteria, some parameters involved in the estimation process for this variable did not. As a result, this variable should be used with caution. All other Accountability indices — the overall Accountability index (v2x_accountability), Diagonal Accountability index (v2x_diagacc), Vertical Accountability index (v2x_vertacc), and Horizontal Accountability index (v2x_horacc) — met V-Dem criteria for convergence.
- We further ask you to use the following percentage % variables with caution:
 - Female journalists (v2mefemjrn)
 - Weaker civil liberties population (v2clsnlpct)
- We have also excluded certain percentage % variables, since data for these variables have not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. We hope to be able to do so for the version 9 of the dataset. This concerns the following variables:
 - Resident noncitizens who cannot vote (v2elnoncit)
 - Election male suffrage in practice (v2elmalsuf)
 - Election female suffrage in practice (v2elfemsuf)
 - Subnational election area less free and fair population (v2elsnlpop)

- Subnational election area more free and fair population (v2elsnmpop)
 - Party switching (v2psswitch)
 - Stronger civil liberties population (v2clsnpct)
 - State authority over territory (v2svsterr)
 - State authority over population (v2svstpop)
 - Media access (v2meaccess)
- We have not included the following quota variable for version 8. We have discovered mistakes in the time series and hope to be able to correct them for version 9 of the dataset.
 - Lower chamber quota for social groups (v2lgqumin)
 - Given the sparsity of affirmative responses to some binary variables, specifically some of those which took the form of multiple selection questions, we now estimate their values using the mean across country experts, as opposed to using the standard measurement model. These variables are:
 - HOS control over (v2exctlhs)
 - HOG removal by other in practice (v2exrmhgnp)
 - HOS removal by other in practice (v2exrmhsol)
 - *Historical V-Dem*: In the coding of several Historical V-Dem A type variables, the historical part of the time series — including 20 years of overlap with the "contemporary" time series (typically 1900–1920) — were conducted completely independently from the existing coding in the original V-Dem dataset, by one or more new coders. For many of these historical variables, we have gone through and checked the consistency of the coding, further scrutinized the sources, and determined which coding represents the most appropriate score after deliberation. We have subsequently made the appropriate adjustments to the data.

For other historical A variables we have yet to finalize this process, and this will be done before the release of version 9 of the V-Dem dataset. For these variables, the scores reported for the overlap period (typically 1900–1920) in version 8 of the dataset are the "contemporary" V-Dem scores, by default. This means that for some countries, where there is disagreement in the historical and contemporary coding in the starting year for the contemporary time series (typically 1900), there may be artificial changes between that year and the year before that do not necessarily reflect a real-world change in the political system in the country. Hence, we advise users to exert caution before running analysis on the entire time series extending across both the historical and contemporary coding periods.

Please also note that for the variables where there is not full correspondence between the historical (1789–1920) and contemporary (1900–2017) coding, the historical coding of the variables will also be provided in their original form as separate variables, carrying a "v3" rather than a "v2" prefix on the variable tag. These "v3" variables are gathered together with a number of new (A and C type) variables that are currently only coded for the Historical V-Dem sample, in a separate section of the codebook.

1.3 Variable Types

The V-Dem Codebook divides variables into six different variable types:

- **Type A*: Variables coded by Research Assistants**
This data is based on extant sources and is factual in nature. Country Experts indicate their confidence for this pre-coded data.
- **Type A: Variables coded by Project Managers and Research Assistants**
This data is based on extant sources and is factual in nature.
- **Type B: Variables coded by Country Coordinators or Research Assistants**
This person is typically a graduate student or recent graduate who is from the country in question. These variables are also factual in nature.

- **Type C: Variables coded by Country Experts**

A Country Expert is typically a scholar or professional with deep knowledge of a country and of a particular political institution. Generally, that person is a citizen or resident of the country being coded. Multiple experts (usually 5 or more) code each variable. For more information about Country Experts, please see Methodology document.

- **Type A + C: Variables coded by Country Experts and crosschecked by Research Assistants**

- **Type D: Indices**

Variables composed of type A, B, or C variables. This data may be accomplished by adding a denominator (*e.g.*, per capita), by creating a cumulative scale (Total number of...), or by aggregating larger concepts (*e.g.*, components or indices of democracy).

- **Type E: Non-V-Dem variables**

If we import a variable from another source without doing any original coding, except for perhaps imputing missing data, it is not considered a V-Dem product. These variables are found in the section of the Codebook labeled "Background Factors" or "Other Democracy Indices and Indicators." If, however, we gather data from a number of sources and combine them in a more than purely mechanical fashion (requiring some judgment on our part), we regard this as a V-Dem product and classify it as type A, B, or C. All "E" variables are included in the codebook except those drawn from sources that have more than 30 variables such as Archigos (Goemans et al.), BDM (Bueno de Mesquita et al.), Henisz/POLCON (2000, 2002), Miller (Democratic Pieces), Performance of Nations (Kugler and Tammen), PEI (Norris et al.), PIPE (Przeworski et al.), QoG (Quality of Government). For these variables, we ask users to consult separate codebooks, as listed above.

1.4 Variable Versions and Suffixes

The V-Dem Dataset contains three versions of the variables coded by country experts (type C variables):

- **Relative Scale**

"Relative Scale" — Measurement Model Output:

This version has no special suffix (*e.g.* v2elmulpar). This version of the variables provides country-year (country-date in the alternative dataset) point estimates from the V-Dem measurement model (see Pemstein et al. 2017). The measurement model aggregates the ratings provided by multiple country experts and, taking disagreement and measurement error into account, produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval scale (see the *V-Dem Methodology* document). The point estimates are the median values of these distributions for each country-year. The scale of a measurement model variable is similar to a normal ("Z") score (*e.g.* typically between -5 and 5, with 0 approximately representing the mean for all country-years in the sample) though it does not necessarily follow a normal distribution. For most purposes, these are the preferred versions of the variables for time series regression and other estimation strategies.

"Relative Scale Measure of Uncertainty" — Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density (HPD) Intervals:

This version has the suffixes: "codelow" and "codehigh" (*e.g.* v2elmulpar_codelow and v2elmulpar_codehigh). These two kinds of variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 68 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.*, v2elmulpar_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.

- **Original Scale (*osp)**

"Original Scale" — Linearized Original Scale Posterior Prediction:

This version has the suffix "_osp," (*e.g.* v2elmulpar_osp). In this version of the variables, we

have linearly translated the measurement model point estimates back to the original ordinal scale of each variable (*e.g.* 0-4 for `v2elmulpar_osp`) as an interval measure. The decimals in the `_osp` version indicate the distance between the point estimate from the linearized measurement model posterior prediction and the threshold for reaching the next level on the original ordinal scale. Thus, a `_osp` value of 1.25 indicates that the median measurement model posterior predicted value was closer to the ordinal value of 1 than 2 on the original scale. Since there is no conventional theoretical justification for linearly mapping ordinal posterior predictions onto an interval scale, these scores should primarily be used for heuristic purposes. However, since the `_osp` version maps onto the coding criteria found in the V-Dem Codebook, and is strongly correlated with the Measurement Model output (typically at .98 or higher), some users may find the `_osp` version useful in estimating quantities such as marginal effects with a clear substantive interpretation. Using the "Ordinal Scale" estimates—or incorporating the properties of ordinal probit models into the estimation procedure—is generally preferable to using the `_osp` estimates in statistical analyses. That said, if a user uses `_osp` data in statistical analyses it is imperative that she first confirm that the results are compatible with estimations using Measurement Model output.

"Original Scale Measure of Uncertainty" — Linearized Original Scale HPD Intervals:

This version has the suffixes - "codelow" and "codehigh" (*e.g.* `v2elmulpar_osp_codelow` and `v2elmulpar_osp_codehigh`). We estimate these quantities in a similar manner as the Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density Intervals. These two variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 70 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.*, `v2elmulpar_sd`). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.

- **Ordinal Scale (*ord)**

"Ordinal Scale" — Measurement Model Estimates of Original Scale Value:

This version has the suffix "`_ord`" (*e.g.* `v2elmulpar_ord`). This method translates the measurement model estimates back to the original ordinal scale of a variable (as represented in the Codebook) after taking coder disagreement and measurement error into account. More precisely, it represents the most likely ordinal value on the original codebook scale into which a country-year would fall, given the average coder's usage of that scale. More specifically, we assign each country-year a value that corresponds to its integerized median ordinal highest posterior probability category over Measurement Model output.

"Ordinal Scale Measure of Uncertainty" — Original Scale Value HPD Intervals:

This version has the suffixes - "codelow" and "codehigh" (*e.g.* `v2elmulpar_ord_codelow` and `v2elmulpar_ord_codehigh`). We estimate these values in a similar manner as the Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density Intervals. These two variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 70 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.* `v2elmulpar_sd`). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.

1.5 Aggregation

C-variables, ratio/percentage variables, and High-Level/Mid-Level Democracy indices are aggregated from the country-date level to the country-year level by the day-weighted mean. Ordinal A-variables and A*-variables are aggregated by taking the last observation in the year with one exception: event-specific dichotomies or event-specific ordinal variables, which mostly concerns elections or election related data, are aggregated by max (meaning the highest observed value for a given year is retained) to reflect that an "event" of the coded type occurred within the year.

1.6 Variable Entries

1.7 Variable Tags

Every variable has a name and a tag, the tag consists of three or four parts and has the following structure:

Prefix + Index (if V-Dem index) + Section + Abbreviated title. While the prefix lets you know what type of variable is, the two letters following indicates which section a variable belongs to.

Prefixes

- v2: V-Dem variables (A, B, C)
- v3: Historical V-Dem only variables (A, B, C)
- v2x_: Main indices and component-indices
- v2x[two-letter designation]_: Indices specific for certain areas (*e.g.* v2xel_ would be an index in the election-specific area, see below). Sometimes used in aggregations of higher-level indices (*i.e.* v2x_ type indicesD)
- e_: Non-V-Dem variables (E) and ordinal versions of V-Dem indices.

Sections

- cl: Civil liberty
- dd: Direct democracy
- de: Demography
- dl: Deliberation
- mi: Miscellaneous (all background variables)
- el: Elections
- ex: Executive
- ju: Judiciary
- lg: Legislature
- me: Media
- pe: Political equality
- ps: Political parties
- sv/st: Sovereignty/State
- x: Index (comprised of several variables that are also contained in the database)
- zz: Post survey questionnaire

1.8 Variable Information

The following information is available per variable (if applicable):

Project Manager : The team member(s) primarily responsible for designing the indicator/index, and in some cases responsible for the data collection.

Question: The question that the variable attempts to measure.

Clarification: Definition of key terms, clarification of scope-conditions, contexts, and any other

features needed to understand the question (if any). All key terms appear in the Glossary (Appendix A), unless they are specific to a single section (in which case they need only appear in the Introduction to that section or in the clarifications for particular questions). Key terms are sometimes cross-referenced with hypertext.

Responses: Numeric, Percentage, Text, Date, Countries, or specific response categories (listed below under "Answer-types" and "Scales").

Answer-Types:

Multiple-choice: Where a coder can select only one answer. This is the usual protocol and is therefore not noted.

Multiple-selection: Where a coder can select more than one answer. For most of these variables, the dataset contains both the original variable, and a set of dummies for each of the responses.

Ordering (applicable only to a selection of C variables): These relate to the ordering of questions when the coding of one indicator depends upon the coding of other indicators (*i.e.*, whenever there is some alteration of the serial ordering of questions as listed in this document).

Aggregation (applicable only to indices): Explanation of how an index is constructed.

Scale: Dichotomous, Nominal, Ordinal, or Interval/Ratio (Extra response options such as N/A, Don't know, or Other, are not counted as part of this classification.)

Cross-Coder Aggregation (applicable only to C variables): IRT, Bayesian ordinal item response theory measurement model (see the *V-Dem Methodology* document). Available in mode and mean.

Data releases: indicates dataset version (1-8). Versions respond to changes to the dataset for V-Dem variables (A, B, C, D), including new variables, new indices, corrections to existing variables, and new iterations of the measurement model. Changes are synchronized with Codebook and Methodology documents so that they all share the same version number. The second number (after the decimal point), refers to sub-versions of the data.

Releases to date:

Version 1-4 were only internal releases, thus not publically available.

v1: March 31, 2014

v2: September 11, 2014

v3: December 17, 2014

v4: March 31, 2015

Version 5-8 are public ally available free of charge.

v5: January 4, 2016 (first public release of data for download)

v6: March 31, 2016

v6.2: June, 2016

v7: May 2017

v7.1: July 2017

v8: April 2018

Sources: Citations for type-A* and A variables are listed, wherever possible, with complete references in the "References" section. Note that sometimes this coding rests on numerous country-specific sources, in which case it is not possible to include all citations. Composite indices (type-D) build on other variables in the V-Dem database, and are therefore listed as the source for that index.

Coverage: specifies which year coverage.

Citation: Citation when using the specific variable.

Note: Additional information about the variable.

For more details, please consult the reference materials for version 8 at <https://www.v-dem.net/en/reference/version-8-apr-2018/>

1.9 Number of Variables

Variable Type	A*	A	B	C	D	E	A(B)	A(C)	PSQ	Total
<i>V-Dem Democracy Indices and Indicators</i>										
Democracy indices					5					5
Mid-level democracy indices					21					21
Indices created using V-Dem data					53					53
Elections	1	47	7	62	4		6			127
Political parties				14						14
Direct democracy		42								42
The executive	5	15	2	26	4					52
The legislature	3	14	4	14	3		1			39
Deliberation				8						8
The judiciary		5		15						20
Sovereignty		1		7						8
Civil Society				10						10
The media				11						11
Political equality		3		6						9
Civil liberty				25						25
Historical V-Dem	5	46		24						75
Post survey questionnaire									32	32
<i>Total</i>	14	173	13	222	64		1	3	32	551
<i>Other Democracy Indices and Indicators</i>										
Ordinal version of the V-Dem indices						43				43
Database of Political Institutions						10				10
Bilinski						8				8
Comparative Constitutional Project						63				63
Political Regimes						6				6
Freedom House						7				7
World Bank Governance Indicators						12				12
Election Quality and International Observation						23				23
Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy						5				5
Haber and Menaldo						5				5
Nelda						38				38
Unified Democracy Score						4				4
Political Institutions and Events						21				21
Polity IV						13				13
Others						16				16
<i>Total</i>						274				274
<i>Background Factors</i>										
Education						6				6
Geography						4				4
Economics						14				14
Socioeconomic status						10				10
Natural resource wealth						13				13
Infrastructure						16				16
Demography						13				13
Conflict						4				4
<i>Total</i>						80				80
<i>Total</i>	14	173	13	222	64	354	1	6	32	905

1.10 Suggested Citation

Nota bene: If a variable(s) drawn from the V-Dem dataset plays an important role in your project (published or unpublished), please use all the suggested citations below:

- **V-Dem Dataset:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraž Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Joshua Krusell and Farhad Miri. 2018. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 21, 3d edition

- **V-Dem Codebook:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Methodology:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Natalia Stepanova, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraž Medzihorsky, and Steven Wilson. 2018. "V-Dem Methodology v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Country Coding Units:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Vlad Ciobanu, and Moa Olin. 2018. "V-Dem Country Coding Units v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Organization and Management:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Joshua Krusell, Moa Olin, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, and Natalia Stepanova. 2018. "V-Dem Organization and Management v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

1.11 Countries

The following country units are included in the V-Dem Dataset and their year coverage. Some countries are coded prior to independence, and some have gaps in their coding periods, for a more detailed description of the country units and their year coverage see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

Name	ID	Coverage	Name	ID	Coverage
Afghanistan	36	1789–2017	Ecuador	75	1830–2017
Albania	12	1912–2017	Egypt	13	1789–2017
Algeria	103	1900–2017	El Salvador	22	1838–2017
Angola	104	1900–2017	Equatorial Guinea	160	1900–2017
Argentina	37	1789–2017	Eritrea	115	1900–2017
Armenia	105	1990–2017	Estonia	161	1918–2017
Australia	67	1789–2017	Ethiopia	38	1789–2017
Austria	144	1789–2017	Fiji	162	1900–2017
Azerbaijan	106	1990–2017	Finland	163	1809–2017
Baden	349	1789–1871	France	76	1789–2017
Bahrain	146	1900–2017	Gabon	116	1910–2017
Bangladesh	24	1971–2017	Georgia	118	1990–2017
Barbados	147	1900–2017	German Democratic Rep.	137	1949–1990
Bavaria	350	1789–1871	Germany	77	1789–2017
Belarus	107	1990–2017	Ghana	7	1902–2017
Belgium	148	1789–2017	Greece	164	1822–2017
Benin	52	1900–2017	Guatemala	78	1789–2017
Bhutan	53	1900–2017	Guinea	63	1900–2017
Bolivia	25	1825–2017	Guinea-Bissau	119	1900–2017
Bosnia and Herzegovina	150	1992–2017	Guyana	166	1900–2017
Botswana	68	1900–2017	Haiti	26	1789–2017
Brazil	19	1789–2017	Hamburg	362	1789–1867
Brunswick	363	1789–1867	Hanover	357	1789–1866
Bulgaria	152	1878–2017	Hesse-Darmstadt	359	1789–1866
Burkina Faso	54	1919–2017	Hesse-Kassel	358	1789–1866
Burma/Myanmar	10	1789–2017	Honduras	27	1838–2017
Burundi	69	1916–2017	Hong Kong	167	1900–2017
Cambodia	55	1900–2017	Hungary	210	1789–2017
Cameroon	108	1961–2017	Iceland	168	1900–2017
Canada	66	1841–2017	India	39	1789–2017
Cape Verde	70	1900–2017	Indonesia	56	1800–2017
Central African Republic	71	1920–2017	Iran	79	1789–2017
Chad	109	1920–2017	Iraq	80	1920–2017
Chile	72	1789–2017	Ireland	81	1919–2017
China	110	1789–2017	Israel	169	1948–2017
Colombia	15	1789–2017	Italy	82	1861–2017
Comoros	153	1900–2017	Ivory Coast	64	1900–2017
Congo, Democratic Rep. of	111	1900–2017	Jamaica	120	1900–2017
Congo, Republic of the	112	1903–2017	Japan	9	1789–2017
Costa Rica	73	1838–2017	Jordan	83	1922–2017
Croatia	154	1941–2017	Kazakhstan	121	1990–2017
Cuba	155	1789–2017	Kenya	40	1900–2017
Cyprus	156	1900–2017	Korea, North	41	1945–2017
Czech Republic	157	1918–2017	Korea, South	42	1789–2017
Denmark	158	1789–2017	Kosovo	43	1999–2017
Djibouti	113	1900–2017	Kuwait	171	1789–2017
Dominican Republic	114	1789–2017	Kyrgyzstan	122	1990–2017

Name	ID	Coverage	Name	ID	Coverage
Laos	123	1900–2017	Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach	365	1809–1867
Latvia	84	1920–2017	Saxony	353	1789–1867
Lebanon	44	1918–2017	Senegal	31	1904–2017
Lesotho	85	1900–2017	Serbia	198	1804–2017
Liberia	86	1821–2017	Seychelles	199	1903–2017
Libya	124	1789–2017	Sierra Leone	95	1900–2017
Lithuania	173	1918–2017	Singapore	200	1867–2017
Luxembourg	174	1815–2017	Slovakia	201	1939–2017
Macedonia	176	1991–2017	Slovenia	202	1989–2017
Madagascar	125	1817–2017	Solomon Islands	203	1900–2017
Malawi	87	1900–2017	Somalia	130	1900–2017
Malaysia	177	1900–2017	Somaliland	139	1900–2017
Maldives	88	1900–2017	South Africa	8	1900–2017
Mali	28	1900–2017	South Sudan	32	2011–2017
Mauritania	65	1904–2017	South Yemen	23	1900–1990
Mauritius	180	1900–2017	Spain	96	1789–2017
Mecklenburg-Schwerin	360	1789–1867	Sri Lanka	131	1900–2017
Mexico	3	1789–2017	Sudan	33	1900–2017
Modena	351	1789–1859	Suriname	4	1900–2017
Moldova	126	1990–2017	Swaziland	132	1900–2017
Mongolia	89	1911–2017	Sweden	5	1789–2017
Montenegro	183	1789–2017	Switzerland	6	1789–2017
Morocco	90	1789–2017	Syria	97	1918–2017
Mozambique	57	1900–2017	Taiwan	48	1900–2017
Namibia	127	1900–2017	Tajikistan	133	1990–2017
Nassau	366	1806–1866	Tanzania	47	1914–2017
Nepal	58	1789–2017	Thailand	49	1789–2017
Netherlands	91	1789–2017	The Gambia	117	1900–2017
New Zealand	185	1841–2017	Timor Leste	74	1900–2017
Nicaragua	59	1838–2017	Togo	134	1916–2017
Niger	60	1922–2017	Trinidad and Tobago	135	1900–2017
Nigeria	45	1914–2017	Tunisia	98	1789–2017
Norway	186	1789–2017	Turkey	99	1789–2017
Oldenburg	365	1789–1867	Turkmenistan	136	1990–2017
Oman	187	1789–2017	Tuscany	354	1789–1861
Pakistan	29	1947–2017	Two Sicilies	356	1789–1860
Palestine/British Mandate	209	1918–1948	Uganda	50	1900–2017
Palestine/Gaza	138	1948–2017	Ukraine	100	1990–2017
Palestine/West Bank	128	1948–2017	United Arab Emirates	207	1971–2017
Panama	92	1903–2017	United Kingdom	101	1789–2017
Papal States	361	1789–1870	United States of America	20	1789–2017
Papua New Guinea	93	1900–2017	Uruguay	102	1825–2017
Paraguay	189	1811–2017	Uzbekistan	140	1789–2017
Parma	352	1789–1859	Vanuatu	206	1906–2017
Peru	30	1789–2017	Venezuela	51	1789–2017
Philippines	46	1900–2017	Vietnam, Democratic Rep. of	34	1945–2017
Piedmont-Sardinia	373	1789–1861	Vietnam, Republic of	35	1802–1975
Poland	17	1789–2017	Württemberg	355	1789–1871
Portugal	21	1789–2017	Yemen	14	1789–2017
Qatar	94	1900–2017	Zambia	61	1911–2017
Romania	190	1789–2017	Zanzibar	236	1856–2017
Russia	11	1789–2017	Zimbabwe	62	1900–2017
Rwanda	129	1916–2017	.	.	.
Sao Tomé and Príncipe	196	1900–2017	.	.	.
Saudi Arabia	197	1789–2017	Total number of countries	201	

1.12 Identifier Variables in the V-Dem Datasets

1.12.1 Country Name (`country_name`)

Name of coded country. A V-Dem country is a political unit enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For more details on country units consult the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document. Response: Text.

1.12.2 Time-Specific Country Name (`histname`)

Time-specific name of coded country. Many countries go by different names in different time-periods, for example due to name changes, changes in territory, colonization, occupation, or independence. This variable contains a brief description of the identity of each polity that comprises a country's history. This variable is based on the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document. Response: Text.

1.12.3 V-Dem Country ID (`country_id`)

Unique country ID designated for each country. A list of countries and their corresponding IDs used in the V-Dem dataset can be found in the country table in the codebook, as well as in the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document. Response: Numeric.

1.12.4 Country Name Abbreviation (`country_text_id`)

Abbreviated country names. Response: Text.

1.12.5 Year (`year`)

V-Dem year coded annually from 1789-2017. This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Year as well as Country Date datasets. Response: Date.

1.12.6 Historical Date (`historical_date`)

This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Date dataset. The default date is 31st December, as in 2017-12-31, referring to the time span from 01-01 to 12-31 in a respective year. Additionally, specific changes, such as the appointment of a Head of State, are coded on the specific date within a certain year. Thus, a code can change within a year, and will be reflected in the 12-31 date. Response: Date.

1.12.7 Start of Coding Period (`codingstart`)

V-Dem country coding starts in 1789, or from when a country first enjoyed at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For detailed information, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document. Response: Date.

1.12.8 Contemporary Start of Coding Period (`codingstart_contemp`)

This variable indicates the coding start for the countries coded by Contemporary V-Dem. Response: Date.

1.12.9 Historical Start of Coding Period (`codingstart_hist`)

This variable indicates the coding start for the countries coded by Historical V-Dem. Response: Date.

1.12.10 Gap in Coding Period Starts (gapstart)

Time periods when a country does not fulfill V-Dem's coding period criteria are not coded. The date that indicates the gap start is the last date coded before the gap. For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document. Response: Date.

1.12.11 Gap in Coding Period Ends (gapend)

The periods of when a country does not fulfill V-Dem's coding period criteria are not coded. The date that indicates the gap end is the first date coded after the gap. For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document. Response: Date.

1.12.12 End of Coding Period (codingend)

V-Dem country coding ends in 2017, or from when a country formally stopped enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For detailed information, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document. Response: Date.

1.12.13 Historical End of Coding Period (codingend_contemp)

This variable indicates when the coding ends for countries coded by the Contemporary V-Dem project. Response: Date.

1.12.14 Historical End of Coding Period (codingend_hist)

This variable indicates when the coding ends for countries coded by the Historical V-Dem Project. Response: Date.

1.12.15 V-Dem Project (project)

This variable indicates which V-Dem project coded that country-year: Contemporary V-Dem (0), Historical V-Dem (1), or both (2).

1.12.16 Historical V-Dem coding (historical)

This variable indicates if the Historical V-Dem project coded a country at any time: No (0), Yes (1).

1.12.17 COW Code (COWcode)

COW country codes according to the Correlates of War Project (2016). Response: Numeric.

1.12.18 Number of Coders per Country, Variable and Year/Date (v2*_nr)

The number of V-Dem Country Experts (regular coders, bridge- and lateral coders) who provided data on country, variable and year. V-Dem's methodology is based on the assumption that we have a minimum of five Country Experts for every single country-variable-year. Sometimes, however, we end up with fewer than five Country Experts. From v7 of the Country-Year, and the Country-Date type datasets, we provide all data we have for full transparency. By providing the number of Country Experts for each country-variable-year/date, we suggest that users primarily base analyses on observations based on five or more coders. We strongly advise against using observations based on three or fewer coders. This concerns all C type variables. Response: Numeric.

2 V-Dem Democracy Indices

2.1 V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices (D)

This section groups together macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest (most abstract) level. Appendix D provides an overview of all the indices, the component-indices, and the lower levels indices. This is a great place to start getting a good sense of the structure of the aggregations.

2.1.1 Electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_freexp_altinf v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff

Data release: 6-8. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one exception of the non-electoral component. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2x_polyarchy &= .5 * MPI + .5 * API \\
 &= .5 * (v2x_elecoff * v2xel_frefair * v2x_frassoc_thick * \\
 &\quad v2x_suffr * v2x_freexp_altinf) \\
 &\quad + .5 * ((1/8) * v2x_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair \\
 &\quad + (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/8) * v2x_suffr \\
 &\quad + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf)
 \end{aligned}$$

Citation: Teorell *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:25); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.1.2 Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by

the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_liberal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 4-8. Release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_libdem = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x_liberal + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x_liberal$$

Citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.1.3 Participatory democracy index (D) (v2x_partipdem)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_polyarchy v2x_partip

Data release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_partipdem = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x_partip + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x_partip$$

Citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.1.4 Deliberative democracy index (D) (v2x_delibdem)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xdl_delib v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_delibdem = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x_delib + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x_delib$$

Citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.1.5 Egalitarian democracy index (D) (v2x_egalDEM)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

Clarification: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_egal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 5-8. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_egalDEM = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x_egal + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x_egal$$

Citation: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Coppedge *et al.* 2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2 V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices (D)

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices presented in section 2.1. Furthermore, Appendix D provides an overview of all the indices, component-indices, and lower levels. This is a great place to start getting a good sense of the structure of aggregations.

2.2.1 Additive polyarchy index (D) (v2x_api)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff v2x_freexp_altinf

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected executive (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr). The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as much as the other three, respectively. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_api = (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf + (1/8) * v2x_elecoff + (1/8) * v2x_suffr$$

Citation: Teorell *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:25); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.2 Multiplicative polyarchy index (D) (v2x_mpi)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff v2x_v2x_freexp_altinf

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link. Specifically, the index is formed by multiplying indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected executive (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr), or

$v2x_mpi = v2x_frassoc_thick * v2xel_frefair * v2x_freexp_altinf * v2x_elecoff * v2x_suffr$

Citation: Teorell *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:25); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.3 Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index (D) (v2x_freexp_altinf)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Clarification: This index includes all variables in the two indices v2x_freexp and v2xme_altinf.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

Data release: 4-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media bias (v2mebias), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.4 Freedom of association thick index (D) (v2x_frassoc_thick)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Data release: 4-8. Release 1-3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x_frassoc.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.5 Share of population with suffrage (D) (v2x_suffr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal *extitde jure* restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice *extitde facto*. The adult population as defined by statute is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.

Universal suffrage is coded as 100. The scores reflect *extitde jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elsuffrage

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: v2elsuffrage/100

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.6 Clean elections index (D) (v2xel_frefair)

Project Manager(s): Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are elections free and fair?

Clarification: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x_elecreg. For the US and UK, the only two countries holding national elections prior to 1789 but with their first election within our sampling period occurring only in 1790, we have backfilled this index for 1789 with the value observed in 1790.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.7 Elected officials index (D) (v2x_elecoff)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?

Clarification: This index attempts to measure (a) whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and (b) whether the legislature, in presidential systems with a directly elected president that is also chief executive, is directly or indirectly elected.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, "appointment" by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): v2lgbicam v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelecup v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdsghg v2exhoshog v2exapupap v2exapup

Data release: 1-3 preliminary aggregation formula, 4-6 as v2x_accex, 7 renamed to v2x_elecuff and modified aggregation, 8.

Aggregation: The index is formed in two steps. First, there are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected $a = 1$ or not $a = 0$. Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected b . If the legislature is unicameral, b is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state $c1 = 1$, otherwise 0. Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government $c2 = 1$, otherwise 0. Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state $d = 1$ or not $d = 0$. Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected $e = 1$ or not $e = 0$.

In the second step, the extent to which the legislature is elected (b) is also independently taken into account in order to penalize presidential systems with unelected legislatures, or legislatures with a large share of presidential appointees, for example.

Define $hosw$ as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government $v2exhoshog = 1$, $hosw = 1$. If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then $hosw = 1$; if the reverse is true, $hosw = 0$. If they share equal power, $hosw = .5$. Define the weight for the head of government as $hogw = 1 - hosw$. The formula then is:

$$v2x_elecuff = hosw \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2),$$

unless the head of state is directly elected ($v2ex_elechos = 1$) and the chief executive ($v2ex_hosw = 1$), in case of which:

$$v2x_elecuff = [hosw \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2) + b]/2$$

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.8 Liberal component index (D) (v2x_liberal)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xcl_rol v2x_jucon v2xlg_legcon

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon).

Citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.9 Equality before the law and individual liberty index (D) (v2xcl_rol)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavef v2clrelig v2clfmov v2clmovem v2clmovew

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2clmovem, v2clmovew).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.10 Judicial constraints on the executive index (D) (v2x_jucon)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.11 Legislative constraints on the executive index (D) (v2xlg_legcon)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are the legislature and government agencies *e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.12 Participatory component index (D) (v2x_partip)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_cspart v2xdd_dd v2xel_locelec v2xel_regelec

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x_cspart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power (v2xel_locelec), and elected regional government power (v2xel_regelec).

Citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.13 Civil society participation index (D) (v2x_cspart)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

Clarification: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection — national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csptrcpt), and CSO women participation (v2csgender).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.14 Direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_dd)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

Clarification: Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy. The term does *not* encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddlevci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc
v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprf v2ddspmrfr v2ddadmrf

v2ddyrrf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddyprpl v2ddlexor v2ddpartor
v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyror v2ddthreor v2ddthrerf v2ddthrepl

Data release: 1-6, 7 new aggregation formula, 8.

Aggregation: This index results from the addition of the weighted scores of each type of popular votes studied (popular initiatives $\times 1.5$, referendums $\times 1.5$, plebiscites, and obligatory referendums). Each type of popular vote receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of two terms (easiness of initiation and easiness of approval), where each term obtains a maximum value of one. As we are studying four types of popular votes, the minimum value is 0, and the maximum is 8. In the v2xdd_dd all scores are normalized to range between 0 and 1. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see: Altman, David. 2016. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_dd = (v2xdd_i_pi) \times 1.5 + (v2xdd_i_rf) \times 1.5 \\ + (v2xdd_i_pl) + (v2xdd_i_or)$$

Regarding each type of citizen initiated popular vote (i.e., popular initiative), the ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlexci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigpci), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddsigdci), and (d) the level of government (national and/or subnational). Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by (a) participation quorum (v2ddsigdci), (b) approval quorum (v2ddpartci), and (c) supermajority (v2ddspmc). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority (v2ddadmci). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlexci), and (b) the frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past (v2ddthreci). The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_dd = [(IF\ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - (v2ddsigpci)) \times (IF\ v2ddsigdci \\ = 0, 1, .5 + (2 \times v2ddsigdci/365)) \times (IF\ v2ddlevci = 2, 1, \\ IF\ v2ddlevci = 0, 0.75, IF\ v2ddlevci = 1, 0.5) + \\ (v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc)] \\ \times (0.5 + ((100 - v2ddadmci)/100))/2] \\ \times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 2, 1, IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, v2ddlexci = 0, 0) \\ \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, \\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year \\ until\ 0.1; if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful \\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddapprci \\ = 0.9, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)$$

In case the vote originates from above (i.e., authorities), there is no need to account for v2ddsigpci and v2ddsigdci. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, $(v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc)$, see Altman, David. 2016.

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.15 Local government index (D) (v2xel_locelec)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Question: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors

at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ellocelec v2ellocpwr v2ellocgov

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: First, local government elected (v2ellocelec) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel_locelec is set to 0 whenever v2ellocgov is 0 (there is no local government).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.16 Regional government index (D) (v2xel_regelec)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Question: Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr v2elreggov

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel_regelec is set to 0 whenever v2elreggov is 0 (there is no regional government).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.17 Deliberative component index (D) (v2xdl_delib)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation

(v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage).

Citation: Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.18 Egalitarian component index (D) (v2x_egal)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

Clarification: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and 3 access to power is equally distributed by gender, socioeconomic class and social group.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xeg_eqprotec v2xeg_eqaccess v2xeg_eqdr

Data release: Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula, 5-8 modified aggregation formula including v2xeg_eqaccess.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equal protection index (v2xeg_eqprotec), equal access index (v2xeg_eqaccess) and equal distribution of resources (v2xeg_eqdr).

Citation: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Coppedge *et al.* 2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.19 Equal protection index (D) (v2xeg_eqprotec)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

Clarification: Equal protection means that the state grants and protects rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms, the state itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate and it must also take action to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions of another group or individual.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2chnlpct

Data release: 5-6, 7 modified excluding v2xcl_acjst, 8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp) and percent of population with weaker civil liberties (v2chnlpct); reversed scale.

Citation: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.20 Equal access index (D) (v2xeg_eqaccess)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How equal is access to power?

Clarification: The Equal Access subcomponent is based on the idea that neither the protections of rights and freedoms nor the equal distribution of resources is sufficient to ensure adequate representation. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal *de facto* capabilities to participate, to serve in positions of political power, to put issues on the agenda, and to influence policymaking.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2pepwrngen v2pepwrsoc v2pepwrse

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwrse), power distributed by social group (v2pepwrsoc), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrge).

Citation: Sigman and Lindberg (2017); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2.21 Equal distribution of resources index (D) (v2xeg_eqdr)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How equal is the distribution of resources?

Clarification: This component measures the extent to which resources — both tangible and intangible — are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943. Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully Aristotle, Dahl 2006. Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services *i.e.* means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.. This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer 1983, who argues that overlapping "spheres" of inequality are particularly harmful to society. To address these overlapping "spheres", this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth

Data release: 5, 7 modified: v2pepwrse, v2pepwrsoc and v2pepwrge now form a separate sub-component index, 8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for particularistic or public goods v2dlencmps, means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies v2dlunivl, educational equality v2peedueq and health equality v2pehealth.

Citation: Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3 V-Dem Indicators (A, B, or C)

This section lists all V-Dem variables by theme.

3.1 Elections

3.1.1 Elections introduction (A,B,C) (v2elintro)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency.

For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

3.1.2 Non-election specific coding introduction (A, B, C) (v2elintro1)

Clarification: The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

3.1.3 Disclosure of campaign donations (C) (v2eldonate, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?

Responses:

0: No. There are no disclosure requirements.

1: Not really. There are some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time.

2: Ambiguous. There are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are observed or enforced.

3: Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced.

4: Yes. There are comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.4 Public campaign finance (C) (v2elpubfin, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office?

Responses:

0: No. Public financing is not available.

1: Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties' campaigns.

2: Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.

3: Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.

4: Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.5 Resident noncitizens who cannot vote (C) (v2elnoncit)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: What percentage (%) of the people residing in the country (or colony) does not enjoy the legal right to vote in national elections because they are not full citizens?

Clarification: This question focuses on people whose exclusion from suffrage stems from their immigrant status or lack of recognition as citizens by a colonial power. An example of the first sort would be Kuwait, where about half of the population consists of non-nationals, who are thereby excluded from the suffrage. An example of the second sort would be French West Africa, where (until the late 1950s) only a small portion of permanent residents were allowed to vote.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.6 EMB autonomy (C) (v2elembaut, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

Responses:

0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other *de facto* ruling body.

1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the *de facto* ruling body.

2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.

3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the *de facto* ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.

4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.7 EMB capacity (C) (v2elembcap, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?

Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

Responses:

0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory.

1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country.

2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB.

3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread.

4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.8 Election-specific questions introduction (A,B,C) (v2elintro2)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

Historical Clarification: The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections.

The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

3.1.9 Elections multiparty (C) (v2elmulpar, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was this national election multiparty?

Responses:

0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all *de facto* controlled by the dominant party).

1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.

2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained — legally or informally.

3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (*de jure* or *de facto*) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.

4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (*e.g.* far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.10 Executive elections multiparty (C) (v2elmulpar_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Elections multiparty (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.11 Legislative elections multiparty (C) (v2elmulpar_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Elections multiparty (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.12 Election voter registry (C) (v2elrgstry, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?

Responses:

0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used.

1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).

2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.

3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.

4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.13 Executive election voter registry (C) (v2elrgstry_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election voter registry (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.14 Legislative election voter registry (C) (v2elrgstry_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election voter registry (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.15 Election male suffrage in practice (C) (v2elmalsuf)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of male citizens who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

Clarification: Legal voting rights can be compromised by a number of issues (for example intimidation, insecurity, prohibitive laws or practices, impersonation, or by social/religious norms and practices). Do *not* consider registration practices that place the burden on the voter to take action to register ahead of the election.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 3-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.16 Executive election male suffrage in practice (C) (v2elmalsuf_ex)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Election male suffrage in practice (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.17 Legislative election male suffrage in practice (C) (v2elmalsuf_leg)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Election male suffrage in practice (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.18 Election female suffrage in practice (C) (v2elfemsuf)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of female citizens who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

Clarification: Legal voting rights can be compromised by a number of issues (for example intimidation, insecurity, prohibitive laws or practices, impersonation, or by social/religious norms and practices). Do *not* consider registration practices that place the burden on the voter to take action to register ahead of the election.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 3-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.19 Executive election female suffrage in practice (C) (v2elfemsuf_ex)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Election female suffrage in practice (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.20 Legislative election female suffrage in practice (C) (v2elfemsuf_leg)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Election female suffrage in practice (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.21 Election vote buying (C) (v2elvotbuy, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

Clarification: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to

vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, *i.e.*, "porkbarrel" legislation.

Responses:

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.22 Executive election vote buying (C) (v2elvotbuy_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election vote buying (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.23 Legislative election vote buying (C) (v2elvotbuy_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election vote buying (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.24 Election other voting irregularities (C) (v2elirreg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of other *intentional* irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

Clarification: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions). Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions)

Responses:

0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.

2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.

3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.

4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.25 Executive election other voting irregularities (C) (v2elirreg_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election other voting irregularities (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.26 Legislative election other voting irregularities (C) (v2elirreg_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election other voting irregularities (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.27 Election government intimidation (C) (v2elintim, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

Clarification: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

Responses:

0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.

1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.

2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.

3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.

4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.28 Executive election government intimidation (C) (v2elintim_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election government intimidation (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.29 Legislative election government intimidation (C) (v2elintim_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election government intimidation (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.30 Election other electoral violence (C) (v2elpeace, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (*not* by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

Responses:

0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.

1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.31 Executive election other electoral violence (C) (v2elpeace_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election other electoral violence (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.32 Legislative election other electoral violence (C) (v2elpeace_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election other electoral violence (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.33 Election boycotts (C) (v2elboycot, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

Clarification: A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

Responses:

0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.

1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.

2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.

3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.

4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.34 Executive election boycotts (C) (v2elboycot_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election boycotts (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.35 Legislative election boycotts (C) (v2elboycot_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election boycotts (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.36 Election free campaign media (C) (v2elfrcamp, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?

Responses:

- 0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.
- 1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.
- 2: All parties receive free access.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.37 Executive election free campaign media (C) (v2elfrcamp_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election free campaign media (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.38 Legislative election free campaign media (C) (v2elfrcamp_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election free campaign media (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.39 Election paid campaign advertisements (C) (v2elpdcamp, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

Responses:

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.
- 2: It is permitted without limit.
- 3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.40 Executive election paid campaign advertisements (C) (v2elpdcamp_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election paid campaign advertisements (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.41 Legislative election paid campaign advertisements (C) (v2elpdcamp_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election paid campaign advertisements (C)" for legislative only.

3.1.42 Election paid interest group media (C) (v2elpaidig, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: In this election, were interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

Responses:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.43 Executive election paid interest group media (C) (v2elpaidig_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Clarification: Subset of "Election paid interest group media (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.44 Legislative election paid interest group media (C) (v2elpaidig_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Clarification: Subset of "Election paid interest group media (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.45 Election free and fair (C) (v2elfrfair, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?

Clarification: The only thing that should *not* be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).

Responses:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.46 Executive election free and fair (C) (v2elfrfair_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election free and fair (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.47 Legislative election free and fair (C) (v2elfrfair_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election free and fair (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.48 Election losers accept results (C) (v2elaccept, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?

Responses:

0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.

1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.

2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.

3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.

4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.49 Executive election losers accept results (C) (v2elaccept_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election losers accept results (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.50 Legislative election losers accept results (C) (v2elaccept_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election losers accept results (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.51 Election assume office (C) (v2elasmoff, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

Responses:

0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by *unconstitutional* means.

1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.

2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: The question text between contemporary and historical differ in inclusion of "within 12 months of the election". In contemporary it is excluded while included in historical.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.52 Executive election assume office (C) (v2elasmoff_ex, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Executive election assume office (C)" for executive elections only.

3.1.53 Legislative election assume office (C) (v2elasmoff_leg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Executive election assume office (C)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.54 Elections comments (A,B,C) (v2elcomcom)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on electoral competition.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.55 Introduction subnational elections and offices (C) (v2elintro4)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Clarification: This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as

"regional government" and "local government".

Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

3.1.56 Regional government exists (A,C) (v2elreggov)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Is there a regional government?

Clarification: Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, please code this question as "0" for the appropriate time period.

If you have questions about identifying the regional government for your country, please send an email inquiry to your V-Dem contact.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014.

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.57 Regional government name (A,C) (v2elregnam)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of regional government use multiple terms such as "provinces and federal city." If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Germany regional units are called "Länder."

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.58 Regional government elected (A,C) (v2elsrgel)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

Clarification: "Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, *not* a judiciary and *not* minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into

two chambers.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by higher or lower levels of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

Responses:

- 0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.
- 1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.
- 2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.
- 3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.
- 4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.
- 5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.59 Regional offices relative power (C) (v2elrgpwr, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?

Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, *not* the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

Responses:

- 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
- 1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
- 2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.
- 3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.
- 4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.60 Local government exists (A,C) (v2ellocgov)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Is there a local government?

Clarification: Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on local government.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014.

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.61 Local government name (A,C) (v2ellocnam)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: What is the term(s) for the local government units?

Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of local government, use multiple terms. For example, different terms may be needed for rural and urban units.

If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Mexico local units are called "Municipios."

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.62 Local government elected (A,C) (v2ellocelc)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: At the local level, are government (local government) offices elected in practice?

Clarification: "Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, *not* a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by a higher level of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

Responses:

0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.

1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.

2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.

3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.

4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.

5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions on local offices relative power.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Country expert coding (C data).

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.63 Local offices relative power (C) (v2ellocpwr, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?

Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to *each other*, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

Responses:

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.

3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.64 Subnational elections free and fair (C) (v2elffelr, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

Clarification: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.

"Free and fair" refers to all aspects of the election process *except* the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

Responses:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were

largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, the former category "5" is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin).

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.65 Subnational elections held (C) (v2elffelrbin, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Are subnational elections held?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, the former category "5" from variable v2elffelr is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin). If a coder chose the 5th category in the original question, it receives 0 in the new "v2elffelrbin" variable (corresponding to the answer, no, there were no subnational elections); otherwise it receives 1 (yes, there are subnational elections held). The resulting series of 0-1 country-coder time-series is run in the measurement model, which calculates the final value of v2elffelrbin while taking into account background coder characteristics.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.66 Subnational election unevenness (C) (v2elsnlsff, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

Clarification: Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above.

Responses:

0: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

2: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).

Ordering: If answer is "2", skip remaining questions in this section.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.67 Subnational election area less free and fair name (C) (v2elsnless)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly *less* free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, "the North").

Responses:
Text.

Data release: 3-8. Only in disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.68 Subnational election area less free and fair population (C) (v2elsnlpop)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas you designated as having elections that are significantly *less* free and fair?

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.69 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (C) (v2elsnlfc)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *less* free and fair?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

- 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_0]
- 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_1]
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_2]
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_3]
- 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_4]
- 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_5]
- 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_6]
- 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_7]
- 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_8]
- 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_9]
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_10]
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_18]
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_19]
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_20]
- 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_21]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple selection.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.70 Subnational election area more free and fair name (C) (v2elsnmore)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly *more* free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, "the North").

Responses:

Text.

Data release: 3-8. Only included in the disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.71 Subnational election area more free and fair population (C) (v2elsnmpop)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas you designated as having elections that are significantly *more* free and fair?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.72 Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (C) (v2elsnmrfc)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *more* free and fair?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

- 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_0]
- 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_1]
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_2]
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_3]
- 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_4]
- 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_5]
- 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_6]
- 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_7]
- 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_8]
- 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_9]
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_10]
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_18]

- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_19]
 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_20]
 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_21]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.73 Comments subnational elections (A,B) (v2elcomsn)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on subnational elections and offices.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.74 Suffrage (A) (v2asuffrage)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised adults older than the minimal voting age?

Clarification: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x_elecreg), v2asuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x_elecreg.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.75 Adult citizens with right to vote (A) (v2eladltvt)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); Paxton *et al.* (2003).

Data release: 1-6.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.76 Minimum voting age (A) (v2elage)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote in national elections?

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): IFES; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Furtak (1990); KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Paxton *et al.* (2003); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012). See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012 for additional country-specific sources).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.77 Compulsory voting (A) (v2elcomvot)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.

2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.

3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); V-Dem Country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.78 Election domestic election monitors (B) (v2eldommon)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.79 Executive election domestic election monitors (B) (v2eldommon_ex)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election domestic election monitors (B)" for executive elections only.

3.1.80 Legislative election domestic election monitors (B) (v2eldommon_leg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election domestic election monitors (B)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.81 Female suffrage restricted (A) (v2elfemrst)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Are women eligible to vote in national elections?

Clarification: If there are no (direct) national elections, observations are not coded (missing).

Responses:

0: No female suffrage. No women are allowed to vote, but some or all males vote.

- 1: Restricted female suffrage. Some women are allowed to vote, and face more or different restrictions than men
- 2: Universal female suffrage. All women are allowed to vote.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Paxton *et al.* (2003); Paxton *et al.* (2008); Reif (GVED).

Data release: 1-6, 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.82 Suffrage level (A) (v2elgvsuffvl)

Project Manager(s): Megan Reif

Question: What is the level of suffrage practiced?

Clarification: Note that this question applies to citizens only. Note also that we are interested in legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). In cases where married people are allowed to vote at a younger age than single people, the higher (older) age minimum for single voters is given (see v2elage).

Responses:

- 0: Indirect suffrage and/or offices filled by appointment only
- 1: Propertied ethnic males
- 2: Ethnic males
- 3: Propertied/educated males
- 4: Ethnic males and females
- 5: Propertied/educated males and females
- 6: All males
- 7: Spatially variant
- 8: Universal
- 9: Occupational categories/Party membership
- 10: Only citizens of colonial metropole
- 11: Propertied/tax-paying colons and non-colons
- 12: Propertied males and military females
- 13: Propertied/landowning households
- 14: All households
- 15: All males and married Females
- 16: Age differential: Married people vote at younger age than single

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): IFES; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Furtak (1990); KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); IPU; constituteproject.org. See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012 for additional country-specific sources).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.83 Election international monitors (A) (v2elintmon)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were international election monitors present?

Responses:

- 0: No/Unclear
- 1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): NELDA 45 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by international election monitors.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.84 Executive election international monitors (A) (v2elintmon_ex)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election international monitors (A)" for executive elections only.

3.1.85 Legislative election international monitors (A) (v2elintmon_leg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election international monitors (A)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.86 Lower chamber election introduction (A,B) (v2elintro3)

Clarification: The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

3.1.87 Lower chamber election consecutive (D) (v2ellocons)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no legislature.

Source(s): v2eltype

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.88 Lower chamber election cumulative (D) (v2ellocumul)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the lower chamber or unicameral legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no legislature. However, if there is a legislature and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.

Source(s): v2eltype

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.89 Lower chamber election district magnitude (A) (v2elloeldm)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

Question: For this election, what was the average district magnitude for seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.90 Lower chamber electoral system — 13 categories (A) (v2elloelsy)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

Question: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as a two-round system. Regarding multi-member districts we coded list PR with large multi-member districts when the mean district size = 7. Constituent Assembly elections are excluded from the coding, since they often use specifically designed electoral systems. Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook* (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) — downloadable, free of charge, at www.idea.int/publications/esd/.

Responses:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50% + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50% +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multi-member districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary. This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot).

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size > 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts. Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes

than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

Source(s): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

Data release: 7-8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.91 Lower chamber election seats (A) (v2elloseat)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.92 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v2ellostlg)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.93 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (A) (v2ellostsl)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.94 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v2ellostsm)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.95 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (A) (v2ellostss)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.96 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovtlg)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.97 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovtsm)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.98 Election international monitors denied (A) (v2elmonden)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were some international election monitors denied opportunity to be present by the government holding the election?

Responses:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): NELDA 48 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by international election monitors.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.99 Executive election international monitors denied (A) (v2elmonden_ex)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election international monitors denied (A)" for executive elections only.

3.1.100 Legislative election international monitors denied (A) (v2elmonden_leg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Election international monitors denied (A)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.101 Monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Did any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed that it would not be free and fair?

Responses:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA 49 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); websites of election monitors.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.102 Executive monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref_ex)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref)" for executive elections only.

3.1.103 Legislative monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref_leg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.104 Effective number of cabinet parties (B) (v2elncbpr)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, how many political parties were represented in the cabinet?

Responses:

- 0: Parties are not allowed.
- 1: One party.
- 2: Two parties.
- 3: Three parties.
- 4: Four or more parties.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.105 Lower chamber electoral system (A) (v2elparlel)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

Question: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

Responses:

- 0: Majoritarian.
- 1: Proportional.
- 2: Mixed.
- 3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)

Source(s): Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

Notes: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as majoritarian systems. Category 3: Other was introduced for data release 7.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.106 Presidential elections consecutive (D) (v2elprescons)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of presidential elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency.

Source(s): v2eltype

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.107 Presidential elections cumulative (D) (v2elprescumul)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of presidential elections, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency. However, if there is a presidency, and no elections have ever occurred, this should be recorded as 0.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2eltype

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.108 HOG restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrsthog)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of government (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

Clarification: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

Responses:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v130 ; National constitutions.

Data release: 4-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.109 HOS restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrsthos)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of state (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

Clarification: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

Responses:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v95; National constitutions.

Data release: 4-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.110 Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrstrct)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Is the eligibility of candidates for national legislative office (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

Clarification: Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

Responses:

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators; Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v250; National constitutions.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.111 Percentage of population with suffrage (A) (v2elsuffrage)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence,

having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (*extitde jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*extitde facto*). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.

Universal suffrage is coded as 100. The scores reflect *extitde jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); country-specific sources.

Notes: In Version 3 of the dataset this variable was re-coded from scratch based on the modified criteria reflected in the clarification section (above).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.112 Lower chamber election statutory threshold (B) (v2elthresh)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: For this election, what was the statutory threshold (% share of votes) that a party needed to obtain in order to gain representation in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: If there is no statutory threshold, enter 0. (Some thresholds are applied at regional levels. Nonetheless, they are usually consistent across regions.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.113 Election turnout (A) (v2eltrnout)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

Responses:

Percent.

Source(s): IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Notes: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different turnout for each election, the turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

Data release: 6, 7.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.114 Executive election turnout (A) (v2eltrnout_ex)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Election turnout (A)" for executive elections only.

3.1.115 Legislative election turnout (A) (v2eltrnout_leg)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Election turnout (A)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.116 Election HOG turnover ordinal (A) (v2elturnhog)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was there turnover in the office of the head of government (HOG) as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. If the HOS and HOG are the same person, the coding is the same for the two variables. The second round of election is coded as the first.

Responses:

0: No. The head of government- retained his/her position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOG.

1: Half. The head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership.

2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. This code also applies if this is the first head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.117 Election HOS turnover ordinal (A) (v2elturnhos)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was there turnover in the office of the head of state (HOS) as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party.

Responses:

0: No. The head of state retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOS.

1: Half. The head of state is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected.

2: Yes. The head of state lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. This code also applies if this is the first head of state elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.118 Election executive turnover nominal (B) (v2eltvrexn)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Which offices (if any) experienced turnover as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: A new president took office. S/he is a member of the same party as the previous president. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_0]

1: A new president took office. S/he is a member of a different party than the previous president. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_1]

2: A new prime minister took office. S/he is a member of the same party as the previous prime minister. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_2]

3: A new prime minister took office. S/he is a member of a different party than the previous prime minister. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_3]

4: No change in personnel or party control occurred in the presidency or the prime minister's office. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_4]

Scale: A series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple selection.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.119 Election executive turnover ordinal (A) (v2eltvrexo)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. This question considers whether turnover occurs both in the office of head of state and head of government, even if one of the positions is not contested in the particular elections.

Responses:

0: No. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive.

1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of the executive office holders — the head of state or head of government changes, while the other retains their position.

2: Yes. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.120 Lower chamber election turnover (A) (v2eltvrig)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

Responses:

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 % of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 % of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.121 Election type (A*) (v2eltype)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What type of election was held on this date?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter January 1. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

Responses:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_0]

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_1]

2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_2] (Not yet coded)

3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_3] (Not yet coded)

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_4]

5: Constituent Assembly, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_5]

6: Presidential, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_6]

7: Presidential, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_7]

8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_8] (Not yet coded)

9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_9] (Not yet coded)

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple selection

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; IDEA; Reif (2011, 2012); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); *Keesings Records*; *CIA Factbook*; Wikipedia.

Notes: All direct elections and elections by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing an executive or members of parliament are coded. Note that single-party elections, elections held under limited suffrage and for only parts of a parliament, as well as elections of which the results are subsequently cancelled are included. Elections for constituent assemblies that come to perform functions beyond drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are also included and coded under category 0 and 1 (Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers; first or second round). Excluded are elections that are not decisive, i. e. when the HOS alone is selecting the candidate(s). The variable includes elections where results were declared invalid after the fact, *e.g.* by a constitutional court, since they also provide information on the quality of democracy.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.122 Election VAP turnout (A) (v2elvaptrn)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of the adult voting-age population cast a vote according to official results?

Clarification: The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, it can occur that VAP values surpass 100 which is not an error but reflects such conditions.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): IDEA (VAP figures are estimates and should be treated as such).

Notes: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different VAP turnout for each election, the VAP turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The VAP turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.123 Executive election VAP turnout (A) (v2elvaptrn_ex)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Election VAP turnout (A)" for executive elections only

3.1.124 Legislative election VAP turnout (A) (v2elvaptrn_leg)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Election VAP turnout (A)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.125 Fraud allegations by Western monitors (A) (v2elwestmon)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors?

Clarification: If there were no Western monitors, or no international monitors, this variable is coded as missing.

Responses:

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA 47 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by Western election monitors.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.126 Executive election fraud allegations by Western monitors (A) (v2elwestmon_ex)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Fraud allegations by Western monitors (A)" for executive elections only.

3.1.127 Legislative election fraud allegations by Western monitors (A) (v2elwestmon_leg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Clarification: Subset of "Fraud allegations by Western monitors (A)" for legislative elections only.

3.1.128 Election women in the cabinet (B) (v2elwomcab)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, what percentage (%) of the ministers was female?

Clarification: A "minister" is defined as a person with a specific set of duties (a portfolio). It excludes ministers without portfolio and no specific responsibilities. Please provide an estimate if you do not know the exact figure.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.129 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v2elvotlrg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In the first (or only round) of this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by candidate eventually winning office?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IFES.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.130 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v2elvotsml)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IFES.

Notes: In uncontested elections this question is coded 0.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.131 Female suffrage (A) (v2fsuffrage)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised female adults older than the minimal voting age?

Clarification: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x_elecreg), v2fsuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x_elecreg.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.1.132 Male suffrage (A) (v2msuffrage)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised male adults older than the minimal voting age?

Clarification: This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x_elecreg), v2msuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x_elecreg.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2 Political Parties

3.2.1 Parties introduction (C) (v2psintro)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Clarification: A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party.

Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization.

Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

Historical Clarification: A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party.

Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization.

Our notion of a party includes loose factional groupings such as the Tories and Whigs in the 19th-century Britain or the Caps and Hats in 18th-century Sweden.

Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

3.2.2 Party ban (C) (v2psparban, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: Are any parties banned?

Clarification: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

Responses:

- 0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.
- 1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.
- 2: Yes. Many parties are banned.
- 3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.
- 4: No. No parties are officially banned.

Ordering: If your answer is 4, skip the next question [v2psbantar].

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.3 Party ban target (C) (v2psbantar)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

- 0: Ethnic party.
- 1: Religious party.
- 2: Regional/local party.
- 3: Leftist extremist party.
- 4: Rightist extremist party.
- 5: Other.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Notes: The answer categories for contemporary and historical differ in the inclusion of the word "extremist". In contemporary it is included while excluded in the historical answer categories.

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.4 Barriers to parties (C) (v2psbars, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

Clarification: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

Responses:

- 0: Parties are not allowed.
- 1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).
- 2: There are significant obstacles (*e.g.* party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).
- 3: There are modest barriers (*e.g.* party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).
- 4: There are no substantial barriers.

Ordering: If your answer is 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2psoppaut]. If your answer is 0, skip to the question about Party organization [v2psorgs].

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.5 Opposition parties autonomy (C) (v2psoppaut, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

Clarification: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, *i.e.*, that has no control over the executive.

Responses:

- 0: Opposition parties are not allowed.
- 1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.
- 2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
- 3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
- 4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.6 Party organizations (C) (v2psorgs, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

Clarification: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

Responses:

- 0: No parties.
- 1: Fewer than half of the parties.
- 2: About half of the parties.
- 3: More than half of the parties.
- 4: All parties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.7 Party branches (C) (v2psprbrch, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

Responses:

- 0: None.
- 1: Fewer than half.
- 2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.8 Party linkages (C) (v2psprlnks, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

Clarification: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of "good" that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

Responses:

0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.

1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.

2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, *e.g.*, wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.

3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.

4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.9 Distinct party platforms (C) (v2psplats, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

Clarification: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.

This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

Responses:

0: None, or nearly none.

1: Fewer than half.

2: About half.

3: More than half.

4: All, or nearly all.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.10 Candidate selection-national/local (C) (v2pscslnl, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

Clarification: The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

Responses:

- 0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.
- 1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.
- 2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.
- 3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.
- 4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.
- 5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.11 Legislative party cohesion (C) (v2pscohesv, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

Responses:

- 0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.
- 1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.
- 2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.
- 3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.12 Party switching (C) (v2psswitch)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: Roughly what percentage (%) of the members of the national legislature changes or abandons their party in between elections?

Clarification: Do not include official party splits (when one party divides into two or more parties) or dissolutions (when a party formally dissolves).

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.13 Party competition across regions (C) (v2pscomprg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10 % of the vote)?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, *i.e.*, their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.

1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.

2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.14 National party control (C) (v2psnatpar)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: How unified is party control of the national government?

Clarification: With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power. (If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

0: Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.)

1: Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.

2: Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.)

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.15 Subnational party control (C) (v2pssunpar, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

1: In most subnational units (66%-90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

2: In few subnational units (less than 66%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.2.16 Parties comments (C) (v2pscommnt)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on political parties.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3 Direct democracy

3.3.1 Initiatives administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an initiative to be approved?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.2 Obligatory referendum administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an obligatory referendum to be approved?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.3 Plebiscite administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Must a majority across subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) be attained in order for a plebiscite to be approved?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes — at least half of subnational districts.

2: Yes — more than half of subnational districts.

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.4 Referendums administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmrff)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for a referendum to be approved?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.5 Obligatory referendum approval threshold (A) (v2ddappor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of approval — among registered voters — be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.6 Initiatives approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.7 Plebiscite approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.8 Referendums approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.9 Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (A) (v2ddcredal)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: If any direct democracy election occurred this year, was the official result of the vote, or votes (their success or failure) credible?

Clarification: By credible, we mean whether the official results of the vote(s) reflect the actual vote (leaving aside issues of voter exclusion, intimidation, or vote-buying).

Responses:

0: Not credible.

1: Credible.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.10 Direct democracy introduction (A) (v2ddintro)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Clarification: This set of questions focuses on direct popular votes. Four mechanisms are distinguished:

a. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature for which the constitution or basic laws require a vote. These are referred to as *constitutional referendums* (*i.e. obligatory referendums*).

b. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature that for which the constitution or basic laws does not require a vote. These are referred to as *plebiscites*.

c. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible adoption of a new law or constitutional amendment. These are referred to as *popular initiatives*.

c. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. These are referred to as *referendums*.

Notes: Note that we do not consider recall elections or citizen petitions to the legislature even they may also involve a gathering of signatures or a popular vote.

Note also that in coding these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice. In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..."

3.3.11 Initiatives level (A) (v2ddlevci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: At what level(s) of government can initiatives be held?

Responses:

0: Only at the national level.

1: Only at a subnational level.

2: At both national and subnational levels.

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.12 Plebiscite level (A) (v2ddlevpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: At what level(s) of government can plebiscites be held?

Responses:

- 0: Only at the national level.
- 1: Only at subnational levels.
- 2: At both national and subnational levels.

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.13 Referendums level (A) (v2ddlevrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: At what level(s) of government can referendums be held?

Responses:

- 0: Only at the national level.
- 1: Only at a subnational level.
- 2: At both national and subnational levels.

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.14 Initiatives permitted (A) (v2ddlexci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for initiatives?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either a new law or a constitutional amendment.

Responses:

- 0: Not allowed.
- 1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).
- 2: Allowed and binding.

Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Referendums permitted" [v2ddlexrf].

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.15 Constitutional changes popular vote (A) (v2ddlexor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is a popular and direct vote required in order for a constitutional change to be legally binding?

Clarification: Unless otherwise stated, every question refers to direct democracy at the national level, *i.e.* it does not incorporate popular votes at the provincial or local level.

Responses:

- 0: No, it is not required.
- 1: Depends on the content of constitutional change (for some it is required, for others however it is not).

2: Yes, any constitutional must be approved directly by the citizenry.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.16 Plebiscite permitted (A) (v2ddlexpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for plebiscites?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot by the legislature and/or the executive.

Responses:

0: Not allowed.

1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).

2: Allowed and binding.

Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Initiatives permitted" [v2ddlexci].

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.17 Referendums permitted (A) (v2ddlexrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for referendums?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall elections.)

Responses:

0: Not allowed.

1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).

2: Allowed and binding.

Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Occurrence of plebiscite this year" [v2ddyrrpl].

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.18 Initiatives participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.19 Obligatory referendum participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.20 Plebiscite participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.21 Referendums participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.22 Initiatives signature-gathering period (A) (v2ddsigdci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is the period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for an initiative?

Responses:
Numeric.

Ordering: Answer only if answered 1 for previous question.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.23 Referendums signature-gathering period (A) (v2ddsigrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for a referendum?

Responses:

Numeric.

Ordering: Answer if previous question is coded 1.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.24 Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (A) (v2ddsigrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing an initiative on the ballot?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.25 Referendums signature-gathering limit (A) (v2ddsigrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing a referendum on the ballot?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.26 Initiatives signatures (A) (v2ddsigrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many signatures are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.27 Referendums signatures (A) (v2ddsigrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many signatures are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

Clarification: If the law treats this as a percentage (%) of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the next question instead.

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.28 Initiatives signatures % (A) (v2ddsigpci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters — are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.29 Referendums signatures % (A) (v2ddsigprf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (

Clarification: If the law treats this as a raw number of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the previous question instead.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.30 Initiatives super majority (A) (v2ddspmci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an initiative?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.31 Obligatory referendum super majority (A) (v2ddspmor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an obligatory referendum?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.32 Plebiscite super majority (A) (v2ddspmpl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a plebiscite?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.33 Referendums super majority (A) (v2ddspmrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a referendum?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.34 Popular initiative credible threat (A) (v2ddthreci)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How effective is the menace of a popular initiative?

Clarification: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then $v2ddthreci = 1$, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years $v2ddthreci = 0.9$, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1. Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.35 Obligatory referendum credible threat (A) (v2ddthreor)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How effective is the menace of an obligatory referendum?

Clarification: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then $v2ddthreor = 1$, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years $v2ddthreor = 0.9$, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.36 Plebiscite credible threat (A) ($v2ddthrepl$)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How effective is the menace of a plebiscite?

Clarification: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then $v2ddthrepl = 1$, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years $v2ddthrepl = 0.9$, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1. Responses: Percent.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.37 Popular referendum credible threat (A) ($v2ddthrerf$)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How effective is the menace of a popular referendum?

Clarification: If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then $v2ddthrerf = 1$, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years $v2ddthrerf = 0.9$, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1. Responses: Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.38 Number of popular votes this year (A) ($v2ddyral$)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many direct democracy elections (initiatives, referendums and/or plebiscites) occurred this year?

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 3, 7.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.39 Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year (A) ($v2ddyrci$)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many *citizen-initiative* occurred this year?

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.40 Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (A) (v2ddyror)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many *obligatory referendums* occurred this year?

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.41 Occurrence of plebiscite this year (A) (v2ddyrl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many *plebiscites* occurred this year?

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.3.42 Occurrence of referendum this year (A) (v2ddyrrf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: How many *referendums* occurred this year?

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4 The Executive

3.4.1 Executive introduction (A,B,C) (v2exintro1)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Clarification: In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.* a monarch who reigns but does not rule, or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed.

The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both, head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country.

Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general — not the King/Queen of England — would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony — not the prime minister in London — would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOS name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of state" or "head of government."

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the pre-coded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

Historical Clarification: In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The head of state is an individual or collective body that serves as

the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes, this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.*, a monarch who reigns but does not rule or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed.

The head of government is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government. These definitions are grounded in the functions that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country.

Likewise, it may be that the effective head of state/head of government is someone other than the official head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government. This would apply for example to regency councils for underage monarchs. Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have only included executives who held office for at least 100 days.

3.4.2 HOS name (A*) (v2exnamhos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the name of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.3 HOS title (A*) (v2extithos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the title of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, this and the following questions refer to both. Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of state is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple Heads of State with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question

with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002); worldstatesmen.org.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.4 HOS removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhsp, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

Responses:

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.5 HOS removal by other in practice (C) (v2exrmhsol)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

Clarification: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_4]

5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_5]

6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_6]

7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_7]

Ordering: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhsnl]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exctlhs].

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.6 HOS other body remove HOS in practice (C) (v2exrmhsnl)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the head of state from office?

Responses:

Text.

Data release: 3-8. Only included in the disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.7 HOS control over (C) (v2exctlhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. In case the HOS does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

Responses:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_4]

5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_5]

6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_6]

7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_7]

Ordering: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhs]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exdfshs].

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.8 HOS other body controls (C) (v2exctlhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: From which kind of body or bodies does the head of state need approval for its actions?

Responses:

Text.

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered "other" (7) to the previous question [v2exctlhs].

Notes: The question text is different for the historical coding: "From which kind of body or bodies does the head of state need approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?"

Data release: 3-8. Only in disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.9 HOS dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdfdshs, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of state to call a new election for the legislature.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of state's term", and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.10 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.

4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.11 HOS veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvths, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.12 HOS dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdmhs, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.13 HOS proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpchs, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

Clarification: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of

whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.14 HOS comments (A,B,C) (v2excommhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the head of state.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.15 HOS = HOG (A*) (v2exhoshog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?

Clarification: Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, please answer this question with respect to all of them by checking or unchecking the specific dates. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Ordering: If HOS=HOG (answer is yes: 1) for all years: skip to "Executive as whole introduction" [v2exintro3].

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.16 HOG introduction (A,B,C) (v2exintro2)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Clarification: This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG).

Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that "effective" head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOG name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of government." Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the pre-coded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days. This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG). Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question. If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that "effective" head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOG name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of government." Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the pre-coded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

Historical Clarification: This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG).

Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that "effective" head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, only include executives who held office for at least 100 days.

3.4.17 HOG name (A*) (v2exnamhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the head of government?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple heads of government were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.18 HOG title (A*) (v2extithog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

Clarification: Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of government is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the name of the entire body. If multiple heads of government with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to all of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.19 HOG removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhog, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

Responses:

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.20 HOG removal by other in practice (C) (v2exrmhgnp)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

Clarification: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_0]

1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_1]

2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_2]

3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_3]

4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_4]

5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_5]

6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_6]

7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_7]

8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp_8]

Ordering: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhgop]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG control [v2exctlhg].

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple selection

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.21 HOG other body remove HOG in practice (C) (v2exrmhgop)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the head of government from office?

Responses:

Text.

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered "other" (8) to the previous question [v2exrmhgnp].

Data release: 3-8. Only included in the disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.22 HOG control over (C) (v2exctlhg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. In case the HOG does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

Responses:

- 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_0]
- 1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_1]
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_2]
- 3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_3]
- 4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_4]
- 5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_5]
- 6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_6]
- 7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_7]
- 8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_8]

Ordering: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhog]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG dissolution in practice [v2exdjdshg].

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.23 HOG other body controls (C) (v2exctlhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: From which kind of body or bodies does the head of government need approval for its actions?

Responses:

Text.

Notes: The question text is different for the historical coding: "From which kind of body or bodies does the head of government need approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?"

Data release: 3-8. Only in disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.24 HOG dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdjdshg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature.

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).
- 2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of government's term", and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).
- 3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.25 HOG appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdjcbhg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.26 HOG dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdshg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.27 HOG veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvthg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.28 HOG proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpphg, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

Clarification: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.29 HOG comments (C) (v2excommhg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the head of government.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.30 Executive as a whole introduction (A, B, C) (v2exintro3)

Clarification: This final section of the survey pertains to the executive, considered as a whole.

Some questions refer to "members of the executive," *i.e.*, the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers. If you feel that the answer to a question varies across these offices, your answer should reflect the average (arithmetic mean) across these offices.

Other questions refer to lower-level members of the executive branch. This will be clarified as we proceed.

3.4.31 Executive respects constitution (C) (v2exrescon, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

Responses:

0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.

1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.

2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.

3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.

4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.32 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (C) (v2exbribe, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Responses:

0: It is routine and expected.

1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.

2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.

3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.

4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.33 Executive embezzlement and theft (C) (v2exembez, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Responses:

0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.34 Public sector corrupt exchanges (C) (v2excrtps, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

Responses:

0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.

1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.

2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.

3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.

4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.35 Public sector theft (C) (v2exthftps, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies

between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

Responses:

0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.36 Entire executive comments (A,B,C) (v2excomex)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the entire executive.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.37 HOG directly elected (D) (v2ex_elechog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of government HOG directly elected?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhg

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.38 HOS directly elected (D) (v2ex_elechos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of state HOS directly elected?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhs

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.39 Relative power of the HOG (D) (v2ex_hogw)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Does the head of government HOG have more relative power than the head of state HOS over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The relative power of the HOG is simply 1- v2ex_hosw.

Responses:

0: No.

0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.

1: Yes.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg

Notes: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex_hogw is 1.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.40 HOG appointed by HOS (D) (v2ex_hosconhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of government HOG appointed by the head of state HOS?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhg

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.41 HOG age (A) (v2exagehog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In what year was the head of government born?

Responses:

[date-year only]

99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOG is a collective body.

Source(s): worldstatesman.org.

Data release: 7-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.42 HOS age (A) (v2exagehos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In what year was the head of state born?

Responses:

[date-year only]

99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOS is a collective body.

Source(s): worldstatesman.org.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.43 HOG selection by legislature in practice (A) (v2exaphogp)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government?

Clarification: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of government has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Ordering: Answer this question only if you selected 1-6 on question v2expathhg.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.44 HOS selection by legislature in practice (A) (v2exaphos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

Clarification: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of state has to have majority support (or should not be opposed by the majority) in the legislature even though no vote is taken on his/her appointment. We are *not* concerned with certification of electoral college votes (as in the US, Mexico).

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you selected 1-5 on question v2expathhs.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.45 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (A) (v2exapup)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Anna Lührmann

Question: Is the approval of the upper chamber (together with the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

Clarification: The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex_hosw, v2x_hogw). Answer v2exapup only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1).

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): National constitutions; Websites of national governments.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.46 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (A) (v2exapupap)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Anna Lührmann

Question: Is the tacit or implicit approval of the upper chamber (alongside the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

Clarification: The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex_hosw, v2x_hogw). Answer v2exapupap only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1).

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): National constitutions; Websites of national governments.

Data release: 7

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.47 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs_rec, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.

4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: v2edfcbhs_rec is a version of v2exdfcbhs, for v2edfcbhs_rec the answer categories 1 and 2, 3 and 4 has been merged.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.48 HOG disadvantaged social group (B) (v2exdighog)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of government a member of a disadvantaged social group?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, answer for the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are members of a disadvantaged social group. Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

Responses:

0: No, the head of government is not a member of a disadvantaged social group

1: Yes, the head of government is a member of a disadvantaged social group

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.49 HOS disadvantaged social group (B) (v2exdighos)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of state a member of a disadvantaged social group?

Clarification: If the head of state is a collective body, answer for the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are members of a disadvantaged social group. Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

Responses:

0: No, the head of state is not a member of a disadvantaged social group.

1: Yes, the head of state is a member of a disadvantaged social group.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.50 HOG female (A) (v2exfemhog)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell

Question: What is the gender of the head of government?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

Responses:

0: Male

1: Female

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): worldstatesmen.org; cf. Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.51 HOS female (A) (v2exfemhos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton

Question: What is the gender of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

Responses:

0: Male

1: Female

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): worldstatesman.org; Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.52 HOG term length by law (A) (v2exfxtmhg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the maximum term length of the head of government?

Responses:

Numeric

0: Term length not specified

99: Not Applicable

100: Term length is explicitly unlimited or the life of the office holder.

Ordering: CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM=3 or HOSHOG=2; Constitutions.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v126.

Notes: Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.53 HOS term length by law (A) (v2exfxtmhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the maximum term length of the Head of State, in years?

Responses:

Numeric, number of years.

0: Term length not specified in constitution.

99: Not Applicable.

100: Term length for life or there is no term length.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); National constitutions.

Notes: *De jure* term lengths for Head of State and Head of Government, coded for each head of state and head of government as coded in v2exnamhos and v2exnamhog. In the case of a single office representing both Head of State and Head of Government, HOS is coded to the appropriate term length while HOG is coded as 99. For colonies, if there was no official local constitution, HOS/HOG is coded by their constitutional status according to the colonial power. Finally, for sovereign states lacking a constitution or having suspended their constitution, HOS/HOG is coded to 99 as not applicable for those relevant years.

Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.54 HOG other appointing body in practice (A) (v2exothhgl)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Describe the other body/appointment procedure for the head of government.

Responses:

Text.

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you selected 0 or 9 on the previous question [v2expathhg].

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) from version 8.

Data release: 3-8. Only included in the disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.55 HOS other appointing body in practice (A) (v2exothhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Describe the other body/appointment procedure for the head of state.

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) from version 8.

Data release: 3-8. Only included in the disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.56 HOG appointment in practice (A) (v2expathhg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How did the head of government gain access to office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

Responses:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the head of state.

7: Appointed by the legislature.

8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

9: Other.

Ordering: If you select 0 or 9, proceed to the next question [v2exothhgl]. If you selected 1-6, skip to question "HOG selection by legislature in practice" [v2exaphogp]. If you selected 7-8, skip to question [v2excomex].

Scale: Nominal (v2expathhg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4.57 HOS appointment in practice (A) (v2expathhs)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How did the head of state reach office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

Responses:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

- 2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
- 3: Appointed by a royal council.
- 4: Through hereditary succession.
- 5: Appointed by the military.
- 6: Appointed by the legislature.
- 7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
- 8: Other.

Ordering: If you select 0 or 8, proceed to the next question [v2exothhs]. If you select 1-5, skip to question "HOS selection by legislature in practice [v2exaphos]". If you selected 6-7, skip to question [v2excomhs].

Scale: Nominal (v2expathhs), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org.

Notes: Converted from B to A coding. v2expathhs is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of State. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOS was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5 The Legislature

3.5.1 Legislature introduction (A,B,C) (v2lgintro1)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Clarification: The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws.

If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London).

A popular election need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted. A "direct election" can include seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the *de facto* state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the *de jure* state of affairs.

3.5.2 Legislature bicameral (A*) (v2lgbicam)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

Clarification: The number of chambers have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the score has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating. If there is a change in the number of chambers, this is coded on the exact date of when the change occurred, for example the exact date of when a legislature was dissolved, or when the lower and/or upper chamber was established (usually coded on the date when the new legislature first meets; otherwise on the date of the legislative election where the composition of the new legislature was decided).

Responses:

0: 0 chambers.

1: 1 chamber.

2: 2 or more chambers.

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; Websites of national parliaments; National constitutions; Reif (2011, 2012); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v191.

Notes: For the country-year aggregation of the dataset, we have taken the minimum value of v2lgbicam. Constituent assemblies that perform other functions except for drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are coded as 1 (1 chamber). In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are listed in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.3 Upper chamber introduction (A,B,C) (v2lgintro3)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Clarification: The following questions pertain to the upper chamber of the legislature (if bicameral; please only code for those years where `v2lgbicam` is 2). The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber," typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the senate or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

3.5.4 Upper chamber name (A*) (`v2lgnameup`)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

Responses:

Text.

Notes: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (`v2lgnameplo`), while the others are enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (`v2lgnameup`). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable `v2lgbicam` is coded 2, `v2lgnameplo` is coded "House of Assembly", and `v2lgnameup` enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.5 Upper chamber legislates in practice (C) (`v2lglegpup`, `*_osp`, `*_ord`)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

Responses:

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.6 Legislature dominant chamber (C) (`v2lgdomchm`, `*_osp`, `*_ord`)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

Responses:

0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.

- 1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
- 2: They are roughly co-equal in power.
- 3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
- 4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.7 Legislature introduction one or both houses (A,B,C) (v2lgintro4)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Clarification: The following questions pertain to one or both houses.

3.5.8 Legislature questions officials in practice (C) (v2lgqstexp, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

Clarification: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

Responses:

- 0: No — never or very rarely.
- 1: Yes — routinely.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.9 Legislature investigates in practice (C) (v2lginvstp, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

Responses:

- 0: Extremely unlikely.
- 1: Unlikely.
- 2: As likely as not.
- 3: Likely.
- 4: Certain or nearly certain.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.10 Executive oversight (C) (v2lgotovst, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body *other than the legislature*, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

Responses:

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: Very uncertain.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.11 Legislature corrupt activities (C) (v2lgcrrpt, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

Clarification: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use. Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

Responses:

0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.

2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.

3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.

4: Never, or hardly ever.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.12 Legislature opposition parties (C) (v2lgoppart, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

Responses:

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.13 Legislature controls resources (C) (v2lgfunds, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

Responses:

0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.14 Representation of disadvantaged social groups (C) (v2lgdsadlo, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?

Clarification: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

Responses:

1: They have no representation at all.

2: They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

3: They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

4: They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.

5: They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, category 0: There are no disadvantaged groups in the society, is coded as a separate variable (v2lgdsadlobin).

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.15 Representation of disadvantaged social groups binary (C) (v2lgdsadlobin, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Are there disadvantaged groups in the society?

Clarification: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, category "0" from variable v2lgdsadlo is coded separately as v2lgdsadlobin.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.16 Introduction lower chamber (A,B,C) (v2lgintro2)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Clarification: The following questions pertain to the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature.

The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber," is typically the more numerous chamber and also more directly representative of the general population.

If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

Country experts will find the name (proper noun) of the lower chamber of the legislature in the first question (following this page). To see the name, click on any year in the grid. All subsequent questions in this section pertain to that body.

3.5.17 Lower chamber legislature name (A*) (v2lgnamelo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

Responses:

Text.

Notes: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamelo is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.18 Lower chamber legislates in practice (C) (v2lglegplo, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

Responses:

- 0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

- 1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.
- 2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.19 Lower chamber committees (C) (v2lgcomslo, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

Responses:

- 0: No, there are no committees.
- 1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.
- 2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.
- 3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.20 Lower chamber members serve in government (C) (v2lgsrvlo, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.21 Lower chamber staff (C) (v2lgstafflo, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise?

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.22 Legislature comments (A,B,C) (v2lgcommnt)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the legislature.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.23 Relative power of the HOS (D) (v2ex_hosw)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Does the head of state HOS have more relative power than the head of government HOG over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

Responses:

0: No.

0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.

1: Yes.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg

Notes: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex_hosw is 1.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.24 HOG appointed by legislature (D) (v2ex_legconhog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of government HOG appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhg v2exaphogp

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.25 HOS appointed by legislature (D) (v2ex_legconhos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the head of state HOS appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2expathhs v2exaphos

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.26 Legislature amends constitution (B) (v2lgamend)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, can the legislature (including both chambers of the legislature) change the constitution without the involvement of any other body?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.27 Legislature amnesties (B) (v2lgamnsty)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, does the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.28 Upper chamber elected (A) (v2lgelecup)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

Clarification: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10 % of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 %.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

Notes: Converted from B to A coding.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.29 Lower chamber elected (A) (v2lgello)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

Clarification: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/ regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 %.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.30 Lower chamber female legislators (A) (v2lgefemleg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What percentage (%) of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Edgel (2014); Paxton *et al.* (2008); Carmichael *et al.* (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); genderproject.org.

Data release: 4-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.31 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber (A) (v2lginello)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

Clarification: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.32 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber (A) (v2lginelup)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

Clarification: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.33 Lower chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintblo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

Responses:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the lower (or unicameral) chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.34 Upper chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintbup)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, does the upper chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

Responses:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the upper chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.35 Lower chamber legislates by law (B) (v2lglegllo)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.36 Upper chamber legislates by law (B) (v2lgleglup)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.37 Lower chamber gender quota (A) (v2lgqugen)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: National-level quotas either reserve some seats for women in the legislature (as a whole or per district) or mandate through statutory law that all political parties must nominate a certain percentage of female candidates or candidates considered for nomination. A sanction for noncompliance imposes a penalty on a party that fails to meet the quota provisions. Examples of sanctions for noncompliance include rejection of the party list, loss of public campaign funds, or other financial penalties. Weak sanctions are those that parties may be able to ignore, such as a very weak financial penalty. Strong sanctions provide strong deterrents for noncompliance. An example of a strong sanction would be the rejection of a party's list. Countries with both candidate quotas and reserved seats are recorded at the stronger level. This variable records quotas from the date of implementation. The quota adoption date may be earlier, sometimes by several years. Data on quota adoption is available from the QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017) while the theoretical implications of adoption vs. implementation are discussed in Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018).

Responses:

0: No national level gender quota.

1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance.

2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance.

3: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for noncompliance.

4: Yes, there are reserved seats in the legislature for women.

Ordering: If you answer 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2lgqugens]. If you answer 0, skip to question [v2lglegllo].

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2017); Coding by project manager.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 8

Citation: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.38 Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (A) (v2lgqugens)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature contain a placement mandate?

Clarification: A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: Only answer this question if you answered 1-4 on previous question [v2lgqugen].

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2017); Coding by project manager.

Data release: 8

Citation: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.39 Lower chamber gender quota threshold (A) (v2lgqugent)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: What is the threshold of the quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: A quota is the minimum threshold, understood as a percentage (%) of the total seats in the legislature. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2017); Coding by project manager.

Data release: 8

Citation: Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.40 Lower chamber quota for social groups (A,B) (v2lgqumin)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Is there a national-level quota for any social groups in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: These quotas are sometimes informally known as "minority quotas." Do not record gender quotas here (as gender is not part of what we mean by a social group). Also, do not include special rules that benefit parties defined by social group but do not guarantee seats for these groups. For example, do not count a rule exempting parties from threshold requirements. Code "yes" only if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in the legislature.

Responses:

0: No national level quota for any social group.

1: Yes, there are reserved seats for at least one social group.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v225; Coding by V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 1-6.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.41 Legislature approval of treaties by law (A) (v2lgtreaty)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the legislature necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v492; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.42 Lower chamber term limits (A) (v2lgtrmlup)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms members of the lower (or only) chamber may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit. "Eligible for re-election" should be coded as "no term limits."

Responses:

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: CCP ordering: Asked only if HOUSENUM is answered 2, or if HOUSENUM is answered 3.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v223.

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.43 Upper chamber term limits (A) (v2lguchatrlim)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms members of the upper chamber may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

Responses:

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Notes: Converted from C to A coding as of December 2014.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5.44 Legislature declares war by law (A) (v2lgwarlaw)

Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to declare war?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v488; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 6, 7.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6 Deliberation

3.6.1 Deliberation introduction (C) (v2dlintro)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Clarification: The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country's politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

3.6.2 Reasoned justification (C) (v2dlreason, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, *i.e.* before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."

1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]

2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."

3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation."

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6.3 Common good (C) (v2dlcommon, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.

1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.

2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.

3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.

4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping

the least advantaged in a society.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6.4 Respect counterarguments (C) (v2dlcountr, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

- 0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.
- 1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.
- 2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.
- 3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.
- 4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.
- 5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6.5 Range of consultation (C) (v2dlconstl, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at *elite levels*?

Clarification: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

Responses:

- 0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (*e.g.* military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.
- 1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.
- 2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.
- 3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.
- 4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.
- 5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

ology).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6.6 Engaged society (C) (v2dlengage, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

Responses:

- 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.
- 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
- 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.
- 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.
- 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.
- 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6.7 Particularistic or public goods (C) (v2dlencmps, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork", "clientelistic", or "private goods."

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

Responses:

- 0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.
- 1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods.
- 2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.
- 3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic.
- 4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6.8 Means-tested v. universalistic policy (C) (v2dlunivl)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (*e.g.*, when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

Responses:

0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).

1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.

2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.

3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.

4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) are means-tested.

5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6.9 Comments deliberation (C) (v2dlcommnt)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Clarification: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on deliberation.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7 The Judiciary

3.7.1 Judiciary introduction (A, C) (v2juintro1)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Clarification: This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general, whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless otherwise prompted, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system at every level, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, *e.g.* an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Seven of the questions about the judiciary concern high courts. By "high court" we are asking you to consider the country's constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the court of last resort for constitutional matters. If there is no court in your country with constitutional jurisdiction, please consider the highest ordinary court of the state.

For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia in the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court or review body. The Supreme Court is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, we consider it to be the high court of the United States. smallskip If your country's highest judicial body has separate divisions, only one of which is dedicated to final constitutional review, please consider that division to be the high court if its judges are permanently assigned to that division only. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. smallskip If a new high court was established in a given year, please consider that court as the high court for the purposes of these questions only if the court was functioning for the majority of the calendar year. If a new high court was established in a given year, but did not start functioning until a subsequent year, please do not consider the new court as the high court until it was functioning for the majority of the given calendar year.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (*e.g.*, the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (*e.g.*, the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens "on the ground"). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

3.7.2 Judicial reform (C) (v2jureform, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?

Clarification: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.

Responses:

0: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *reduced* via institutional reform.

1: There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review.

2: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *enhanced* via institutional reform.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.3 Judicial purges (C) (v2jupurge, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (*i.e.*, when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

Responses:

0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.

1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.

2: There were limited arbitrary removals.

3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.

4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.4 Government attacks on judiciary (C) (v2jupoatck, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?

Clarification: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

Responses:

0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.

- 1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.
- 2: Attacks occurred more than once.
- 3: There were attacks, but they were rare.
- 4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.5 Court packing (C) (v2jupack, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year.

Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited court packing efforts (*i.e.* when relatively few judgeships are added) by the political importance of the packing. For example, you may consider the packing of the high court to be more important than the packing of a lower court.

Responses:

- 0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary.
- 1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts.
- 2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships.
- 3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: A previous version of the variable contained category "4: There was no increase". As of November 2014, all responses in category "4" are assigned to category "3", since the two responses have the same meaning in practice.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.6 Judicial accountability (C) (v2juacct, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

Responses:

- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

ology).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.7 Judicial corruption decision (C) (v2jucorrdc, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

Responses:

- 0: Always.
- 1: Usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Not usually.
- 4: Never.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.8 High court name (A) (v2juhcname)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Please enter the name of the high court.

Clarification: As accurately as possible, please provide a literal translation of the name of the court in English, followed by the name in the native language, or a transcription transliteration thereof, within parentheses.

Responses:

Text.

Notes: Converted from (C) to (A(C)) from version 7. Where possible, data was pre-coded, and CEs were asked to add their answers to the remaining gaps.

Data release: 3-8. Only included in the disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.9 High court size (by law) (C) (v2juhcsizl)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: By law, what was the size of the high court in this calendar year?

Clarification: Please consider the same high court that you assessed in High court name. The legally required size of the high court may be established by the constitution, statute, or convention. According to the prevailing authority in this calendar year, how many judges were supposed to serve on the high court? This number includes unfilled vacancies. For example, if the constitution mandates that 9 judges serve on the high court, but there was 1 vacancy on the high court in this year, please report 9 for this question. If the number of judges mandated by law to sit on the high court changed in this calendar year due to constitutional or statutory revisions, please report the size of the high court for the majority of the calendar year. For example, if a new constitution was written in December of the calendar year and changed the number of judges required to serve on the high court, please report for this question the number of judges required by the previous constitution, as that was in effect for the majority of the calendar year.

Responses:

Number.

Scale: Numeric.

Data release: 7-8. Only in disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.10 High court size (in practice) (C) (v2juhcsizp)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: In practice, how many judges participated on the high court in this calendar year?

Clarification: Please consider the same high court that you assessed in High court name. How many judges actually served on the high court in this year? Do not include unfilled vacancies in this number. For example, if the constitution mandates that 9 judges serve on the high court, but there was 1 vacancy on the high court for the majority of this calendar year, please report 8 for this question. If judges were appointed to and/or left the high court in this calendar year, please report the size of the high court for the majority of the calendar year. For example, suppose that 9 judges served on the high court from January until August (8 months), when one judge retired and was not replaced by the end of the year. Please report 9 for this question. If 9 judges served on the high court from January until March (3 months), at which point one judge retired and was not replaced by the end of the year, please report 8 for this question. If 9 judges served on the high court from January until March, 1 judge retired in March and was replaced in June, and there were no additional changes to court membership in this year, then report 9 for this question because there were 9 judges on the court for the majority of the year (3 months from January — March, plus 6 months from June — December).

Responses:

Number.

Scale: Numeric.

Data release: 7-8. Only in disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.11 Female judges (C) (v2jufemjdg)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Of the judges who served on the high court during this calendar year, how many were female?

Clarification: Please consider the same high court that you assessed in High court name. If judges were appointed to and/or left the high court in this calendar year, please report the number of female judges serving on the high court for the majority of the calendar year.

Responses:

Number.

Scale: Numeric.

Data release: 7-8. Only in disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.12 First woman appointed (C) (v2jufirstfm)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: In what year was the first female judge appointed to the high court?

Clarification: Please consider the same high court that you assessed in High court name. If the identity of the high court has changed over time, please consider the year in which the first woman was appointed to any court that has served as the country's highest court. For example, the Dominican Republic established a Constitutional Court in 2010, and it began functioning in 2012. In 2012, there were female justices on the new Constitutional Court. Before 2012, the high court was the Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic. A woman was first appointed

to the Supreme Court in 1993. Since a woman was first appointed to what was considered the high court at the time in 1993, the answer to this question would be 1993.

Responses:

Year.

Scale: Numeric.

Data release: 7-8. Only in disaggregated dataset.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.13 High court independence (C) (v2juhcind, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?

Clarification: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without "merely reflecting" those wishes, *i.e.* a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. By "merely reflect the wishes of the government" we mean that the court's own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view of the record.

Responses:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.14 Lower court independence (C) (v2juncind, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: When judges *not* on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?

Responses:

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.15 Compliance with high court (C) (v2juhccomp, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?

Responses:

- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.16 Compliance with judiciary (C) (v2jucomp, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?

Clarification: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts.

Responses:

- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.17 Judicial review (C) (v2jureview, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (*e.g.* statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision?

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.18 Judiciary comments (C) (v2jucommnt)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Clarification: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the judiciary.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.19 Codeable (A) (v2jucodable)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Can we generate a flowchart describing the appointment process from this constitutional event?

Clarification: This variable indicates the reasons we could or could not create a visual flowchart representing the selection procedure.

Responses:

1. Yes
2. No, the event is in a language the coder can not read
3. No, there is no appointment or removal information
4. No, the process is explicitly left to be developed via a statute
5. Yes, but much of the process is left to law

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.20 Corresponding flowchart (A) (v2juflow)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: Is a flowchart of the process available?

Clarification: This variable indicates if a flowchart summarizing the appointment process was generated and is available.

Responses:

0. No
1. Yes

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.21 Language (A) (v2julanguage)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: In which language is the constitutional event written?

Clarification: If the Comparative Constitutions Project had the same constitutional event in both an English and a non-English language, we used the English version.

Responses:

1. English
2. French
3. German
4. Spanish
27. Arabic
43. Azerbaijani
82. Czech

- 229. Korean
- 245. Latvian
- 249. Lithuanian
- 282. Maltese
- 306. Nepali
- 312. Norwegian Nynorsk; Nynorsk, Norwegian
- 343. Polish
- 345. Portuguese
- 357. Romanian; Moldavian; Moldovan
- 382. Slovak
- 409. Swahili
- 410. Swedish
- 441. Turkish
- 485. Greek
- 113. German
- 121. Dutch; Flemish
- 130. Estonian
- 136. Persian
- 151. Georgian
- 170. Hebrew
- 180. Hungarian
- 185. Icelandic

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7.22 Team translated (A) (v2juteamtr)

Project Manager(s): Jeffrey Staton

Question: For constitutions not available in English, did our coders translate the relevant sections of a non-English event?

Clarification: This variable indicates whether someone on our coding team read the constitutional event in a non-English language and translated information in order to collect the necessary information.

Responses:

0: no

1: Yes, this event was translated by our team

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8 Civil Liberty

3.8.1 Civil liberties introduction (C) (v2clintro)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Clarification: The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*).

Historical Clarification: The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*). Note that if there is significant variation in the respect for a particular civil liberty across the territory, the score should reflect the "average situation" across the territorial scope of the country unit (for each period) as defined in the coder instructions.

3.8.2 Freedom of academic and cultural expression (C) (v2clacfree, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.3 Freedom of religion (C) (v2clrelig, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom of religion?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or

groups due to their religion occur occasionally.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.4 Freedom from torture (C) (v2cltort, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom from torture?

Clarification: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (*e.g.*, police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.

2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.5 Freedom from political killings (C) (v2clkill, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom from political killings?

Clarification: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top

leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.6 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (C) (v2cltrnslw, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

Clarification: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

Responses:

0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.

1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.

2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.

3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.7 Rigorous and impartial public administration (C) (v2clrspct, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

Clarification: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (*i.e.*, nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).

The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

Responses:

0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.

1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.

2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.

3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the

law is limited.

4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.8 Freedom of foreign movement (C) (v2clfmov, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.

2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.

4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.9 Freedom of domestic movement for men (C) (v2cldmovem, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Responses:

0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea).

- 1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).
- 2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement.
- 3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
- 4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.10 Freedom of domestic movement for women (C) (v2cldmovew, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Responses:

- 0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).
- 1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).
- 2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.
- 3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
- 4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.11 Freedom of discussion for men (C) (v2cldiscm, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

Responses:

- 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
- 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.
- 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.12 Freedom of discussion for women (C) (v2cldiscw, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

Responses:

- 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
- 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.
- 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.13 Freedom from forced labor for men (C) (v2clslavem, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

Responses:

0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.14 Freedom from forced labor for women (C) (v2clslavef, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

Responses:

0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.15 State ownership of economy (C) (v2clstown, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?

Clarification: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors.

It does *not* measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

Responses:

0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.

1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.

3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.

4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.16 Property rights for men (C) (v2clprptym, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property. This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

Responses:

0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind.

1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.

2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.

3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights.

4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.17 Property rights for women (C) (v2clprptyw, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

Responses:

- 0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.
- 1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
- 2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
- 3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.
- 4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
- 5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.18 Access to justice for men (C) (v2clacjstm, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

Responses:

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.
- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.
- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.19 Access to justice for women (C) (v2clacjstw, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

Responses:

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.
- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.
- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.20 Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (C) (v2clacjust, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

- 0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.21 Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clsocgrp, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

- 0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.22 Subnational civil liberties unevenness (C) (v2clrgunev, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

Responses:

0: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

2: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.

Ordering: If answer is "2" skip remaining civil liberties questions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.23 Stronger civil liberties population (C) (v2clsmpct)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.24 Stronger civil liberties characteristics (C) (v2clrgstch)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *stronger*?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_10]

- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_18]
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_19]
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_20]
- 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_21]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.25 Weaker civil liberties population (C) (v2clsnlpct)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.26 Weaker civil liberties characteristics (C) (v2clrgwkch)

Project Manager(s): Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker*?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

- 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_0]
- 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_1]
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_2]
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_3]
- 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_4]
- 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_5]
- 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_6]
- 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_7]
- 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_8]
- 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_9]
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_10]
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_16]

- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_17]
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_18]
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_19]
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_20]
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_21]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8.27 Civil liberties comments (C) (v2clcommnt)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Kelly McMann

Clarification: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on civil liberties.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9 Sovereignty/State

3.9.1 Sovereignty introduction (C) (v2svintro)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Clarification: This section addresses a number of issues concerning the sovereignty of the state. A state is political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from other actors in the system.

The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

Historical Clarification: This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff – in this context termed the state administrators.

3.9.2 Domestic autonomy (C) (v2svdomaut, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?

Clarification: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (*e.g.*, NATO), international organizations (*e.g.*, the WTO), or confederations (*e.g.*, the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.

Responses:

0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power (*e.g.* Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (*e.g.*, the USSR during WW II).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (*e.g.*, protectorates and limited home government).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9.3 International autonomy (C) (v2svinlaut, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?

Responses:

0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either *de facto* or *de jure*. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (*e.g.* Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (*e.g.* countries under German occupation during WWII).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (*e.g.* Austria following WWII).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9.4 State authority over territory (C) (v2svstterr)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control?

Clarification: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, *e.g.* where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (*e.g.*, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (*e.g.* opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (*e.g.*, contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (%) of the total territory that is officially part of the country.

By "officially part of the country" we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the

government of the PRC.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6, 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9.5 State authority over population (C) (v2svstpop)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Over what percentage (%) of the population does the state have effective control?

Clarification: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over the population. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the populations over which it is hegemonic, extite.g. where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (extite.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (extite.g. opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (extite.g., contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the population that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (By "population" we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, the existence of Taiwan should not be considered an example of the PRC's failure to control its territory.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9.6 State fiscal capacity (C) (v2stfiscap)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: On which of the following sources of revenue does the central government primarily rely to finance its activities?

Responses:

0: The state is not capable of raising revenue to finance itself.

1: The state primarily relies on external sources of funding (loans and foreign aid) to finance its activities.

2: The state primarily relies on directly controlling economic assets (natural resource rents, public monopolies, and the expropriation of assets within and outside the country) to finance its activities.

3: The state primarily relies on taxes on property (land taxes) and trade (customs duties).

4: The state primarily relies on taxes on economic transactions (such as sales taxes) and/or taxes on income, corporate profits and capital.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9.7 Bureaucratic remuneration (C) (v2strenadm)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are state administrators salaried employees?

Clarification: A state administrator is anyone who works for the state administration. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work; work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes; private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the administration; contractors being paid on an irregular basis; or "parastatals" (those working for state-owned companies), since the latter are not paid directly out of the state coffers. Note that the question refers to the practices obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces.

Responses:

- 0: None or almost none are salaried state employees.
- 1: A small share is salaried state employees.
- 2: About half are salaried state employees.
- 3: A substantial number are salaried state employees.
- 4: All or almost all are salaried state employees.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9.8 Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (C) (v2stcritrecadm)

Project Manager(s): Agnes Cornell

Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?

Clarification: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.

Responses:

- 0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.
- 1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
- 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.
- 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit.
- 4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9.9 Sovereignty comments (A,B) (v2svcommnt)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Michael Bernhard

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on sovereignty.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9.10 Independent states (A) (v2svindep)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Michael Bernhard

Question: Is the polity an independent state?

Clarification: We use Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) coding of independent states. Their definition recognizes that listing independent states relies at least in part on subjective evaluations. A state is considered to be an independent polity if it (a) has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, (b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on. Polities excluded from the list are: colonies; states that have some form of limited autonomy (*e.g.* Scotland); are alleged to be independent but are contiguous to the dominant entity (Ukraine and Belarus prior to 1991); *de facto* independent polities but recognized by at most one other state (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). Occupations or foreign rule are considered to be an actual loss of statehood when they extend beyond a decade. This means that cases such as the Baltic Republic during Soviet occupation are not considered independent states, but independent statehood is retained for European countries occupied during World War II.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Gleditsch and Ward (1999; 2013).

Notes: V-Dem uses the updated List of independent states (v.5.0), including the tentative list of microstates, posted on Gleditsch's webpage on 14 March 2013. We have reconciled Gleditsch and Ward's data with the V-Dem country definitions (see the document "V-Dem Countries v1.1").

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10 Civil Society

3.10.1 CSOs introduction (C) (v2csintro)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Clarification: The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

Historical Clarification: The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

If no CSOs exist at all for a particular time period, code the following relevant questions as giving the "lowest score" (indicating, for instance, strong repression or no consultation, a 0).

3.10.2 CSO entry and exit (C) (v2cseeorgs, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?

Responses:

0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.

1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.

2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.

3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (*e.g.* the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.

4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.3 CSO repression (C) (v2csreprss, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Responses:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia.

4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: For reasons of consistency, as of December 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.4 CSO consultation (C) (v2cscnsult, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

Responses:

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.5 CSO structure (C) (v2csstruc)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs.

Responses:

0: The state does not allow autonomous CSOs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc_0]

1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and CSOs are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large CSOs are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc_1]

2: Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc_2]

3: Small CSOs dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc_3]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.6 CSO participatory environment (C) (v2csprtcpt, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Responses:

0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.

1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.

2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.

3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.7 CSO women's participation (C) (v2csgender, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Clarification: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

Responses:

- 0: Almost always.
- 1: Frequently.
- 2: About half the time.
- 3: Rarely.
- 4: Almost never.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.8 CSO anti-system movements (C) (v2csantimv, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?

Clarification: An anti-system opposition movement is any movement — peaceful or armed — that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, *e.g.*, from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a "movement" character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition.

If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.

Responses:

- 0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.
- 1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.
- 2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.
- 3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime.
- 4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.

Ordering: If coded "0", skip the following questions focused on anti-system movements.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.9 CSO anti-system movement character (C) (v2csanmvch)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: How would you characterize the anti-system movement(s) identified in the previous question?

Clarification: Check all that apply.

Responses:

- 0: Works through legal channels, for the most part. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_0]
- 1: Participates in elections. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_1]
- 2: Works through a mix of legal and extra-legal channels. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_2]

- 3: Insurrectionary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_3]
- 4: Democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as willing to play by the rules of the democratic game, willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_4]
- 5: Anti-democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as unwilling to play by the rules of the democratic game, not willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and/or not willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_5]
- 6: Leftist, socialist, communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_6]
- 7: Rightist, conservative, party of order. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_7]
- 8: Ethnolinguistic, tribe, kinship, clan. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_8]
- 9: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_9]
- 10: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_10]
- 11: Paramilitary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_11]
- 12: Heavily engaged in criminal activity, *e.g.*, narcotics, bootlegging, illegal exploitation of natural resources, extortion, kidnapping. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_12]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.10 Religious organization introduction (C) (v2csintro2)

Clarification: In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

3.10.11 Religious organization repression (C) (v2csrlgrep, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

Responses:

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.

4: No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.12 Religious organization consultation (C) (v2csrlgcon, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Are major religious organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

Responses:

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from input from religious organizations. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize religious organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But typically, it does not consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. Religious organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important religious organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10.13 Civil society comments (C) (v2cscommnt)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard, Michael Coppedge

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on civil society.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11 The Media

3.11.1 Media introduction (A,B) (v2meintro)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Clarification: Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media.

We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

Historical Clarification: Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole.

If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

3.11.2 Government censorship effort — Media (C) (v2mecenefm, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

Clarification: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

Responses:

- 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.
- 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.
- 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.
- 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.
- 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.3 Internet censorship effort (C) (v2mecenefi, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

Clarification: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

Responses:

- 1: The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.
- 2: The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.
- 3: The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.
- 4: The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, the former category "0" is coded separately as v2mecenefibin.

Data release: 3-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.4 Internet binary (C) (v2mecenefibin, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Is there Internet in this country?

Responses:

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Notes: As of December 2014, category 0: Internet does not exist in this country, from variable v2mecenefi is coded separately as v2mecenefibin.

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.5 Print/broadcast media critical (C) (v2mecrit, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

Responses:

- 0: None.
- 1: Only a few marginal outlets.
- 2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.
- 3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.6 Print/broadcast media perspectives (C) (v2merange, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?

Responses:

- 0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.

- 1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.
- 2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.
- 3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.7 Female journalists (C) (v2mefemjrn)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

Question: Please estimate the percentage (%) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

Responses:
Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.8 Harassment of journalists (C) (v2meharjrn, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Are individual journalists harassed — *i.e.*, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

Responses:

- 0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.
- 1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.
- 2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.
- 3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.
- 4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.9 Media self-censorship (C) (v2meslfcen, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

Responses:

- 0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.
- 1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.
- 2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.
- 3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.10 Media access (C) (v2meaccess)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Approximately what percentage (%) of the population has access to any print or broadcast media that are sometimes critical of the national government?

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval.

Data release: 1-6.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.11 Media bias (C) (v2mebias, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

Clarification: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered "more or less impartial" when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

Responses:

- 0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.
- 1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.
- 2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.
- 3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates.
- 4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.12 Media corrupt (C) (v2mecorrpt, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge

Question: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

Responses:

0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.

1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11.13 Media comments (C) (v2mecommt)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the media.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12 Political Equality

3.12.1 Political equality introduction (C) (v2peintro)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Clarification: This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population.

What does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power? Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power into account.)

3.12.2 Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C) (v2pepwrse, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

Responses:

0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.

1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.

2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.

3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.

4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.3 Power distributed by social group (C) (v2pepwrsoc, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to social groups?

Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that

are understood — by those residing within that society — to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

Responses:

0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.

3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another — but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.

4: All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.4 Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrngen, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Responses:

0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.

2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.

3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.

4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.5 Power distributed by sexual orientation (C) (v2pepwrort, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?

Clarification: This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as "heterosexual" and (B) as "LGBT."

Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power per person. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal, or more power than heterosexuals we mean relative to their share of the population (as near as this can be estimated).

Responses:

0: LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).

1: LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power.

2: LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.

3: LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.

4: LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.6 Educational equality (C) (v2peedueq, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.7 Health equality (C) (v2pehealth, *_osp, *_ord)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 1-8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.8 Political equality comments (C) (v2pecommnt)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on political equality.

Responses:

Text.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.9 Primary school enrollment (A) (v2peprisch)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Question: What percentage of the primary school-aged population is enrolled in primary school?

Clarification: The base variables are UNESCO's adjusted net primary enrollment rate (available in the World Bank Education Statistics Database) and Barro and Lee's (2015) long-run data on primary enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). These two variables correlate at .94. This compiled time series is interpolated increasing the number of observations from 5,181 to 11,927. Missing data for the base variable is then imputed from UNESCO's total primary enrollment percentage, which includes those enrolled who are not of primary-school age. The linear imputation increases the number of observations from 11,927 to 12,840.

Source(s): UNESCO Institute for Statistics (accessed through World Bank Education Statistics); Barro and Lee (1996) Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

Data release: 6, 7.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.10 Secondary school enrollment (A) (v2pesesch)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Question: What percentage of the secondary school-aged population is enrolled in secondary school?

Clarification: The base variables are UNESCO's adjusted net secondary enrollment rate (available in the World Bank Education Statistics Database) and Barro and Lee's (2015) long-run measure of secondary enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). These two variables correlate at .98. This compiled time series is interpolated increasing the number of observations from 3,927 to 9,308. Missing data for the base variable is then imputed from UNESCO's total secondary enrollment percentage, which includes those enrolled who are not of secondary-school age. The linear imputation increases the number of observations from 11,080 to 12,317.

Source(s): UNESCO Institute for Statistics (accessed through World Bank Education Statistics); Barro and Lee (1996) Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

Data release: 6, 7.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.12.11 Secondary tertiary enrollment (A) (v2petersch)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman

Question: What percentage of the tertiary school-aged population is enrolled in tertiary school?

Clarification: The base variable is Barro and Lee's (2015) long-run measure of tertiary enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated increasing the number of observations from 2,025 to 9,308. Missing data for the base variable is then imputed from UNESCO's total secondary enrollment percentage, which includes those enrolled who are not of secondary-school age. The linear imputation increases the number of observations from 9,308 to 11,613.

Source(s): UNESCO Institute for Statistics (accessed through World Bank Education Statistics); Barro and Lee (1996) Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

Data release: 6, 7.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13 Historical V-Dem

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the Historical V-Dem sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the Organization and Management document or <https://www.v-dem.net/en/historical/>. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present. In this part of the codebook, however, you will find the following types of variables, all of which have "v3" (rather than "v2") as the variable prefix:

1. A number of new A, A* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables).
2. V-Dem indicators that were modified, for instance for the purpose of gathering additional relevant information for the historical period in Historical V-Dem. One example is v3lgbicam, which codes a more elaborate multi-camerae structure of legislatures than v2lgbicam and also includes a separate category (9) to capture bodies that have some of the functions of legislatures without qualifying as full legislatures (these entities are coded as 0/No legislature on v2lgbicam). Another example is v3elcomvot, which is coded as a C type variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as an A type variable in Contemporary V-Dem.
3. In addition, the dataset includes V-Dem indicators where the original Historical V-Dem coding (before their transformation into versions that yield consistent time series with the Contemporary V-Dem coding) is substantially different, by design. Examples are various indicators pertaining to legislatures, where the original Historical V-Dem coding includes information also for observations with bodies with some functions of legislatures (these observations are treated as missing in the v2 versions of these variables). These indicators are the following:

v3elloelsy	v3elloseat	v3ellostlg	v3ellostsl	v3ellostsm	v3ellostss
v3ellovtlg	v3ellovtsm	v3elncbpr	v3elparlel	v3eltrnout	v3eltrvirg
v3elvotlrg	v3elvotsm	v3lgcmslo	v3lgcrrpt	v3lgdomchm	v3lgelecup
v3lgello	v3lgfunds	v3lginello	v3lginelup	v3lginvstp	v3lglegplo
v3lglegpup	v3lgnameo	v3lgnameup	v3lgoppart	v3lgotovst	v3lgqstexp
v3lgsrvlo					

4. Finally, the dataset includes A and A* variables where there is a discrepancy in the coding of some observations between the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding for the overlap period (typically 1900-1920). The v2-versions of these variables, reported elsewhere in the codebook, report the Contemporary V-Dem scores in cases of discrepancies in the overlap period. These indicators are the following:

v3elage	v3elfemrst	v3ellocelc	v3ellocgov	v3ellocnam	v3elreggov
v3elregnam	v3elsrgel	v3elsuffrage	v3elwomcab	v3exagehos	v3exaphogp
v3exaphos	v3exapup	v3exapupap	v3exhoshog	v3exnamhog	v3exnamhos
v3exathhg	v3exathhs	v3extithog	v3extithos	v3lgamend	v3lgamnsty
v3lgintblo	v3lgintbup	v3lglegllo	v3lgleglup	v3lgtreaty	v3lgwarlaw

NB: As detailed elsewhere in the codebook, remaining inconsistencies in the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding that are not due to substantive differences in the indicators will, however, be sorted out for the version 9 of the dataset.

3.13.1 Minimum candidate age lower chamber (A) (v3canagelc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature?

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.2 Minimum candidate age upper chamber (A) (v3canageuc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the upper chamber?

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.3 Slavery (A) (v3clslavery)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is slavery legal?

Clarification: Refers to the *de jure* status of slavery, not its actual practice.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country specific sources

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.4 Minimum voting age presidency (A) (v3elagepr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for presidential elections?

Clarification: Leave blank if there are no presidential elections.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.5 Minimum voting age upper chamber (A) (v3elageuc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for the upper chamber of the national parliament?

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.6 Direct lower chamber (unicameral) elections (A) (v3eldirelc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the mode of election of the parliament/lower chamber?

Responses:

0: Indirect

1: Direct

2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.7 Direct presidential elections (A) (v3eldirepr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the mode of election of the president in popular elections?

Clarification: Cases in which the constitution provides that the president is elected by the legislature, including those in which the legislature elects only if none of the candidates obtains some minimum threshold of votes, should be coded according to the provisions concerning popular elections.

Responses:

0: Indirect

1: Direct

2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.8 Direct upper chamber elections (A) (v3eldireuc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What is the mode of election of the upper chamber?

Responses:

0: Indirect

1: Direct

2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.9 Lower chamber election seats won by third largest party (A) (v3ellostm)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.10 Lower chamber election seat share won by third largest party (A) (v3ellosts)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.11 Lower chamber election vote share of third-largest vote-getter (A) (v3ellovtm)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.12 Minority or majority government (A) (v3elncbmaj)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, did the political parties that were represented in the cabinet hold a majority of the seats in the (lower chamber of) the legislature?

Responses:

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: No, the parties represented in cabinet held less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

2: Yes, the parties represented in cabinet held half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

3: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, and the factions represented in government hold less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

4: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, but the factions represented in government hold half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): <http://countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.13 Candidate exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (A) (v3elrstrlc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to run as a candidate to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

0: Literacy

1: Property

2: Income

3: Tax payment

4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father)

5: Slave

6: Ethnicity, race

7: Religion

8: Region

9: "Bad moral character"

10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants

11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons

12: Gender – all women excluded

13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.14 Candidate exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (A) (v3elrstrpr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to run as a candidate in presidential elections restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no direct presidential elections. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

- 0: Literacy
- 1: Property
- 2: Income
- 3: Tax payment
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father)
- 5: Slave
- 6: Ethnicity, race
- 7: Religion
- 8: Region
- 9: "Bad moral character"
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons
- 12: Gender – all women excluded
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.15 Candidate exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (A) (v3elrstrup)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to run as a candidate to the upper chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no upper chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

- 0: Literacy
- 1: Property
- 2: Income
- 3: Tax payment
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father)
- 5: Slave
- 6: Ethnicity, race
- 7: Religion
- 8: Region

- 9: "Bad moral character"
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons
- 12: Gender – all women excluded
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.16 De jure ballot secrecy (A) (v3elsec)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is there ballot secrecy by law?

Responses:

- 0: no.
- 1: Yes.
- 2: Secrecy optional.
- 3: Varies spatially and/or hierarchically.

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): IFES; IDEA; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot, various country specific sources.

Data release: 8

3.13.17 Upper chamber election turnover (A) (v3eltvriguc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Did control of the upper chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

Responses:

- 0: No. The same party/group/coalition remained in control of the majority of seats.
- 1: Partly. The leading position within a coalition changed. Or, a new coalition includes some old groups/parties and some new groups/parties.
- 2: Yes. Another party/group/coalition gained control of the majority of seats.

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.18 Upper chamber election seats (A) (v3elupseat)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election, how many seats were there in the upper chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.19 Upper chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v3elupstsl)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.20 Upper chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v3elupstsm)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election, how many seats in the upper chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.21 Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v3elupvtlg)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.22 Upper chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v3elupvtsm)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Percent

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.23 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (A) (v3elvstrlc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to vote for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons?

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800). If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) category. Thus, if most regions of a country imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2. Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) parliament.

Responses:

- 0: Literacy
- 1: Property
- 2: Income
- 3: Tax payment
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father)
- 5: Slave
- 6: Ethnicity, race
- 7: Religion
- 8: Region
- 9: "Bad moral character"
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons
- 12: Gender – all women excluded
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.24 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (A) (v3elvstrpr)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to vote in the presidential election restricted for any of the following reasons?

Check all that apply.

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if the head of state is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

- 0: Literacy
- 1: Property
- 2: Income
- 3: Tax payment
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father)
- 5: Slave
- 6: Ethnicity, race
- 7: Religion
- 8: Region
- 9: "Bad moral character"
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons
- 12: Gender – all women excluded
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.25 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (A) (v3elvstruc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is the right to vote for the upper house of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800). If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) situation. Thus, if most regions imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2. Leave blank if there is no upper chamber or if upper chamber is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

Responses:

- 0: Literacy
- 1: Property
- 2: Income
- 3: Tax payment
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father)
- 5: Slave
- 6: Ethnicity, race
- 7: Religion
- 8: Region
- 9: "Bad moral character"
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants

- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons
- 12: Gender – all women excluded
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.26 HOG year of death (A) (v3exdeathog)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In what year did the head of government die?

Responses:

Date — year only

Scale: Interval

Source(s): worldstatesman.org.

Data release: 8

3.13.27 HOS year of death (A) (v3exdeathos)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: In what year did the head of state die?

Responses:

Date — year only

Scale: Interval

Source(s): worldstatesman.org.

Data release: 8

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.28 Legislature other than uni- or bicameral (A) (v3lcamoth)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: What is the cameral structure of the legislature?

Clarification: Please provide the names of all chambers, as well as how they are grouped into a "upper" and "lower" chamber. For example, in Sweden prior to 1866, the names would be Estates of Nobility, Clergy, Burghers and Peasantry, where the Estates of Nobility and Clergy are grouped into the "upper" chamber, those of the Burghers and Peasantry into the "lower" chamber.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.29 Name of largest party (A) (v3lpname)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the name of the largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.30 Child labor laws (A) (v3pechilabl)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is there national regulation prohibiting child labor?

Responses:

0: No.

1: For nonagricultural employment only.

2: For all sectors.

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): Child Labor: A Global View (A World View of Social Issues) Hardcover– October 30, 2004 by Cathryne L. Schmitz (Editor), Elizabeth K. Collardey (Editor), Desi Larson (Editor). CCP (v592) asks Does the constitution place limits on child employment? The Routledge History of Childhood in the Western World, 2013, Paula S. Fass (editor). The World of Child Labor: An Historical and Regional Survey, 2009 by Hugh D. Hindman.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.31 Minimum wage (A) (v3peminwage)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: Is there a minimum wage?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, the state imposes a minimum wage (legislation, regulations).

2: Yes, there are corporate bargaining arrangements that effectively ensure a minimum wage.

3: Yes, there is a tripartite committee that sets the wage (representatives from union, employer, government).

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): ILO; East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-being, By World Bank, 2014.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.32 Minimum wage restriction (A) (v3peminwagerestr)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: If there is a minimum wage provision, are there any explicit exceptions based on one or more of the following categories?

Clarification: Code as missing if there is no minimum wage.

Responses:

0: Rural/urban area

1: Region of the country

2: Trade (industry)

3: Gender

- 4: Ethnicity
- 5: Age
- 6: Public/private sector
- 7: Other characteristic
- 8: There are no exceptions.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): ILO; East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-being By World Bank, 2014; National minimum wage: Low Pay Commission report 2011, Low Pay Commission.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.33 Party age largest (A) (v3psagefirst)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since the party that holds the most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

Clarification: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): <http://countrystudies.us>

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.34 Party age executive (A) (v3psagepm)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since the party controlling the executive was formed?

Clarification: If there is a coalition government, you should count the party of the prime minister was counted. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): <http://countrystudies.us>

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.35 Party age second largest (A) (v3psagesecond)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since the party that holds the second most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

Clarification: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): <http://countrystudies.us>

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.36 Party age third largest (A) (v3psagethird)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since the party that holds the third most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

Clarification: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): <http://countrystudies.us>

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.37 Regime end type, multiple selection version (A) (v3regendtypems)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig

Question: Could you specify the types of processes (one or more) that led to the end of the regime?

Responses:

- 0: A military coup d'état.
- 1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military.
- 2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
- 3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état).
- 4: Natural death of the sitting leader.
- 5: Loss in civil war.
- 6: Loss in inter-state war.
- 7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war).
- 8: Popular uprising.
- 9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders.
- 10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization).
- 11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1-10.
- 12: Other process than those specified by categories 1-11.
- 13: The regime still exists.

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Multiple selection

Source(s): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.38 Regime interregnum (A) (v3regint)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig

Question: Does there exist an identifiable political regime?

Clarification: This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no political

regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that partial control over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.39 Serfdom de jure/slavery de jure (A) (v3serfdeju)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is serfdom legal?

Clarification: Refers to the *de jure* status of serfdom, not its actual practice.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country specific sources

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.40 Name of second largest party (A) (v3slpname)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the name of the second largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.41 Census (A) (v3stcensus)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

Question: Was there a national census in this year?

Clarification: In order to count as a "census", the following four criteria needs to be satisfied:

1. UNIVERSALITY: the census attempted to cover the entire population and not just a sample.

2. INDIVIDUAL ENUMERATION: the census enumerates each individual separately and records his or her characteristics separately. If the census only produces aggregate or summarised information, it is only a population count and should not count as a census. For example, A population count of a household with 4 people would produce the following results:

Age—Adults: 2; Children: 2

Sex—Males: 2; Females: 2

Instead, an individual enumeration would look like this:

Head of household-male-adult

Spouse-female-adult

Son-male-child

Daughter-female-child

The key difference is that only in the individual enumeration the data on various characteristics can be cross-tabulated.

3. DEFINED TERRITORY: The territory covered, along with any changes in its area is clearly stated.

4. SIMULTANEITY AND SPECIFIED TIME: Each person is enumerated as nearly as possible to the same well-defined point in time, and the collected data should refer to a well-defined reference period.

Code "1" if a national census was completed in this year – but not if it was aborted or was not national in scope.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources

Data release: 8.

Citation: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.42 Citizenship laws (A) (v3stcitlaw)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Are there laws specifying who is a citizen and who is not and establishing procedures for naturalization?

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): CCP (v543); <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/>; various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.43 Flag (A) (v3stflag)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is there a national flag?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): CCP (v68); Whitney Smith (1975), *Flags Through the Ages and Across the World*; Wikipedia; World Fact Book, CIA.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.44 National anthem (A) (v3stnatant)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is there a national anthem?

Responses:

0: No. There may be popular songs identified with the nation but there is no official, state-recognized national anthem.

1: Yes. There is an official, state-recognized national anthem.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): CCP (v67); Bristow, Michael Jamieson (ed). 2006. *National Anthems of the World*, Eleventh Edition. Casell. www.nationalanthems.info; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_historical_national_anthems.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.45 National bank (A) (v3stnatbank)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is there a national bank?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.46 Statistical agency (A) (v3ststatag)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

Question: Is there a national statistical agency?

Clarification: A statistical agency is an official government organization exclusively devoted to gathering numerical information in a variety of subjects about the country. This may be a completely independent agency or a distinguishable office or department within another governmental agency.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources

Data release: 8.

Citation: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.47 Statistical yearbook covered (A) (v3ststybcov)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

Question: Was this year covered by a published statistical yearbook?

Clarification: By "covered" we mean whether, based on the title of the yearbook, information about this year was included in a statistical yearbook. For example, if a yearbook was published in 1914, according to its title covering 1911-1914, then v3ststybpub should be coded as 1 for 1914 only, 0 for 1911-1913, but v3ststybcov as 1 for 1911-1914.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources

Data release: 8.

Citation: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.48 Statistical yearbook published (A) (v3ststybpub)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

Question: Was there a statistical yearbook issued this year?

Clarification: A statistical yearbook is a recurrent publication of a government agency published annually or less frequently which contain statistical tables in more than one of the following categories: 1. Physical environment; 2. Demography; 3. Economic Affairs; 4. Political Affairs; and 5. Cultural Affairs.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous

Source(s): Various country-specific sources

Data release: 8.

Citation: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.49 Name of third largest party (A) (v3tlpname)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the name of the third largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Scale: Nominal

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.50 Total votes (A) (v3ttlvote)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the total number of votes cast in this election.

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Scale: Interval

Answer-type: Numeric

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.51 Election type (A*) (v3eltype)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What type of election was held on this date?

Clarification: The date and type of each election has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same elections.

If the election unfolds across more than one day, the date for the first day is entered. If the precise date was unavailable, the first of the month is entered. If the month is unknown, January 1 is entered. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately, *i.e.*, as separate elections. More than one election in a single year is accommodated by listing each election with a separate calendar date. When elections to more than one office occur on the same day these are listed separately (though naturally with the same date).

Responses:

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round.

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round.

- 2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round.
- 3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round.
- 4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round.
- 5: Constituent Assembly, second round.
- 6: Presidential, first or only round.
- 7: Presidential, second round.
- 8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round.
- 9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); websites of national parliaments; Wikipedia; Election Politique Citoyen (<http://www.election-politique.com>); CLEA (<http://www.electiondataarchive.org/countries.html>); various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.52 High court existence (A*) (v3juhcourt)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is there a high court?

Clarification: Note that in some cases we consider an institution to be the Highest Court in a given country, even though we acknowledge that its jurisdiction covers most though not all the territory of the country. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the rating and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: If answer is "0", skip to v2juncind.

Source(s): Various country-specific sources

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.53 Legislature bicameral (A*) (v3lgbicam)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

Clarification: The answer to this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the code and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

Responses:

0: No legislature exists (or the legislature is shut down).

1: Unicameral

2: Bicameral

3: Tricameral

4: Quadricameral

9: Other type of legislature

Ordering: If all years are (0), skip to The Judiciary (v2juintro). If (1) is chosen, skip to v2lginthro2.

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); CCP (<http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.54 Regime end type (A*) (v3regendtype)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: Could you specify the type of process that you consider the most important in leading to the end of the regime?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that what is considered the most important process that eventually ended the relevant regime has already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the information has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

Responses:

- 0: A military coup d'état.
- 1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military.
- 2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
- 3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état)
- 4: Natural death of the sitting leader
- 5: Loss in civil war.
- 6: Loss in inter-state war.
- 7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)
- 8: Popular uprising.
- 9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders
- 10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization)
- 11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1–10
- 12: Other process than those specified by categories 1–11.
- 13: The regime still exists

Scale: Nominal

Source(s): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.55 Regime information (A*) (v3reginfo)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: What is the regime name as well as start and end dates of this regime?

Clarification: The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the identity of the regime, which is given a suggestive name, and its start and end dates have already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

Scale: nominal

Answer-type: Text

Source(s): Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources.

Data release: 8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.56 Labor rights (C) (v3cllabrig)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Does labor enjoy the right to organize freely and bargain collectively?

Clarification: Refers to actual practice not formal (*de jure*) rights. If practices vary across the country, or across sectors, please consider the overall situation of labor.

Responses:

- 0: Independent labor unions (free from state or ruling party control) are not allowed.
- 1: Independent labor unions are allowed, at least in some sectors of the economy or some sections of the country. However, they are subject to harassment by the police, paramilitary groups, business associations, or other groups. Harassment refers to systematic beatings, imprisonment, outlawing of specific unions, and other actions that seriously impinge upon the ability of unions to organize and bargain collectively.
- 2: Independent labor unions are allowed and they do not face violent repression but the legal climate is not friendly (*e.g.*, "closed shop" rules are widespread), making it difficult to organize and bargain collectively.
- 3: Independent labor unions are allowed and may organize freely in all sectors of the economy.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.57 Voting, voice or ballot (C) (v3elbalpap)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How are votes cast?

Responses:

- 0: Votes are cast verbally (*viva voce*).
- 1: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but verbal voting is more common.
- 2: Voice voting and paper ballots are both common.
- 3: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but paper ballots are more common.
- 4: All votes are cast on paper ballots.

Ordering: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following question (v3elbalstat), meaning: jump to v3elecsdf.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.58 Ballot printing (C) (v3elbalstat)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Who prints ballot papers?

Clarification: Leave blank if all or nearly all voting is verbal (*viva voce*).

Responses:

- 0: Political parties or candidates print all (or nearly all) the ballot papers.
- 1: Both the state and parties or candidates print the ballot papers.
- 2: The state prints all (or nearly all) ballot papers.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.59 Compulsory voting (C) (v3elcomvot)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.

2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.

3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.60 Secret ballot, *de facto* (C) (v3elecsedf)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Are polling stations organized to guarantee voters a secret, anonymous choice?

Responses:

0: No. Voters cannot make a secret, anonymous choice.

1: No. Some voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in most instances violated.

2: Mixed. Voting secrecy and anonymity is assured to roughly the same extent as it is violated.

3: Yes. Most voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in some instances violated.

4: Yes. All voters can make a secret, anonymous choice.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.61 Malapportionment legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3elmalalc)

Project Manager(s): Daniel Ziblatt

Question: Is there a large discrepancy in the vote/seat ratio across electoral districts for the lower (or unicameral) chamber?

Clarification: "Malapportionment" characterizes a situation in which voters in some districts have more power by virtue of a more favorable vote/seat ratio. For example, if seats have not been reapportioned in a long time rural areas may be over-represented relative to urban areas simply because the latter have grown more rapidly than the former. (This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria.) Leave blank if there is no lower

(or unicameral) chamber.

Responses:

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.

1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.62 Malapportionment upper chamber (C) (v3elmalauc)

Project Manager(s): Daniel Ziblatt

Question: Does the electoral system (including the size of electoral districts) involve large differences in the ratios of votes to representatives in elections for the upper chamber?

Clarification: This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria but only the relationship between votes and seats. Leave blank if no upper chamber.

Responses:

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.

1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.63 Reapportionment legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3elreapple)

Project Manager(s): Daniel Ziblatt

Question: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

Clarification: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no lower (or unicameral) chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.64 Reapportionment upper chamber (C) (v3elreappuc)

Project Manager(s): Daniel Ziblatt

Question: Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the upper chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

Clarification: Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no upper chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.65 Equal vote legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3equavolc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are ballots in elections for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

Responses:

0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group.

1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies.

2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight)

3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies.

Scale: nominal

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.66 Equal vote upper chamber (C) (v3equavouc)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are ballots in elections for the upper chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

Responses:

- 0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group.
- 1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies.
- 2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight)
- 3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies.

Scale: nominal

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.67 Lower chamber budget (C) (v3lgbudglo)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is the lower chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

Clarification: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50% of those voting approve the measure.

Responses:

- 0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the lower house or ignores its actions.
- 1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

Scale: Dichotomous

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.68 Upper chamber budget (C) (v3lgbudgup)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is the upper chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

Clarification: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50% of those voting approve the measure.

Responses:

- 0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the upper house or ignores its actions.
- 1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

Scale: Dichotomous

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.69 Lower chamber in session (C) (v3lginse)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: During the year, for how long was the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in session?

Clarification: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all session during the year.

Responses:

- 0: It did not convene at all during the year.
- 1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.
- 2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.
- 3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.
- 4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.
- 5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.70 Upper chamber in session (C) (v3lginseup)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: During the year, for how long was the upper chamber of the legislature in session?

Clarification: If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all sessions during the year.

Responses:

- 0: It did not convene at all during the year.
- 1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.
- 2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.
- 3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.
- 4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.
- 5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.71 Party identification (C) (v3partyid)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Do voters identify with a political party?

Clarification: When party identification is strong, vote choice is largely determined by a voter's party affiliation (and his/her affiliation with that party) rather than attachments to particular candidates, non-partisan issue-positions, or material incentives (*e.g.*, vote-buying). Likewise, when party identification is strong, voters retain loyalty to a single party rather than switching from one party to another across elections or across offices in the same election (ticket-splitting). In this fashion we can somewhat crudely distinguish between partisans and non-partisans. Note that this question refers only to voters, not to members of the population who do not vote

(because they are disenfranchised, choose not to vote, or are discouraged from voting). Leave this question blank if there are no national elections.

Responses:

- 0: There are national elections, but there are no political parties.
- 1: Only one party is allowed to participate in national elections.
- 2: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are non-partisans.
- 3: More than one party participates, and most voters are non-partisans.
- 4: More than one party participates, and voters are equally divided between partisans and non-partisans.
- 5: More than one party participates, and most voters are partisans.
- 6: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are partisans.

Scale: Nominal, but categories 2—6 constitute ordinal.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.72 Regime most important support group (C) (v3regimpgroup)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: Which (one) group does the current political regime rely on most strongly in order to maintain power? Do not code for years denoted as "interregnum".

Clarification: Choose the group that, if it were to retract its support to the regime, would most endanger the regime (*i.e.* most strongly increase the chance that it loses power).

Responses:

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (*e.g.* peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (*e.g.*, family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

Scale: Nominal

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.73 Regime support groups (C) (v3regsupgroups)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: Which groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power? (Check all that apply.)

Clarification: Consider which group(s) is supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. Do not code for years denoted as "interregnum".

Responses:

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.

- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: The state bureaucracy.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including customary chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (*e.g.* peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (*e.g.*, family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

Scale: nominal

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.74 Regime support groups size (C) (v3regsupgroupsize)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In total, how large is the percentage share of the domestic adult (18+) population that belongs to the political regime's supporting groups? Do not code for years denoted as "interregnum".

Clarification: You should consider the sum of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v3regsupgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size of the/those groups that are supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power.

Regarding the issue of overlapping identities, and one individual potentially belonging to more than one groups: Individuals should only be "counted" once; thus if the two relevant supporting groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5%, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the supporting groups is still 5% (presuming that no other members of that ethnic group are essential for the regime staying in power).

Responses:

0: Extremely small

(About 1 percent of the population or less; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — a handful of higher-rank military officers, or by only a royal council and a few hundred landowners)

1: Very small

(Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — higher ranking civil servants and the military, or by moderately sized business and agrarian elites)

2: Small

(Between 5 percent and 15 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — relatively small ethnic groups, or by urban elites and the urban middle classes in predominantly rural societies)

3: Moderate

(Between 15 percent and 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — moderately sized ethnic groups, by rural middle classes in rural societies, or by urban middle classes in urban societies)

4: Large

(More than 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing

the support from — large ethnic groups (and then not only the elites/leaders of such groups), or by rural working classes in rural societies.)

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.75 Regime support location (C) (v3regsuploc)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Question: In which geographic area do the support groups for the current political regime mainly reside? Do not code for years denoted as "interregnum".

Responses:

- 0: Abroad.
- 1: In the capital.
- 2: In urban areas outside the capital.
- 3: In rural areas.
- 4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

Scale: Nominal

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.76 Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (C) (v3stcritapparm)

Project Manager(s): Agnes Cornell, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit?

Clarification: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the armed forces or between top and lower level ranks please try to consider the average when answering the question.

Responses:

- 0: All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.
- 1: Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
- 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.
- 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit.
- 4: None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.77 Remuneration in the Armed Forces (C) (v3strenarm)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell, Agnes Cornell

Question: To what extent are members of the armed forces salaried employees?

Clarification: By members of the armed forces, we mean members of all ranks, excluding conscripts. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work, work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes, or private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the armed forces.

Responses:

- 0: None or almost none are salaried employees
- 1: A small share is salaried employees
- 2: About half are salaried employees
- 3: A substantial number are salaried employees
- 4: All or almost all are salaried employees

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.78 Rulers' involvement in the state administration (C) (v3struinvadm)

Project Manager(s): Agnes Cornell

Question: To what extent are day-to-day decisions made by state administrators subject to intervention from political elites?

Clarification: By political elites we mean members of the executive, members of the legislature and political elites at local and regional levels. Note that the focus on the day-to-day decisions of the state administration implies interference in specific operational decisions in a meticulous manner. Decisions taken by rulers about the general direction of the state administration should not be considered. Note that the question refers to the *de facto* situation.

Responses:

- 0: Constantly. Day-to-day decisions taken by state administrators are constantly subject to intervention.
- 1: Often. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are often subject to intervention.
- 2: About half. Approximately half of the day-to-day decisions in the state administration are subject to intervention.
- 3: Occasionally. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are occasionally subject to intervention.
- 4: Never, or hardly ever. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are never or hardly ever subject to intervention.

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.79 State steering capacity (C) (v3ststecap)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Can the state oversee and regulate the economy?

Clarification: This refers to the state's ability to keep track of economic activities in its territory and potentially influence them by shaping the incentives and constraints that private firms

face to do business; *e.g.*, through licensing, granting exploitation rights, taxing, imposing market barriers, building infrastructure, offering subsidies, adjudicating conflicts, or enforcing regulations.

Responses:

- 0: Most economic activities happen outside the reach of the state
- 1: The state steers some economic activities
- 2: The state steers a substantial share – but less than half – of the national economy
- 3: The state steers about half or more than half, of the national economy
- 4: The state steers all or almost all economic activities

Scale: Ordinal.

Data release: 8.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2018, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2018:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.13.80 Regime introduction (I) (v3exintro4)

Project Manager(s): Carl Henrik Knutsen

Clarification: This final part of this section of the survey pertains to the political regime, and asks questions about the key supporting groups the regime relies on to stay in power.

A political regime can be defined as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. If it is evident that formal and informal rules correspond (*i.e.* the formal rules are followed), then the formal rules define the regime. In these cases, we observe the formal rules (*e.g.* the constitution) to observe the regime. If, on the other hand, the formal rules do not correspond with the informal rules, such as in most dictatorships, then the regime is defined by the informal coalition of actors that select and sustain leaders, along with the informal rules they administer. In these cases, we must look to the *de facto* ruling elites and their established practice to observe the regime (*e.g.*, the military junta in a military regime). Thus a regime is typically characterized by it determining who selects policies, and often also how these policies are typically selected. A regime change presupposes a substantial change in the formal and/or informal rules by which a country is governed.

Examples of regimes might include the Second French Republic, the Communist regime in post-WWII Poland, the current Saudi monarchic regime in Saudi Arabia and the post-WWII democratic regime in Austria. Sometimes, regime changes are related to government or leadership changes (such as the change in Zaire/DR Congo from the regime under Mobutu to the current regime under Kabila), but government or leadership changes do not necessarily bring regime changes (such as in post-election government changes in democracies or with the institutionalized changes to prime ministers and presidents in current China). Sometimes, regime changes can also take place without leadership changes (for instance when military juntas and leaders institutionalize one-party rule, or when there is substantial political liberalization *e.g.* by opening up for multi-party elections but where the former autocrat continues in power for some time).

4 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data

This section includes indices created using V-Dem data but are not subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices presented in section 2.1. Furthermore, Appendix D provides an overview of all the indices and their lower level indicators. This is a great place to start getting a good sense of the structure of aggregations.

4.0.1 Regimes of the world – the RoW measure (D) (v2x_regime)

Project Manager(s): Anna Lührmann, Marcus Tannenberg, Staffan I Lindberg

Question: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

Responses:

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy).

2: Electoral democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).

3: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): v2x_elecreg v2xlg_elecreg v2xex_elecreg v2elmulpar_osp_ex v2elmulpar_osp_leg v2elmulpar_osp v2elfrfair_osp v2elfrfair_osp_leg v2elfrfair_osp_ex v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2ex_hosw v2x_polyarchy v2x_liberal v2clacjstm_osp v2clacjstw_osp v2cltrnslw_osp

Data release: 8

Aggregation: Electoral democracies score above 2 on the indicators for multi-party (v2elmulpar_osp) and free and fair elections (v2elfrfair_osp), as well as above 0.5 on the Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy). Liberal democracy meets the criteria for Electoral democracy but also satisfy the liberal dimensions by a score above 0.8 on the V-Dem Liberal Component index (v2x_liberal), as well as a score above 3 on transparent law enforcement (v2cltrnslw_osp), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm_osp) and women (v2clacjstw_osp). Electoral autocracies fail to meet one or more of the above-mentioned criteria of electoral democracies, but subject the chief executive and the legislature to de-jure multiparty elections as indicated by a score above 1 on the V-Dem multiparty elections indicator (v2elmulpar_osp_leg/_ex). Closed autocracies do not satisfy the latter criterion.

Citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.2 Regimes of the world – the RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases (D) (v2x_regime_amb)

Project Manager(s): Anna Lührmann, Marcus Tannenberg, Staffan I Lindberg, Valeriya Mechkova

Question: How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

Responses:

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence intervals of the

multiparty election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies.

2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the confidence intervals of one or both of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of closed autocracies.

3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy).

4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and multiparty elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.

5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.

6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).

7: Electoral democracy upper bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index overlap the level of liberal democracies.

8: Liberal democracy lower bound: Same as liberal democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index reaches the level of electoral democracies.

9: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).

Scale: Ordinal

Source(s): v2x_elecreg v2xlg_elecreg v2xex_elecreg v2elmulpar_osp_ex v2elmulpar_osp_leg v2elmulpar_osp v2elrfair_osp v2elrfair_osp_leg v2elrfair_osp_ex v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2ex_hosw v2x_polyarchy v2x_liberal v2clacjstm_osp v2clacjstw_osp v2cltrnslw_osp

Data release: 8

Aggregation: Same as for "Regimes of the World Measure– the RoW Measure " (v2x_regime) above. In order to account for ambiguity this version of the regime type index reflects the upper and lower bounds of the point estimates used to aggregate the index in intermediate categories.

Citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.3 Accountability index (D) (v2x_accountability)

Project Manager(s): Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

Question: To what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Government accountability is understood as constraints on the government's use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions. We organize the sub-types of accountability spatially. Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state's population to hold its government accountable through elections, horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances between institutions; and diagonal accountability captures oversight by civil society organizations and media activity.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_veracc v2x_horacc v2x_diagacc

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: To create an aggregate measure of accountability, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three sub-indices of accountability: vertical (v2x_veracc), horizontal (v2x_horacc) and diagonal accountability (v2x_diagacc). This strategy assumes that overall accountability is a function of all variables included in each sub-index, though the sub-indices structure this relationship.

Citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:46); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.4 Vertical accountability index (D) (v2x_veracc)

Project Manager(s): Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

Question: To what extent is the ideal of vertical government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Vertical accountability captures the extent to which citizens have the power to hold the government accountable. The mechanisms of vertical accountability include formal political participation on part of the citizens — such as being able to freely organize in political parties — and participate in free and fair elections, including for the chief executive.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphgp v2ex_hosw v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: Vertical accountability consists of two main components: elections and political parties. We operationalize electoral accountability with three components: 1) an aggregate measure the quality of elections; 2) the percent of enfranchised population and 3) whether the chief executive is directly or indirectly elected. We model non-electoral regimes as having no suffrage and the quality of elections as a function of having an electoral regime (v2x_elecreg). Quality of elections consists of seven variables measuring different aspects of national elections for the executive and legislature. Specifically, we include autonomy and capacity of the electoral management body (v2elembaut) and (v2elembcap); accuracy of the voter registry (v2elrgstry), intentional irregularities conducted by the government and opposition (v2elirreg); intimidation and harassment by the government and its agents (v2elintim); to what extent the elections were multi-party in practice (v2elmulpar); and an overall measure for the freedom and fairness of elections (v2elfrfair). This is a modified version of the V-Dem Clean elections index (v2xel_frefair). We added the variable v2elmulpar, which is theoretically important for accountability, and we removed v2elvotbuy and v2elpeace, as they have low loadings.

We measure suffrage as the percentage of people that have the legal right to vote (v2elsuffrage) to proxy the inclusivity of the exercise of electoral accountability. To account for the differences between states which have an executive subject to elections, we include a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the head of the executive either the head of state or head of government — whoever has more relative power over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers as measured by v2ex_hosw is subjected to direct or indirect elections (v2expathhs v2ex_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphgp).

The second form of vertical accountability focuses on political parties, which we model as a hierarchical node. This node includes variables that capture whether there are barriers to forming a party and how restrictive they are (v2psparban) and (v2psbars), as well as the degree to which opposition parties are independent of the ruling regime (v2psoppaut).

Citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:46); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.5 Diagonal accountability index (D) (v2x_diagacc)

Project Manager(s): Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

Question: To what extent is the ideal of diagonal government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Diagonal accountability covers the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil society organizations CSOs, and an independent media can use to hold the government accountable. These mechanisms include using informal tools such as social mobilization and

investigative journalism to enhance vertical and horizontal accountability.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csprcpt
v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree
v2dlengage

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: We model this form of accountability as a function of four hierarchical nodes: media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the degree to which citizens are engaged in politics.

The media freedom node incorporates variables representing two broad dimensions. The first dimension regards the extent to which the government attempts to censor the media (v2mecenefm) and information on the Internet (v2mecenefi), as well as the extent to which government and other powerful actors harass journalists (v2meharjrn). The second dimension concerns the work of the media itself, namely the extent to which: the media criticizes the government at least occasionally (v2mecrit); there is bias against opposition candidates (v2mebias); the media offers a wide array of political perspectives in their coverage (v2merange); and there is self-censorship on salient issues for the government (v2meslfcen). The media freedom node is an expanded version of the V-Dem Alternative sources of information index (v2xme_altinf). Finally, we use the components of the V-Dem core index of civil society to account for the opportunity of citizens to channel their interests and potentially oppose the government and its policies in an organized way through a robust, self-organized and autonomous civil society organizations. The indicators included in this node are: popular and voluntary participation in CSOs, (v2csprcpt), government control to the entry and exit of CSOs into the public life, (v2cseeorgs), and government oppression of CSOs (v2csreprss).

The freedom of expression node incorporates variables regarding the degree to which men and women are free to discuss political issues without fear of harassment (v2cldiscm and v2cldiscw), as well as an indicator on the freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Finally, we incorporate a variable representing engaged society (v2dlengage), which gives information on the width and depth of public deliberations when important policy changes are being considered.

Citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:46); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.6 Horizontal accountability index (D) (v2x_horacc)

Project Manager(s): Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

Question: To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved?

Clarification: Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior.

This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power.

The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgbicam
v2lgotovst

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: We capture the extent to which the judiciary, the legislature and other oversight agencies hold the government to account by modeling each of these factors as separate hierarchical nodes.

The judiciary node speaks to the degree to which members of the executive compromise horizontal accountability by "unlawfully encroaching" on the legitimate authority of the judiciary branch. To capture that we use the indicators from the V-Dem judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x_jucon).

To model the degree to which a legislature facilitates horizontal accountability we model whether or not a legislature exists a dichotomized version of v2lgbicam, and legislature activities as a function of this variable. The key function of a legislature in terms of horizontal

accountability is to scrutinize government officials' potential misconduct by demanding information for their policies and decisions, and taking specific actions in case of irregularities. We use as baseline the indicators from the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg_legcon): the degree to which: 1 the legislature routinely questions the executive (v2lgotovst); and 2 a legislature is likely to investigate and produce a decision unfavorable to the executive, if the latter were engaged in an illegal or unethical activity (v2lginvstp). We exclude the legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart) as this aspect is part of vertical accountability.

Finally, we include a variable regarding the degree to which other state bodies comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman are likely to investigate and report on potential illegal or unethical activities on part of the executive (v2lgotovst).

Citation: Lührmann *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:46); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.7 Neopatrimonial Rule Index (D) (e_v2x_neopat)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is rule based on personal authority?

Clarification: Neopatrimonial rule reflects the idea that personalistic forms of authority pervade formal regime institutions (Clapham, 1985). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) a neopatrimonialism regime is one that combines clientelistic political relationships, strong and unconstrained presidents and the use of public resources for political legitimation. The index is constructed using Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators representing these three concepts. The sixteen indicators are those included in the three sub-indices: Clientelism, Presidentialism and Regime Corruption.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): e_v2xnp_client e_v2xnp_pres e_v2xnp_regcorr

Data release: 8

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more neopatrimonialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps), party linkages (v2psprlnks), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature controls resources (v2lgefunds), legislature investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp), high court independence (V2juhcind), low court independence (v2jucnind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), electoral management body autonomy (v2elembaut), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez), executive bribes and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). See Sub-Indices for notes on imputation of specific indicators.

Citation: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.8 Clientelism Index (D) (e_v2xnp_client)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships?

Clarification: Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks

Data release: 8

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more clientelism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote-buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps) and whether party linkages are programmatic or clientelistic (v2psprlnks).

Since `v2elvotbuy` is only measured in the years in which elections take place, we impute using the most recent known value. For years before an election ever took place (meaning there is no most recent known value) we impute up to 10 previous years using the value of `v2elvotbuy` in the first election conducted.

Citation: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.9 Presidentialism Index (D) (`e_v2xnp_pres`)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is the regime characterized by presidentialism?

Clarification: Presidentialism means the "systemic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 63). It relates closely to V-Dem's index of Horizontal Accountability (`v2x_horacc`) but focuses more specifically on the extent to which the President is free from constraints by other institutions or actors.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): `v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginstp v2juhcind v2jucnind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut`

Data release: 8

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more presidentialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respect for the constitution (`v2exrescon`), whether there are mechanisms for oversight of the executive other than the legislature (`v2lgotovst`). For legislative constraints, the index includes an indicator of whether the legislature controls its own resources (`v2lgfunds`) and investigates the executive in practice (`v2lginstp`). There are four indicators of judicial constraints on the executive: high court independence (`v2juhcind`), lower court independence (`v2jucnind`), compliance with high court (`v2juhccomp`) and compliance with judiciary (`v2jucomp`). Finally, the index includes a measure of autonomy of the electoral management body (`v2elembaut`) that captures whether or not the President can influence its decisions and actions.

For years in which no legislatures exist, there are no observations for `v2lgotovst v2lginstp, v2lgfunds`. We develop an imputation strategy to ensure index coverage in these years. For oversight, investigations and funding, we assume that the non-existence of the legislature is effectively similar to the minimum value of each variable, meaning that there is no effective constraint. We thus impute missing observations for `v2lgotovst v2lginstp` and `v2lgfunds` with the minimum value of each respective indicator.

Citation: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.10 Regime corruption (D) (`e_v2xnp_regcorr`)

Project Manager(s): Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?

Clarification: In systems of neopatrimonial rule, politicians use their offices for private and/or political gain. This index relates closely to V-Dem's political corruption index (`v2x_corr`), but focuses on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices - and a more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the conceptualization of corruption in literature on neopatrimonial rule.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): `v2exembez v2exbribe v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc`

Data release: 8

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more regime corruption) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive executive embezzlement (`v2exembez`), executive bribes (`v2exbribe`), legislative corruption

(v2xlgrcpt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrde).

*Estimates of legislative corruption (v2lgrcpt) are missing for country-years in which no legislature exists. In order to ensure we have index coverage for these country-years, we use the most recent known value. For years before a legislature ever existed (meaning there is no most recent known value) we impute up to 10 previous years using the value of v2lgrcpt in the first non-missing year.

Citation: Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.11 Election suffrage in practice (D) (v2elprasuf)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage % of citizens male and female who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

Clarification: Legal voting rights can be compromised by a number of issues for example intimidation, insecurity, prohibitive laws or practices, impersonation, or by social/religious norms and practices. Do *not* consider registration practices that place the burden on the voter to take action to register ahead of the election.

Responses:

Percent.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2elmalsuf v2elfemsuf

Data release: 3-6.

Aggregation: An average mean of indicators focused on election suffrage in practice for men (v2elmalsuf) and women (v2elfemsuf).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.12 Executive election suffrage in practice (D) (v2elprasuf_ex)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Executive election suffrage in practice D" for executive elections only.

4.0.13 Legislative election suffrage in practice (D) (v2elprasuf_leg)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Clarification: Subset of "Executive election suffrage in practice D" for legislative elections only.

4.0.14 Legislature directly elected (D) (v2ex_elecleg)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the legislature directly or indirectly elected?

Clarification: If the legislature is unicameral, v2ex_elecleg is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right. Since the variables coding the share of directly and indirectly elected legislators are not yet fully in sync for all country dates, a few observations now receive an index value larger than 1.

Responses:

Proportion.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelecup v2exapup v2exapupap

Data release: 5, 7-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.15 Civil liberties index (D) (v2x_civlib)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: To what extent is civil liberty respected?

Clarification: Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_clpriv v2x_clphy v2x_clpol

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.16 Physical violence index (D) (v2x_clphy)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: To what extent is physical integrity respected?

Clarification: Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cltort v2clkill

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom from torture (v2cltort) and freedom from political killings (v2clkill).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.17 Political civil liberties index (D) (v2x_clpol)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: To what extent are political liberties respected?

Clarification: Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: government censorship effort — media (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men and women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree), party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss).

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.18 Private civil liberties index (D) (v2x_clpriv)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: To what extent are private liberties respected?

Clarification: Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2clslavem v2clslavef v2clreliq v2csrlgprep v2clfmov v2cldmov v2cldmovew

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clreliq), religious organization repression (v2csrlgprep), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmov, v2cldmovew).

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.19 Political corruption index (D) (v2x_corr)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How pervasive is political corruption?

Clarification: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive at the level of the rulers/cabinet on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both ‘petty’ and ‘grand’; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_pubcorr v2x_execorr v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index (v2x_pubcorr); (b) executive corruption index (v2x_execorr); (c) the indicator for legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt); and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. We replace missing values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of a, b and d.

Citation: McMann et al. (2016, V-Dem Working Paper Series 2016:23); V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.20 Divided party control index (D) (v2x_divparctrl)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are the executive and legislature controlled by different political parties?

Clarification: This variable is a reordered version of the continuous measurement model estimates for indicator v2psnatpar: National party control. After reordering, the positive extreme signifies Divided party control. A Different parties or individuals unconnected to parties control

the executive and the legislature or B Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister. The intermediate values signify Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats. And the negative extreme signifies "Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats."

Scale: Interval, from low to high.

Source(s): v2psnatpar v2psnatpar_ord

Notes: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

Data release: 6 as Divided party control of legislature index v2x_lgdivparctrl, 7 modified to Divided party control index, 8.

Aggregation: The reordering is accomplished in two steps. First, 5 is subtracted from v2psnatpar when the ordinal version of this variable, v2psnatpar_ord, is 2. This moves the ordinal score corresponding to unified party control to the lowest values. Then the result is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.21 Electoral component index (D) (v2x_EDcomp_thick)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff

Data release: 3-8.

Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_EDcomp_thick = .125 * v2x_frassoc_thick + .125 * v2x_suffr + .125 * v2xel_frefair + .125 * v2x_elecoff + .5 * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_suffr * v2xel_frefair * v2x_elecoff$$

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.22 Electoral regime index (D) (v2x_elecreg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

Clarification: An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the HOS, *e.g.* a coup d'état, is defined by v2x_hosinter as a change in v2x_elecpres, with the exception of a change when the elected HOS is replaced by a HOS appointed by a legislature. An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the legislature is defined by v2xlg_leginter based on changes in v2lgbicam. Elections to the legislature or executive where the ones elected were never allowed to assume office are coded as aborted elections v2x_hosabort and, respectively, v2x_legabort.

Elecreg is thus coded 1 from when there was a presidential or parliamentary election, if it was not aborted, until there was an interruption through the executive or legislature. An electoral interruption is i an event that dissolves, replaces, or otherwise terminates an elected body executive or parliament or ii an event that implies that the elected body, while still intact, will not be subject to election in the future. Typically, an interruption is the product of a coup, declared state of emergency, or military defeat. After an interruption, a coding of 0 continues until another election occurs. An executive and a legislative electoral regime cannot be separated since they form an integral part, where an aborted legislature is interpreted as a signal that also the executive is not standing for election any longer, and vice versa.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2xel_elecparl v2xlg_leginter v2xel_elecpres v2x_hosinter v2x_hosabort v2x_legabort

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.23 Executive corruption index (D) (v2x_execorr)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2exbribe v2exembez

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive bribery v2exbribe and executive embezzlement v2exembez.

Citation: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.24 Division of power index (D) (v2x_feduni)

Project Manager(s): Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are there elected local and regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local or regional governments, or where all or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at any local or regional level that exists. A high score would be accorded to a country in which both local and regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local or regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. A medium score can be achieved in various ways: there are strong elected governments at the local level but not the regional level, or vice versa; or both local and regional governments elect an executive but not an assembly; or elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local and regional levels; or various combinations of these scenarios.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ellocgov v2elreggov v2ellocelc v2elsrgel v2ellocpwr v2elrgpwr

Notes: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index

and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: This index is an equally weighted average of a local government index and a regional government index. The local government index is the product of a dummy variable for the existence of local government (v2ellocgov), a recoded version of Local government elected (v2ellocelc), and a CDF of local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr). Local governments are recoded as unelected 0 if they did not exist or if data is missing. They are coded 0.5 if an executive is elected but no assembly, and 1 if an assembly is elected, with or without an executive. The regional government index is calculated the same way but using the existence of regional government (v2elreggov), regional government elected (v2elsrgel), and regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.25 Freedom of expression index (D) (v2x_freexp)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.26 Women civil liberties index (D) (v2x_gencl)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?

Clarification: Women's civil liberties are understood to include freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cldmovew v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), and access to justice for women (v2clacjstw).

Citation: Sundström *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.27 Women civil society participation index (D) (v2x_gencs)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

Clarification: Women's civil society participation is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), CSO women's participation (v2csgender), and female journalists (v2mefemjrn).

Citation: Sundström *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.28 Women political empowerment index (D) (v2x_gender)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: How politically empowered are women?

Clarification: Women's political empowerment is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_gencl v2x_gencs v2x_genpp

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of women's civil liberties index (v2x_gencl), women's civil society participation index (v2x_gencs), and women's political participation index (v2x_genpp).

Citation: Sundström *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.29 Women political participation index (D) (v2x_genpp)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton

Question: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

Clarification: Women's political participation is understood to include women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2lgfemleg v2pepwrgen

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of the indicators for lower chamber female legislators (v2lgfemleg, standardized) and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen).

Citation: Sundström *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.30 Presidential election aborted (D) (v2x_hosabort)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Have presidential election results been aborted?

Clarification: Aborted election results usually occur when the President-elect does not reach office from the direct elections, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'état interferes with inaugural passage.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs v2xel_elecpres

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.31 Chief executive no longer elected (D) (v2x_hosinter)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Is the chief executive no longer elected?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.32 Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted (D) (v2x_legabort)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Have legislative election results been aborted?

Clarification: Aborted election results usually occur when the elected members do not reach office after election occurs, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'état interferes with inaugural session.

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2lgbicam v2xel_elecparl

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.33 Public sector corruption index (D) (v2x_pubcorr)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2excrptps v2exthftps

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for public sector bribery v2excrptps and embezzlement v2exthftps.

Citation: McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.34 Rule of law index (D) (v2x_rule)

Project Manager(s): Svend-Erik Skaaning and Jeffrey Staton

Question: To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2juhcind v2juncind v2exrescon v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2juacct v2jucorrdc v2excrptps v2exthftps v2exbribe v2exembez

Data release: 8

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2juncind), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), judicial accountability (v2juacct), judicial corruption decision (v2jucorrdc), public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps), public sector theft (v2exthftps), executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.35 Access to justice (D) (v2xcl_acjst)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model, from from low to high 0-1.

Source(s): v2clacjstm v2clacjstw

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: Bayesian factor analysis of indicators focused on access to justice for men (v2clacjstm) and women (v2clacjstw).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.36 Freedom of discussion (D) (v2xcl_disc)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are citizens able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc. without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model, from from low to high 0-1.

Source(s): v2cldiscm v2cldiscw

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: Bayesian factor analysis of indicators focused on freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm) and women (v2cldiscw).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.37 Freedom of domestic movement (D) (v2xcl_dmove)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary non-political criminals.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model, from from low to high 0-1.

Source(s): v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: Bayesian factor analysis of indicators focused on freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem) and women (v2cldmovew).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.38 Property rights (D) (v2xcl_prpty)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do citizens enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them; customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model, from from low to high 0-1.

Source(s): v2clprptym v2clprptyw

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: Bayesian factor analysis of indicators focused on property rights for men (v2clprptym) and women (v2clprptyw).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.39 Freedom from forced labor (D) (v2xcl_slave)

Project Manager(s): Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult citizens free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model, from from low to high 0-1.

Source(s): v2clslavem v2clslavew

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: Bayesian factor analysis of indicators focused on freedom from forced labor for men (v2clslavem) and women (v2clslavew).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.40 Core civil society index (D) (v2xcs_ccsi)

Project Manager(s): Michael Bernhard

Question: How robust is civil society?

Clarification: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprcpt

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis

model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2cspptept).

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.41 Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_cic)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the Citizen Initiated Component utilized?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2xdd_i_ci v2xdd_i_rf

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of citizen-initiated mechanism of direct democracy popular initiatives and referendums. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2016. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_cic = [v2xdd_i_ci + v2xdd_i_rf]/4$$

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.42 Obligatory referendum index (D) (v2xdd_i_or)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the *obligatory referendum* utilized?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddthreor

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of obligatory referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexor.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by

- Participation quorum v2ddpartor
- Approval quorum v2ddappor, and
- Supermajority V2ddspmor. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2016.

The resulting score is then multiplied with d district majority v2ddadmor.

Consequences are measured by

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexor, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthreor.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd_i_or = & (IF\ v2ddlexor > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartor) \cap v2ddappor \cap V2ddspmor) \\
 & \times ((.5 + (1 - v2ddadmor)/2) \times (IF\ v2ddlexor = 1, .75, 1) \\
 & \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthreor = 1, \\
 & afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .06\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1, \\
 & if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthreor = .9, \\
 & afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1)
 \end{aligned}$$

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.43 Popular initiative index (D) (v2xdd_i_pi)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the *popular initiative* utilized?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddlevci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc
v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddthreci

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of popular initiatives, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexci,
- The number of signatures needed v2ddsigpci,
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures v2ddsigdci.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by

- Participation quorum v2ddpartci,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprci, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmc.

For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman (2016). The resulting score is then multiplied with d district majority v2ddadmci.

Consequences are measured by

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexci, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthreci. The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd_i_ci = & [(IF\ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigpci)) \\
 & \times (IF\ v2ddsigdci = 0, 1, 0.5 + v2ddsigdci/365/2) \\
 & + (v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc)] \\
 & \times (0.5 + 1 - v2ddadmci/2)] \\
 & \times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, 1 \times IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful \\
 & event < 6, then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06 \\
 & then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year \\
 & until\ 0.1; if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years \\
 & v2ddthreci=0.9, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1 \\
 & units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)
 \end{aligned}$$

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.44 Plebiscite index (D) (v2xdd_i_pl)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the *plebiscite* utilized?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ddlexpl v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddyrpl v2ddthrepl

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of plebiscites, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexpl.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by

- Participation quorum v2ddpartpl,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprpl, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmpl. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2016.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmpl.

Consequences are measured by

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlexpl), and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past (v2ddthrepl). The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd_i_pl = & (IF\ v2ddlexpl > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartpl \cap v2ddapprpl \cap v2ddspmpl) \\
 & \times ((0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmpl)/2)) \times (IF\ v2ddlexpl = 1, 0.75, 1) \\
 & \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthrepl = 1, \\
 & afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1, \\
 & if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthrepl = 0.9, \\
 & afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)
 \end{aligned}$$

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.45 Popular referendum index (D) (v2xdd_i_rf)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the *referendum* utilized?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprf v2ddspmrfrf v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddthrerf

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process $v2ddlexrf$,
- The number of signatures needed $v2ddsigprf$,
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures $v2ddsigdrf$.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum $v2ddpartrf$,
- Approval quorum $v2ddapprf$, and
- Supermajority $v2ddspmrfrf$. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2016.

The resulting score is then multiplied with d district majority $v2ddadmrf$.

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative $v2ddlexrf$, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past $v2ddthrerf$. The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this *formula*:

$$v2xdd_i_rf = [(IF\ v2ddlexrf > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigprf) \\ \times (IF\ v2ddsigdrf = 0, 1, .5 + (v2ddsigdrf \times 2)/365) \\ + (v2ddpartrf \cap v2ddapprf \cap v2ddspmrfrf)] \times (0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmrf)/2) \\ \times (IF\ v2ddlexrf = 1, .75, 1) \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, \\ then\ v2ddthrerf = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .06units\ per\ year\ until\ .1, \\ if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthrerf = .9, \\ afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1units\ per\ year\ until\ .1)$$

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.46 Top-Down component of direct popular vote index (D) ($v2xdd_toc$)

Project Manager(s): David Altman

Question: To what extent is the Top-Down Component utilized?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): $v2xdd_i_pl$ $v2xdd_i_or$

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of mechanism of direct democracy which are not citizen-initiated obligatory referendums and plebiscites. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2016. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd_toc = [v2xdd_i_pl + v2xdd_i_or]/4$$

Citation: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.47 Legislative or constituent assembly election (D) ($v2xel_elecparl$)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Did a legislative or constituent assembly election take place this year?

Clarification: In the country-date data set $v2xel_elecparl$ is coded only on the specific election date.

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2eltype_0 v2eltype_1 v2eltype_4 v2eltype_5

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.48 Presidential election (D) (v2xel_elecpres)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Did a presidential election take place this year?

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2eltype_6 v2eltype_7

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.49 Executive electoral regime index (D) (v2xex_elecreg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the executive on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

Clarification: v2xex_elecreg is coded 1 from when an election for executive office typically called "president" is held until there is an interruption in these elections. An electoral interruption is an event that dissolves, replaces, or otherwise terminates an elected body in this case the elected executive but unlike the more general v2x_elecreg variable *not* an event that implies that the elected body, while still intact, will not be subject to election in the future. After an interruption, a coding of 0 continues until another election to the executive occurs.

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2xel_elecpres v2x_hosinter v2x_hosabort

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.50 Legislative electoral regime index (D) (v2xlg_elecreg)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the legislature on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

Clarification: v2xlg_elecreg is coded 1 from when an election for seats to the legislature is held until there is an interruption in these elections. An electoral interruption is an event that dissolves, replaces, or otherwise terminates an elected body in the case the elected parliament but unlike the more general v2x_elecreg variable *not* an event that implies that the elected body, while still intact, will not be subject to election in the future. After an interruption, a coding of 0 continues until another election to the legislature occurs.

Responses:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2xel_elecparl v2xlg_leginter v2x_legabort

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.51 Legislature closed down or aborted (D) (v2xlg_leginter)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: Has the legislature been closed down or aborted?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): v2lgbicam

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.52 Alternative sources of information index (D) (v2xme_altinf)

Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage or lack of coverage of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange).

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.0.53 Party institutionalization index (D) (v2xps_party)

Project Manager(s): Allen Hicken

Question: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

Clarification: Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, *e.g.*, level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.

This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on larger parties, *i.e.*, those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv

Data release: 1-6 Party system institutionalization index, 7 changed to Party institutionalization index, 8

Aggregation: The index is formed by adding the indicators for party organizations (v2psorgs), party branches (v2psprbrch), party linkages (v2psprlnks), distinct party platforms (v2psplats), and legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv, after standardization). The index was then converted to its CDF in order to range from 0 to 1.

Citation: Bizzarro *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:48); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators (E)

This section lists indicators on democracy gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

5.1 Ordinal Versions of Indices

5.1.1 Additive polyarchy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_api_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem Additive polyarchy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_api

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation:

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if v2x_api >= 0 and v2x_api <= 0.25
 0.0: if v2x_api > 0.25 and v2x_api <= 0.5
 and v2elmulpar_osp >= 0 and v2elmulpar_osp <= 2.5
 0.0: if v2x_api > 0.25 and v2x_api <= 0.5
 and v2elfrfair_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair_osp <= 2
 0.5: if v2x_api > 0.25 and v2x_api <= 0.5
 and v2elmulpar_osp > 2.5 and v2elmulpar_osp <= 4
 0.5: if v2x_api > 0.25 and v2x_api <= 0.5
 and v2elfrfair_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair_osp <= 4
 0.5: if v2x_api > 0.5 and v2x_api <= 1
 and v2elfrfair_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair_osp < 3
 1.0: if v2x_api > 0.5 and v2x_api <= 1
 and v2elfrfair_osp >= 3 and v2elfrfair_osp <= 4

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if v2x_api >= 0 and v2x_api <= 0.25
 0.00: if v2x_api > 0.25 and v2x_api <= 0.5
 and v2elmulpar_osp >= 0 and v2elmulpar_osp <= 2
 0.00: if v2x_api > 0.25 and v2x_api <= 0.5
 and v2elfrfair_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair_osp <= 2
 0.33: if v2x_api >= 0.250001 and v2x_api <= 0.5
 and v2elmulpar_osp > 2 and v2elmulpar_osp <= 4
 0.33: if v2x_api > 0.25 and v2x_api <= 0.5
 and v2elfrfair_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair_osp <= 4
 0.67: if v2x_api > 0.5 and v2x_api <= 1
 and v2elfrfair_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair_osp < 3 and v2elmulpar_osp > 2
 1.00: if v2x_api > 0.5 and v2x_api <= 1
 and v2elfrfair_osp > 3 and v2elmulpar_osp > 3

5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >= 0 and I <= 0.2
 0.25: if I > 0.2 and I <= 0.4

0.50: if $I > 0.4$ and $I \leq 0.6$

0.75: if $I > 0.6$ and $I \leq 0.8$

1.00: if $I > 0.8$ and $I \leq 1$

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.2 Civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_civlib_3C /_4C /_5C)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: To what extent is civil liberty respected?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_civlib

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.3 Physical violence index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clphy_3C /_4C /_5C)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: To what extent is physical integrity respected?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem physical violence index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_clphy

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.4 Political civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clpol_3C /_4C /_5C)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: To what extent are political liberties respected?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_clpol

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.5 Private liberties index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_clpriv_3C /_4C /_5C)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: To what extent are private liberties respected?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem private civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_clpriv

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.6 Political corruption index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_corr_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: How pervasive is political corruption?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_corr

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.7 Civil society participation index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_cspart_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.8 Deliberative democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_delibdem_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem deliberative democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the _4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the _5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2xdl_delib v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.9 Electoral component index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_EDcomp_thick_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem electoral component index. There are three versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) categories respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): `v2x_EDcomp_thick`

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for `v2x_polyarchy_3C / _4C / _5C`.

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.10 Egalitarian component index ordinal (E) (`e_v2x_egal_3C / _4C / _5C`)

Question: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem egalitarian component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): `v2xeg_eqprotec v2xeg_eqdr`

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C / _4C / _5C`".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.11 Egalitarian democracy index ordinal (E) (`e_v2x_egaldem_3C / _4C / _5C`)

Question: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem egalitarian democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

For the `_3C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the `_4C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the `_5C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): `v2x_egal v2x_polyarchy`

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C / _4C / _5C`".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.12 Elected officials index (*de jure*) ordinal (E) (`e_v2x_elecoff_3C / _4C / _5C`)

Question: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem elected executive index (*de jure*). The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): `v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2exathhs v2exaphogp v2exathhg v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdsghg v2exhoshog`

Data release: 7-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C / _4C / _5C`".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.13 Executive corruption index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_execorr_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem executive corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_execorr

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.14 Division of power index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_feduni_3C /_4C /_5C)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Are there elected local and regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem division of power index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_feduni

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.15 Freedom of association (thick) index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_frassoc_thick_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of association (thick) index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.16 Freedom of expression index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_freexp_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of expression index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.17 Expanded freedom of expression index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_freexp_altinf_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem expanded freedom of expression index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.18 Women civil liberties index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_genc1_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2cldmovew v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.19 Women civil society participation index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_gencs_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.20 Women political empowerment index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_gender_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: How politically empowered are women?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women political empowerment index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_gencl v2x_gencs v2x_genpp

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.21 Women political participation index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_genpp_3C / _4C / _5C)

Question: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women political participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2lgfemleg v2pepwrgen

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.22 Judicial constraints on the executive index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_jucon_3C / _4C / _5C)

Question: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem judicial constraints on the executive index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.23 Divided party control index ordinal (D) (e_v2x_lgdivparctrl_3C / _4C / _5C)

Project Manager(s): Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Are the executive and legislature controlled by different political parties?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem divided party control index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three _3C, four _4C, and five _5C levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_lgdivparctrl

Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.24 Liberal democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_libdem_3C / _4C / _5C)

Question: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem liberal democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

For the _3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the `_4C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the `_5C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): `v2x_libdem`

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation:

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if $I \geq 0$ and $I \leq 0.25$

0.5: if $I > 0.25$ and $I \leq 0.5$

1.0: if $I > 0.5$ and $I \leq 1$

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if $I \geq 0$ and $I \leq 0.25$

0.33: if $I > 0.25$ and $I \leq 0.5$

0.67: if $I > 0.5$ and $I \leq 0.75$

1.00: if $I > 0.75$ and $I \leq 1$

5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if $I \geq 0$ and $I \leq 0.2$

0.25: if $I > 0.2$ and $I \leq 0.4$

0.50: if $I > 0.4$ and $I \leq 0.6$

0.75: if $I > 0.6$ and $I \leq 0.8$

1.00: if $I > 0.8$ and $I \leq 1$

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.25 Liberal component index ordinal (E) (`e_v2x_liberal_3C` / `_4C` / `_5C`)

Question: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem liberal component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): `v2xcl_rol` `v2x_jucon` `v2xlg_legcon`

Data release: 1-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C`".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.26 Multiplicative polyarchy index ordinal (E) (`e_v2x_mpi_3C` / `_4C` / `_5C`)

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem Multiplicative polyarchy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

For the `_3C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the `_4C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the `_5C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): `v2x_mpi`

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation:

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if $v2x_mpi \geq 0$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.25$
 0.0: if $v2x_mpi > 0.25$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.5$
 and $v2elmpar_osp \geq 0$ and $v2elmpar_osp \leq 2.5$
 0.0: if $v2x_mpi > 0.25$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.5$
 and $v2elfrfair_osp \geq 0$ and $v2elfrfair_osp \leq 2$
 0.5: if $v2x_mpi > 0.25$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.5$
 and $v2elmpar_osp > 2.5$ and $v2elmpar_osp \leq 4$
 0.5: if $v2x_mpi > 0.25$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.5$
 and $v2elfrfair_osp > 2$ and $v2elfrfair_osp \leq 4$
 0.5: if $v2x_mpi > 0.5$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 1$
 and $v2elfrfair_osp \geq 0$ and $v2elfrfair_osp < 3$
 1.0: if $v2x_mpi > 0.5$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 1$
 and $v2elfrfair_osp \geq 3$ and $v2elfrfair_osp \leq 4$

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if $v2x_mpi \geq 0$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.25$
 0.00: if $v2x_mpi > 0.25$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.5$
 and $v2elmpar_osp \geq 0$ and $v2elmpar_osp \leq 2$
 0.00: if $v2x_mpi > 0.25$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.5$
 and $v2elfrfair_osp \geq 0$ and $v2elfrfair_osp \leq 2$
 0.33: if $v2x_mpi \geq 0.250001$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.5$
 and $v2elmpar_osp > 2$ and $v2elmpar_osp \leq 4$
 0.33: if $v2x_mpi > 0.25$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 0.5$
 and $v2elfrfair_osp > 2$ and $v2elfrfair_osp \leq 4$
 0.67: if $v2x_mpi > 0.5$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 1$
 and $v2elfrfair_osp > 2$ and $v2elfrfair_osp < 3$ and $v2elmpar_osp > 2$
 1.00: if $v2x_mpi > 0.5$ and $v2x_mpi \leq 1$
 and $v2elfrfair_osp > 3$ and $v2elmpar_osp > 3$

5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if $I \geq 0$ and $I \leq 0.2$
 0.25: if $I > 0.2$ and $I \leq 0.4$
 0.50: if $I > 0.4$ and $I \leq 0.6$
 0.75: if $I > 0.6$ and $I \leq 0.8$
 1.00: if $I > 0.8$ and $I \leq 1$

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.27 Participatory component index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_partip_3C / _4C / _5C)

Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem participatory component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_cspart v2xdd_dd v2xel_locelec v2xel_regelec

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.28 Participatory democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_partipdem_3C / _4C / _5C)

Question: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem participatory democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions

with three ($_3C$), four ($_4C$), and five ($_5C$) levels respectively.

For the $_3C$ -version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the $_4C$ -version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the $_5C$ -version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_partidem

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_ $_3C$ / $_4C$ / $_5C$ ".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.29 Electoral democracy index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_polyarchy_ $_3C$ / $_4C$ / $_5C$)

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem electoral democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three ($_3C$), four ($_4C$), and five ($_5C$) levels respectively.

For the $_3C$ -version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the $_4C$ -version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the $_5C$ -version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation:

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if v2x_polyarchy \geq 0 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.25

0.0: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.25 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.5

and v2elmulpar_osp \geq 0 and v2elmulpar_osp \leq 2.5

0.0: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.25 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.5

and v2elfrfair_osp \geq 0 and v2elfrfair_osp \leq 2

0.5: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.25 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.5

and v2elmulpar_osp $>$ 2.5 and v2elmulpar_osp \leq 4

0.5: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.25 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.5

and v2elfrfair_osp $>$ 2 and v2elfrfair_osp \leq 4

0.5: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.5 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 1

and v2elfrfair_osp \geq 0 and v2elfrfair_osp $<$ 3

1.0: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.5 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 1

and v2elfrfair_osp \geq 3 and v2elfrfair_osp \leq 4

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if v2x_polyarchy \geq 0 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.25

0.00: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.25 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.5

and v2elmulpar_osp \geq 0 and v2elmulpar_osp \leq 2

0.00: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.25 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.5

and v2elfrfair_osp \geq 0 and v2elfrfair_osp \leq 2

0.33: if v2x_polyarchy \geq 0.250001 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.5

and v2elmulpar_osp $>$ 2 and v2elmulpar_osp \leq 4

0.33: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.25 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 0.5

and v2elfrfair_osp $>$ 2 and v2elfrfair_osp \leq 4

0.67: if v2x_polyarchy $>$ 0.5 and v2x_polyarchy \leq 1

and v2elfrfair_osp $>$ 2 and v2elfrfair_osp $<$ 3 and v2elmulpar_osp $>$ 2

1.00: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5 and v2x_polyarchy<=1
and v2elfrfair_osp>3 and v2elmulpar_osp>3

5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2

0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4

0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6

0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8

1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.130 Public sector corruption index ordinal (E) (e_v2x_pubcorr_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem public sector corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2x_pubcorr

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.131 Share of population with suffrage ordinal (E) (e_v2x_suffr_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem share of population with suffrage. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2elsuffrage

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.132 Equality before the law and individual liberty index ordinal (E) (e_v2xcl_rol_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equality before the law and individual liberty index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavelf v2clrelig v2clfmov v2clmovem v2cldmovew

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.33 Core civil society index ordinal (E) (e_v2xcs_ccsi_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: How robust is civil society?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem core civil society index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprtcpt

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.34 Direct popular vote index ordinal (E) (e_v2xdd_dd_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem direct popular vote index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddlevci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc
v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprf v2ddspmr
v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddyrl v2ddlexor v2ddpartor
v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyror, v2ddthreor, v2ddthrerf, v2ddthrepl

Data release: 5-6, 7 (new aggregation formula),8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.35 Deliberative component index ordinal (E) (e_v2xdl_delib_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem deliberative component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.36 Equal distribution of resources index ordinal (E) (e_v2xeg_eqdr_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: How equal is the distribution of resources?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equal distribution of resources index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrres v2pepwrsoc v2pepwrgrn

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.37 Equal protection index ordinal (E) (e_v2xeg_eqprotec_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equal protection index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2xcl_acjst v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2clnlpct

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.38 Clean elections index ordinal (E) (e_v2xel_frefair_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent are elections free and fair?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem clean elections index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2el_frefair

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_polyarchy_3C/_4C/_5C" above.

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.39 Local government index ordinal (E) (e_v2xel_locelec_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem local government index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.40 Regional government index ordinal (E) (e_v2xel_regelec_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem regional government index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.41 Legislative constraints on the executive index ordinal (E) (e_v2xlg_legcon_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (*e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.42 Alternative sources of information index ordinal (E) (e_v2xme_altinf_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem alternative sources of information index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.1.43 Party institutionalization index ordinal (E) (e_v2xps_party_3C /_4C /_5C)

Question: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

Clarification: These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem party institutionalization index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (_3C), four (_4C), and five (_5C) levels respectively.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv

Data release: 5-8.

Aggregation: Same transformation rule as for "v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C".

Citation: Lindberg (2016).

5.2 Database of Political Institutions

5.2.1 State government authority over taxing, spending, or legislating (E) (e_dpi-author)

Question: Do the state/provinces have authority over taxing, spending, or legislating?

Responses:

If 1 for any of these, category gets a 1. Authority over "cultural affairs", or "planning" in Communist systems, does not qualify.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.2 Autonomous regions (E) (e_dpi_auton)

Question: Are there autonomous regions?

Clarification: Autonomous regions are not the same as states, provinces, etc. An autonomous region is recorded if a source explicitly mentions a region, area, or district that is autonomous or self-governing. Furthermore, they must be constitutionally designated as "autonomous" or "independent" or "special". Federal Districts or Capital Districts do not count as autonomous regions. Disputed autonomy is not recorded. Indian reservations are not counted as autonomous.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Notes: This variable is deviating from convention, no information recorded as 0.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.3 Is chief executive a military officer? (E) (e_dpi_cemo)

Question: Is chief executive a military officer?

Responses:

- 1: if the source (Europa or Banks) includes a rank in their title.
- 0: Otherwise.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Notes: If chief executives were described as officers with no indication of formal retirement when they assumed office, they are always listed as officers for the duration of their term. If chief executives were formally retired military officers upon taking office, then this variable gets a 0.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.4 Checks and balances (E) (e_dpi_checks)

Clarification: Checks and Balances.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.5 Closed list (E) (e_dpi_cl)

Question: Are closed lists used?

Responses:

- 1: Yes
- 0: No.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Notes: When PR is "1", closed list gets a "1" if voters cannot express preferences for candidates within a party list, 0 if voters can. If PR is "NA" or 0, and Mean District Magnitude =1, Closed list is NA. If PR is "NA" or 0 and Mean District Magnitude is greater than one, the following rules apply: 1) If only one party takes seats, closed list is: "0" (open list), if the number of candidates is greater than the number of seats in an electoral district in a one-party state where other parties may or may not be illegal (LIEC is 4 or 5), "1" (closed list), if the number of candidates equals the number of seats in an electoral district in a one party state where other parties are illegal (LIEC is 3), blank, if it is unclear whether there is more than one candidate for every seat in an electoral district in a one-party state where other parties are

illegal (LIEC is 3.5). 2) If there are multiple parties taking seats, closed list is blank unless the system is explicitly stated as open or closed.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.6 Executive electoral competitiveness (E) (e_dpi_eipc)

Clarification: Uses same scale as Legislative IEC.

Responses:

1: Elected directly by population.

2: Elected by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing the executive, are scored on the above scale.

Scale: Categorical.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Notes: Executives elected by bodies other than these are given the same score that the electing body would get. Even if the electing body is not the actual "legislature" that is tracked in the LIEC (such as an appointed electoral college), the competitiveness of that body is used to score the executive. This means that competitively elected prime ministers get 6 or 7. The chief executives of Communist nations (the chairman of the Communist Party) is given a 3, because they are elected by the Party Congress, electing bodies which they do not appoint. Executives elected by small, appointed juntas or by appointed electoral colleges get 2. Rival chief executives in one country, particularly in the setting of armed conflicts, are counted as No executives, and thus score a 1. Referenda and votes by "popular acclamation" on unelected executives are scored as 3. If executives unilaterally extend their terms of office, they get a 2 starting in the year they should have held elections. Any executive elected for life, even by the people or an elected assembly, gets a 2. This elected-for-life rule is slightly different from that followed for legislatures that unilaterally extend their rule. If chief executive takes office through a coup and remains office without an election, EIEC is 2 because the executive is unelected. If an elected president is impeached and the vice-president succeeds the presidency in a legal and proper way, EIEC remains as was. If EIEC was 7 under the old president, it remains 7 under the new president. For "Electoral Rules" variables: all get an NA if the LIEC is 1. If LIEC is 2, then legislature is unelected and we infer that district magnitude is NA. If LIEC is less than or equal to 4, then PR is also NA irrespective of district magnitude. If LIEC is less than or equal to 3.5, then both PR and Plurality are NA. In order to assess electoral rules we use the IPU website as well as the Europa Yearbook (and to a lesser extent Banks). IPU has the most recent information whereas Europa has information up to 1984, and from 1990 to 1994. If there are discrepancies between Europa (to 1984) and IPU (1998), we assume that changes have occurred, and only input the IPU information for 1995, leaving blanks from 1985 to 1994. If the IPU matched the Europa exactly, we assumed no changes took place, and filled in the intervening years. In the event that a system changed and then switched back, this introduces errors. Since this assumption was made only when institutions from 1984 matched those in 1998, these cases are limited to very stable democracies.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.7 Chief executive party orientation (E) (e_dpi_erc)

Clarification: Party orientation with respect to economic policy, coded based on the description of the party in the sources, using the following criteria: Right: for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. Left: for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. Center: for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist (*e.g.* party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). Not described as centrist if competing factions "average out" to a centrist position (*e.g.* a party of "right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists"). 0: for all those cases which do not fit into the above-mentioned category (*i.e.* party's platform does not focus on economic issues, or there are competing wings), or no information.

Responses:

- 1: Right.
- 2: Center.
- 3: Left.

Scale: Categorical.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.8 Presidential election held (E) (e_dpi_exelec)

Question: Was there a presidential election held?

Responses:

- 0: No presidential election this year.
- 1: If there was an executive election in this year.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.9 Finite term in office (E) (e_dpi_finter)

Question: Is there a finite term in office?

Responses:

- 1: Yes.
- 0: No.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Notes: Is there a constitutional limit on the number of years the executive can serve before new elections must be called? Deviating from the convention, a 0 is recorded if a limit is not explicitly stated. This gets a 0 in the cases where the constitution with year limits is suspended or unenforced.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.2.10 Vote fraud (E) (e_dpi_fraud)

Question: Were vote fraud or candidate intimidation serious enough to affect the outcome of elections?

Clarification: This variable captures extra-constitutional irregularities, which are recorded only if mentioned in sources.

Responses:

- 0: Countries where, for example, opposition parties are officially and constitutionally banned or where irregularities are not mentioned (although may still exist).
- 1: When opposition is officially legal but suppressed anyway. If not an election year, or if elected government has been deposed, refers to most recent election (*i.e.* the only way to get rid of a "1" is to hold a fair election).

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cruz *et al.* (2018).

Notes: Recording is irrespective of whether only opposition claims that fraudulent elections have occurred or whether allegations are backed by independent international observers. Recorded also are any forms of boycotts carried out by important parties before or after parliamentary elections. In the cases where irregularities are mentioned in the text of the

sources, they were recorded. However, there may have been instances of fraud/violence that were not reported, thus resulting in false negatives.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cruz *et al.* (2018).

5.3 Bilinski

5.3.1 Percentage of elected MPs (E) (e_electedper)

Question: What is the percentage of elected legislature members?

Responses:

Percent.

Source(s): Bilinski (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Bilinski (2015).

5.3.2 Elected institutions (E) (e_electinst)

Question: Did the country have any elected institutions?

Clarification: Elected institutions means the presence of legislature of executive, or both. If blank, it means that a country lacked an effective central government.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Bilinski (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Bilinski (2015).

5.3.3 Notes (E) (e_notes_srcs)

Question: What sources were used to code this country/year?

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): Bilinski (2015).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Bilinski (2015).

5.3.4 Electoral pluralism (E) (e_pluralism)

Question: Were the legislature or the executive elected?

Clarification: The elections must have oppositional political organizations or candidates that could participate in practice (*i.e.* pluralist elections).

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Bilinski (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Bilinski (2015).

5.3.5 *De facto* sovereignty (E) (e_sovdefacto)

Question: Is the country *de facto* sovereign?

Clarification: A *de facto* sovereign country is defined as free to decide on its form of political system; it is not effectively restricted by an external actor regarding the choice of its political system or head executive.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

12: A country is independent *de facto* and forms a constituent unit of another country which is also independent *de facto*

Source(s): Bilinski (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Bilinski (2015).

5.3.6 *De jure* sovereignty (E) (e_sovdejure)

Question: Is the country *de jure* sovereign?

Clarification: A *de jure* sovereign country is defined as sovereign according to the international law; it is recognized by the international community.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Bilinski (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Bilinski (2015).

5.3.7 Uncertainty 1 (E) (e_uncertainty1)

Question: How certain are the previous answers?

Clarification: If uncertainty1 = 1, it indicates that more detailed information on the scope of suffrage, or the presence of elected institutions, likely exist, but more extensive research, with the use of online-inaccessible content, would be necessary to determine the scope of suffrage more accurately.

Responses:

0: Not certain

1: More information exists

Source(s): Bilinski (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Bilinski (2015).

5.3.8 Uncertainty 2 (E) (e_uncertainty2)

Question: How certain are the previous answers?

Clarification: Relevant if uncertainty1 = 0. If uncertainty2 = 1, it indicates uncertain estimate of the scope of suffrage resulting from objective real-world factors (*i.e.* unrelated to the presence of sources). In other words, the existing accessible sources on the scope of suffrage are sufficient, but they do not provide for precise suffrage estimate, and the latter likely does not exist (for example, the number of eligible or registered votes during a particular period is unknown or uncertain).

Responses:

0: Not certain, because lacking sources

1: Uncertain because of real world factors

Source(s): Bilinski (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Bilinski (2015).

5.4 Comparative Constitutional Project

5.4.1 Amparo (E) (e_ccp_amparo)

Question: Does the constitution provide for a right to petition for ‘amparo’?

Responses:

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: AMPARO

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.2 Cabinet approval by law (E) (e_ccp_cabappr)

Question: Who approves the cabinet/ministers?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "__<Response number>". If the person or group who is responsible for appointing the cabinet/ministers must consult or be advised by another group in their selection, please select one of the "Appointer is directed..." options, rather than choosing that group as the approving body. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_2]
- 3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_3]
- 4: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_4]
- 5: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_5]
- 6: Appointer is directed to act on the advice of majority party, legislature, or executive (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_6]
- 7: Appointer is directed to act on the basis of election results (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_98]

Ordering: Asked only if CABINET is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v165.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.3 Cabinet appointment by law (E) (e_ccp_cabappt)

Question: Who nominates/appoints the cabinet/ministers?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "__<Response number>". If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_1]
- 2: Head of Government. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_2]
- 3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_3]
- 4: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_4]
- 5: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_5]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_97]
- 98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_98]

Ordering: Asked only if CABINET is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v164.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.4 Cabinet dismissal by law (E) (e_ccp_cabdiss)

Question: Who has the authority to dismiss the cabinet/ministers?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_1]
- 2: Head of Government. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_2]
- 3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_3]
- 4: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_4]
- 5: Both Chambers of the Legislature acting separately. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_5]
- 6: Both Chambers of the Legislature in a joint session. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_6]
- 7: By Public Recall. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_7]
- 8: Public Prosecutor. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_8]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_97]
- 98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_98]

Ordering: Asked only if CABINET is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v167.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.5 Cabinet regulated by law (E) (e_ccp_cabinet)

Question: Does the constitution mention the executive cabinet/ministers?

Clarification: By cabinet, we are referring to the government's ministers who are responsible for particular substantive areas.

Responses:

- 1: Yes ?
- 2: No?
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section?
- 97: Unable to Determine

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v163.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CABINET

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.6 Standing — constitutional review (E) (e_ccp_challeg)

Question: Who has standing to initiate challenge to the constitutionality of legislation?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>". If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 7: Lawyers (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 8: Public (by complaint) (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 9: The Courts (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes)
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes)

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CHELLEG

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.7 Type of constitutional review (E) (e_ccp_chalstag)

Question: At what stage of the legislative process can bills be reviewed for constitutionality?

Responses:

- 1: Pre-promulgation
- 2: Post-promulgation
- 3: Either
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CHALSTAG

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.8 Effects of constitutional review (E) (e_ccp_chaluncn)

Question: What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

- 1: Law is void (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-1]
- 2: Void for specific case, but law still exists (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-2]
- 3: Returned to legislature for revision/reconsideration (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-3]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-98]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: CHALUNCN

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.9 CJ term (E) (e_ccp_chfterm)

Question: What is the maximum term length for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

Responses:

- 1: Numeric
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CHFTERM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.10 CJ restrictions (E) (e_ccp_chftrmnm)

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

Responses:

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CHFTRMNM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.11 CJ approval (E) (e_ccp_chiefap)

Question: Who is involved in the approval of nominations for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CHIEFAP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.12 CJ nomination (E) (e_ccp_chiefnom)

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CHIEFNOM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.13 Approval of constitutional court nominations (E) (e_ccp_conap)

Question: Who is involved in the approval of judges to the constitutional court?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CONAP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.14 Restrictions on constitutional judge terms (E) (e_ccp_conlim)

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms judges on the Constitutional Court may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

Responses:

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CONLIM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.15 Constitutional court nominations (E) (e_ccp_connom)

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the constitutional court?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection

questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CONNOM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.16 Special procedures for removing constitutional judges (E) (e_ccp_conrem)

Question: Does the constitution mention any special procedures for removing members of the constitutional court?

Responses:

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CONREM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.17 Procedures for removing constitutional judges (E) (e_ccp_conremp)

Question: What are the details of the process for removing members on the constitutional court?

Responses:

- 1: Text
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if CONREM is answered 1.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: CONREMP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.18 Term for constitutional judges (E) (e_ccp_conterm)

Question: What is the maximum term length for judges for the constitutional court?

Clarification: Please answer 0 if the term length is not specified, and answer 100 if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

Responses:

1: Numeric

99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: CONTERM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.19 Chief justice (CJ) highest ordinary court (E) (e_ccp_hoccj)

Question: Is the selection process specified for the chief justice or the other justices of the Highest Ordinary Court?

Responses:

1: Chief Justice only

2: Regular Justices only

3: Both with same procedure

4: Both with different procedures for each

5: Neither

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question asked only if LEVJUD is answered 1, or if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: HOCCJ

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.20 HOG removal body by law (E) (e_ccp_hogadiss)

Question: Who can approve a dismissal of the Head of Government?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "<Response number>". If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

1: Head of State. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_1]

2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_2]

3: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_3]

4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_4]

5: Public (*e.g.*, recall). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_5]

6: Public Prosecutor. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_6]

7: Court. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_7]

8: Constitutional Council or Constitutional Court. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_8]

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_90]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_96]

97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_97]

98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_98]

Ordering: Asked only if HOGDISS is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v133.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.21 HOG approval by law (E) (e_ccp_hogapp)

Question: Who approves the nomination of the Head of Government?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Head of State. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_1]
- 2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_2]
- 3: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_3]
- 4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_4]
- 5: Parliamentary Majority. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_5]
- 6: No formal approval process specified, but appointer is directed to act on the advice of party/legislative majority. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_6]
- 7: No formal approval process specified, but appointer is directed to act on the basis of election results. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_97]
- 98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_98]

Ordering: Asked only if HOGELECT is answered 3.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v125.

Data release: 1-7.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.22 HOG removal grounds by law (E) (e_ccp_hogdcond)

Question: Under what grounds can the Head of Government be dismissed?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>". You should select the "general dissatisfaction" option if the constitution refers to a loss of confidence or support for the Head of Government.

Responses:

- 1: General dissatisfaction or no confidence with the leadership (*i.e.*, dismissal is fairly unrestricted). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_1]
- 2: Crimes and other issues of conduct, only. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_2]
- 3: Treason. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_3]
- 4: Violations of the constitution. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_4]
- 5: Incapacitated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_5]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_97]
- 98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_98]

Ordering: Asked only if HOGDISS is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v132.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.23 HOG removal regulated by law (E) (e_ccp_hogdiss)

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of Government?

Clarification: For all questions referring to the dismissal of the Head of Government, we are referring to normal dismissal procedures as well as vote of confidence procedures. We are not referring to events such as death, incapacitation, or expiration of term.

Responses:

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v131.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: HOGDISS

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.24 HOG appointment by law (E) (e_ccp_hogelect)

Question: How is the Head of Government selected?

Clarification: If the Head of Government is selected by the legislature alone, please select "Elected by Elite Group." If there is more than one body who is involved in the selection process for the Head of Government and one of them happens to be the legislature, please select "Appointed."

Responses:

- 1: Heredity/Royal Selection
- 2: Elected by Citizens
- 3: Elected by Elite Group
- 4: Appointed
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 2.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v122.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: HOGSELECT

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.25 HOG nomination by law (E) (e_ccp_hognom)

Question: Who nominates the Head of Government for Appointment?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Head of State. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_1]
- 2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_2]
- 3: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_3]
- 4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_4]

- 5: Parliamentary Majority. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_5]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_97]
- 98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_98]

Ordering: Asked only if HOGELECT is answered 3, or if HOGELECT is answered 25.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v124.

Data release: 1-7.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.26 HOG term limit by law (E) (e_ccp_hogterml)

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms the Head of Government may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

Responses:

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM=3 or HOSHOG=2.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v127 [HOGTERML].

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: HOGTERML

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.27 HOS removal body by law (E) (e_ccp_hosadiss)

Question: Who can approve a dismissal of the Head of State?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>". If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Head of Government. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_1]
- 2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_2]
- 3: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_3]
- 4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_4]
- 5: Public (*e.g.*, recall). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_5]
- 6: Public Prosecutor. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_6]
- 7: Court. (0=No, 1=Yes). [e_HOSADISS_7]
- 8: Constitutional Council or Constitutional Court. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_8]
- 9: The Government/Cabinet. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_9]
- 10: No approval needed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_10]

- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_97]
- 98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_98]

Ordering: Asked only if HOSDISS is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v104 (also see v105-107 on proportion of vote needed by legislature); cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8. 1; 8a. 1-4.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: HOSADISS

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.28 HOS removal grounds by law (E) (e_ccp_hosdcond)

Question: On what grounds can the Head of State be dismissed?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "<Response number>". You should select the "general dissatisfaction" option if the constitution refers to a loss of confidence or support for the Head of State.

Responses:

- 1: General dissatisfaction with the leadership (*i.e.*, dismissal is fairly unrestricted). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_1]
- 2: Crimes and other issues of conduct. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_2]
- 3: Treason. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_3]
- 4: Violations of the constitution. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_4]
- 5: Incapacitated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_5]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_97]
- 98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_98]

Ordering: Asked only if HOSDISS is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v97; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8. 1; 8a. 1-4.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: HOSDCOND

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.29 HOS removal regulated by law (E) (e_ccp_hosdiss)

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of State?

Clarification: When referring to dismissal, we mean the active removal of a public official, so do not answer yes to this question if the constitution only refers to death/incapacitation or expiration of term of office.

Responses:

- 1: Yes?
- 2: No?
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section?
- 97: Unable to Determine?
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 1, or if HOSHOG is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 4, or if HOSHOG is answered 96, or if HOSHOG is answered 97.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v96; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8. 1; 8a. 1-4.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: HOSDISS

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.30 HOS appointment by other (E) (e_ccp_hoselctr)

Question: Who are the electors for the Head of State?

Clarification: Please provide any details about the process of election by electors in the comments section.

Responses:

1: Text

99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you selected 0 or 8 on the previous question.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOSELECT is answered 3.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), var v91; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8a, 1-4.

Data release: 3-7.

CPP tag: HOSELCTR

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.31 HOS appointment by law (E) (e_ccp_hoselect)

Question: How is the Head of State selected?

Clarification: If the Head of State is selected by the legislature, please select "Elected by Elite Group."

Responses:

1: Heredity/Royal Selection

2: Elected by Citizens

3: Elected by Elite Group

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 1, or if HOSHOG is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 4, or if HOSHOG is answered 96, or if HOSHOG is answered 97.

Scale: A series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), var v89; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8a, 1-4.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: HOSELECT

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.32 HOS term limit by law (E) (e_ccp_hosterm1)

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms the Head of State may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether there is a limit.

Responses:

1: Only one term permitted, total

2: Only two terms permitted, total

3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted

4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted

- 5: Explicitly no term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered "yes" (1) to the previous question.

CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 1, or if HOSHOG is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 4, or if HOSHOG is answered 96, or if HOSHOG is answered 97.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v93.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: HOSTERML

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.33 Legislature immunity in practice (E) (e_ccp_immunity)

Question: Does the constitution provide for immunity for the members of the legislature under some conditions?

Clarification: Absolute immunity means immunity from all types of legal process. Limited immunity means immunity only for certain types of actions. Please note in the comments section if there are any time restrictions for immunity or if immunity can be waived.

Responses:

- 1: Absolute Immunity
- 2: Limited Immunity
- 3: No Immunity
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v260.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: IMMUNITY

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.34 Constitutional review (E) (e_ccp_interp)

Question: To whom does the constitution assign the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "__<Response number>". If the constitutional court is mentioned in the constitution, you need to check it here regardless if they are explicitly given the power of interpretation. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Any Ordinary Court (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-1]
- 2: Constitutional Court/Council (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-2]
- 3: Supreme Court Only (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-3]
- 4: Special chamber of the Supreme Court (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-4]
- 5: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-5]
- 6: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-6]

- 7: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-98]

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: INTERP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.35 Legislature questions officials by law (E) (e_ccp_intexec)

Question: Does the legislature have the power to interpellate members of the executive branch, or similarly, is the executive responsible for reporting its activities to the legislature on a regular basis?

Responses:

- 1: Legislature can call executive to report as it sees fit
- 2: Executive must report to legislature at regular intervals
- 3: Both
- 4: Neither
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if LEGISL=1.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v261.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: INTEXEC

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.36 Legislature investigates by law (E) (e_ccp_invexe)

Question: Does the legislature have the power to investigate the activities of the executive branch?

Clarification: Please answer "no" if the constitution explicitly denies the subject of the question and "not specified" if the subject of the question is not mentioned in the constitution.

Responses:

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v262 [INVEXE].

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: INVEXE

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.37 Dismissal procedures (E) (e_ccp_jrem)

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing judges?

Responses:

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: JREM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.38 Dismissal approval (E) (e_ccp_jremap)

Question: Who can approve the dismissal of judges?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>". If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-5]
- 6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-6]
- 7: Public Prosecutor (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if JREM is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: JREMAP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.39 Dismissal approval vote 3 (E) (e_ccp_jrembota)

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in Both Chambers to approve the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if JREMAP is answered 6.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: JREMBOTA

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.40 Dismissal vote 3 (E) (e_ccp_jrembotp)

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in Both Chambers to propose the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if JREM is answered 1.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: JREMBOTP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.41 Dismissal rationale (E) (e_ccp_jremcon)

Question: Under what conditions can judges be dismissed?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: General dissatisfaction (*i.e.* dismissal is fairly unrestricted) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-1]
- 2: Crimes and other issues of conduct (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-2]
- 3: Treason (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-3]
- 4: Violations of the constitution (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-4]
- 5: Incapacitated (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-5]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if JREM is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: JREMCON

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.42 Dismissal approval vote 1 (E) (e_ccp_jremfira)

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the first (or unicameral) chamber to approve the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if JREMAP is answered 4.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: JREMFIRA

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.43 Dismissal vote (E) (e_ccp_jremfirp)

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the first (or unicameral) chamber to propose the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: JREMFIRP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.44 Dismissal proposal (E) (e_ccp_jrempro)

Question: Who can propose the dismissal of judges?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>". If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CPP tag: JREMPRO-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CPP tag: JREMPRO-2]

- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: JREMPRO-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-5]
- 6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-6]
- 7: Public Prosecutor (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-7]
- 8: Judicial Council (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-8]
- 9: Public (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-9]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if JREM is answered 1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: JREMPRO

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.45 Dismissal approval vote 2 (E) (e_ccp_jremseca)

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the Second Chamber to approve the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if JREMAP is answered 5.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: JREMSECA

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.46 Dismissal vote 2 (E) (e_ccp_jremsecp)

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the Second Chamber to propose the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: JREMSECP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.47 Specialized courts (E) (e_ccp_judcrts)

Question: For which of the following specialized courts does the constitution contain provisions?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>". If religious courts, labor courts, tax courts, military courts, courts charged with hearing cases against public officials, or courts of amparo are mentioned, please list any special provisions for these courts in the comments section. Choose all that apply.

Responses:

- 1: Administrative courts
- 2: Constitutional court
- 3: Courts of amparo
- 4: Military courts
- 5: Courts charged with hearing cases against holders of public offices
- 6: Tax courts
- 7: Labor courts
- 8: Religious courts
- 9: Special court
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: JUDCRTS

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.48 Judicial salaries (E) (e_ccp_judsal)

Question: Does the constitution explicitly state that judicial salaries are protected from governmental intervention?

Responses:

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: JUDSAL

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.49 Propose legislation by law (E) (e_ccp_leg_in)

Question: Who does the constitution specify can initiate general legislation?

Clarification: Note any restrictions on how the particular offices can initiate legislation. This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_1]
- 2: Head of Government. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_3]
- 4: Political Party. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_4]
- 5: Member of First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_5]
- 6: Member of Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_6]
- 7: Public (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_7]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_97]
- 98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_98]

Ordering: Asked only if LEGISL=1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v263; IAEP question 3. B 2; but only either or.

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.50 Veto legislation by law (E) (e_ccp_legapp)

Question: Who has the power to approve/reject legislation once it has been passed by the legislature (not including reviews for constitutionality)?

Clarification: If the constitution allows a body to ask for reconsideration or request a second reading, please make a note in the comments, but do not select that body below.

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)
- 2: Head of Government
- 3: Both Head of State and Head of Government
- 4: The Government/Cabinet
- 5: Legislation does not require approval
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if LEGISL=1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v270 (also see v271-275 on details and override); IAEP question 4. 2.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: LEGAPP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.51 Dissolution of legislature by law (E) (e_ccp_legdiss)

Question: Who, if anybody, can dismiss the legislature?

Clarification: If constitution expressly prohibits any actor from dissolving or adjourning the legislature, please answer "Other, please specify in the comments section". Choose all that apply.

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)
- 2: Head of Government

- 3: Either Head of State or Head of Government
- 4: The Government/Cabinet
- 5: The Legislature itself
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if LEGISL=1.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v255; IAEP, questions 4. 1; but only either or.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: LEGDISS

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.52 Legislature supermajority (E) (e_ccp_legsupr)

Question: Is a supermajority needed for passing any legislation?

Clarification: Mark "Yes" if there are any types of legislation that require a supermajority, but this does not include economic legislation or any legislative approval powers (*i.e.* impeachment, declaration of war, etc.).

Responses:

- 1: Yes
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: If (1) is chosen, questions pertaining to the upper chamber and the one question entitled Dominant chamber [v2lqdomchm] do not apply. CCP ordering: Asked only if LEGISL is answered.

Scale: Dichotomous (assuming that missing observations can be interpreted as "No").

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v264.

Notes: We might consider adding a "No" option, which could be interpreted as the residual category.

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: LEGSUPR

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.53 Legislature super-majority types (E) (e_ccp_legsuprw)

Question: What types of legislation require a supermajority?

Clarification: This question refers exclusively to legislation, not other acts performed by the legislature like declaring war, impeaching members of government, etc.

Responses:

- 1: Text
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if LEGSUPR is answered 1.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), v265.

Data release: 3-7.

CPP tag: LEGSUPRW

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.54 Type of courts (E) (e_ccp_levjud)

Question: Does the court system provide for any of the following?

Clarification: By ordinary courts, we mean non-specialized courts. For example, the Supreme Court, Appellate Courts, and District Courts in the United States. By contrast, specialized courts include the constitutional court, military courts, and administrative courts.

Responses:

- 1: Supreme or top court only [e_LEVJUD -1]
- 2: Supreme court and other courts to be determined by law [e_LEVJUD -2]
- 3: Supreme court and specific other courts, such as provincial or city courts [e_LEVJUD -3]
- 4: Other courts mentioned, but no supreme court [e_LEVJUD -4]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [e_LEVJUD -96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [e_LEVJUD -97]
- 98: Not Specified [e_LEVJUD -98]

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.55 Ordinary court name (E) (e_ccp_ordname)

Question: What name is given to the ordinary courts?

Clarification: Please list the name in the order given in the constitution.

Responses:

Text.

Ordering: This question is asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 3-8.

CPP tag: e_ ORDNAME

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.56 Nomination of ordinary judges (E) (e_ccp_ordnom)

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to ordinary courts?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: ORDNUM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.57 Approval of ordinary court nominations (E) (e_ccp_ornap)

Question: Who is involved in the approval of nominations to ordinary courts?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: ORNAP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.58 Lower chamber regular sessions (E) (e_ccp_session)

Question: For how long are legislators in session during each year?

Clarification: Report the number of months per year. Answer "0" if not specified.

Responses:

- 1: Numeric
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: Asked only if LEGISL=1.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014). v296.

Data release: 3-7.

CPP tag: SESSION

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.59 Highest ordinary court approval (E) (e_ccp_supap)

Question: Who is involved in the approval of nominations to the highest ordinary court?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>".

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-7]

- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: SUPAP

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.60 Supreme court name (E) (e_ccp_supname)

Question: What name is given to the highest ordinary court?

Responses:

- 1: Text
- 99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question asked only if LEVJUD is answered 1, or if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 3-8.

CPP tag: SUPNAME

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.61 Highest ordinary court judge nominations (E) (e_ccp_supnom)

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the highest ordinary court?

Clarification: This variable is dichotomized in a similar fashion as the V-Dem Multiple Selection questions with each binary answer category suffixed with "_<Response number>". By judicial council/commission, we are referring to an independent body that is composed of experts in law who are important in the selection process for judges.

Responses:

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-1]
- 2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-97]
- 98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-98]

Ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

Scale: Series of dichotomous scales.

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: SUPNOM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.62 Highest ordinary court terms (E) (e_ccp_supterm)

Question: What is the maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

Responses:

Numeric.

Ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-8.

CPP tag: SUPTERM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.4.63 Highest ordinary court restrictions (E) (e_ccp_suptermm)

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms that members of the highest ordinary court may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified.

Responses:

1: Only one term permitted, total

2: Only two terms permitted, total

3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted

4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted

5: No term limits

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

Data release: 1-7.

CPP tag: SUPTERMM

Citation: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014).

5.5 Political Regimes

5.5.1 Democracy (BMR) (E) (e_boix_regime)

Question: Is a country democratic?

Clarification: Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Boix *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Boix *et al.* (2013).

5.5.2 Democratic breakdowns (E) (e_democracy_breakdowns)

Question: How many previous democratic breakdowns occurred?

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Boix *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Boix *et al.* (2013).

5.5.3 Duration of regime (E) (e_democracy_duration)

Question: How many consecutive years of current regime type?

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Boix *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Boix *et al.* (2013).

5.5.4 Omitted data (E) (e_democracy_omitteddata)

Question: Is the country a democracy?

Clarification: This is the same measure as democracy, except it records an "NA" for countries occupied during an international war (*e.g.*, the Netherlands 1940-44) or experiencing state collapse during a civil war (*e.g.*, Lebanon 1976-89). The democracy variable instead fills in these years as continuations of the same regime type.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

2: NA

Source(s): Boix *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Boix *et al.* (2013).

5.5.5 Democratic transition (E) (e_democracy_trans)

Question: Was there a democratic transition?

Responses:

-1: Democratic breakdown

0: No change

1: Democratic transition

Source(s): Boix *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Boix *et al.* (2013).

5.5.6 Sovereignty (E) (e_sovereignty)

Question: Is the country sovereign?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Boix *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Boix *et al.* (2013).

5.6 Freedom House

5.6.1 Civil liberties (E) (e_fh_cl)

Clarification: Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years.

Responses:

Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

Source(s): Freedom House (2018). Taken from Teorell *et al.* (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Freedom House (2018).

5.6.2 Freedom House/Imputed Polity (E) (e_fh_ipolity2)

Responses:

Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic.

Source(s): Freedom House (2018). Taken from Teorell *et al.* (2018).

Notes: Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius and Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Freedom House (2018).

5.6.3 Personal autonomy and individual rights (E) (e_fh_pair)

Clarification: The variable evaluates the extent of state control over travel, choice of residence, employment or institution of higher education; the right of citizens to own property and establish private businesses; the private business' freedom from undue influence by government officials, security forces, political parties or organized crime; gender equality, freedom of choice of marriage partners and size of family; equality of opportunity and absence of economic exploitation.

Responses:

Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

Source(s): Freedom House (2018). Taken from Teorell *et al.* (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Freedom House (2018).

5.6.4 Freedom House/Polity (E) (e_fh_polity2)

Responses:

Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic.

Source(s): Freedom House (2018). Taken from Teorell *et al.* (2018).

Notes: Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Freedom House (2018).

5.6.5 Political rights (E) (e_fh_pr)

Clarification: Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years.

Responses:

Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

Source(s): Freedom House (2018). Taken from Teorell et al (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Freedom House (2018).

5.6.6 Rule of law (E) (e_fh_rol)

Clarification: The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population.

Responses:

Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

Source(s): Freedom House (2018). Taken from Teorell et al (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Freedom House (2018).

5.6.7 Status (E) (e_fh_status)

Responses:

1: Free.

2: Partly Free.

3: Not Free.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Freedom House (2018). Taken from Teorell et al (2018).

Notes: Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free", and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free". Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free", 3.0 to 5.0 "Partly Free", and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free".

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Freedom House (2018).

5.7 World Bank Governance Indicators

5.7.1 Control of corruption — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_cce)

Clarification: "Control of Corruption" measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of "additional payments to get things done", to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring "grand corruption" in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in "state capture".

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.2 Control of corruption — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_ccs)

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.3 Government effectiveness (E) (e_wbgi_gee)

Clarification: "Government Effectiveness" combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on "inputs" required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.4 Government effectiveness — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_ges)

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.5 Political stability — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_pve)

Clarification: "Political Stability" combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.6 Political stability — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_pvs)

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.7 Rule of law — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_rle)

Clarification: "Rule of Law" includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.8 Rule of law — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_rls)

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.9 Regulatory quality — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_rqe)

Clarification: "Regulatory Quality" includes measures of the incidence of marketunfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.10 Regulatory quality — number of sources (E) (e_wbgi_rqn)

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.11 Voice and accountability — estimate (E) (e_wbgi_vae)

Clarification: "Voice and Accountability" includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.7.12 Voice and accountability — standard errors (E) (e_wbgi_vas)

Source(s): Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

5.8 Election Quality and International Observation

5.8.1 Month of executive election (E) (e_Dateexec)

Question: What was the month of the executive election?

Responses:

- 1: January
- 2: February
- 3: March
- 4: April
- 5: May
- 6: June
- 7: July
- 8: August
- 9: September
- 10: October
- 11: November
- 12: December
- 0: Missing data

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5, 7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.2 Month of legislative election (E) (e_Dateleg)

Question: What was the month of the legislative election?

Responses:

- 1: January
- 2: February
- 3: March
- 4: April
- 5: May
- 6: June
- 7: July
- 8: August
- 9: September
- 10: October
- 11: November
- 12: December
- 0: Missing data

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5, 7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.3 Executive election (E) (e_Exelec)

Question: Was there an executive election that year?

Responses:

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.4 Intercoder (E) (e_INTERCODER)

Question: How many variables (0-7) between SR0STR and SR23VIOL had to be reconciled between the datasets?

Responses:

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.5 Legislative election (E) (e_Legelec)

Question: Was there a legislative election that year?

Responses:

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.6 Problems (E) (e_Problems)

Clarification: A variable that Combines SA1 and SA2.

Responses:

0
1
2
3
4
5

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.7 Rec_Score (E) (e_Rec_Score)

Question: How many variables between SF1, SF2, and SF3 had to be reconciled between the datasets?

Responses:

0
1
2
3
9

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.8 Overall election quality (E) (e_SA1)

Question: Do the election results represent the will of the people?

Responses:

0: Yes
.5: Ambiguous
1: No

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.9 Extent of election problems (E) (e_SA2)

Question: What is the extent of problems during the elections?

Clarification: This variable assesses the extent of the problems in the election. This is a combined assessment that considers problems in the legal framework, political and administrative problems in the pre-election period, and then the integrity of the election day itself.

Responses:

0: Good, no problems
1: Low, minor problems only
2: Moderate problems
3: Major problems

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.10 Run-off election (E) (e_Selrunoff)

Question: Was there a run-off election that year?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.11 Transitional election (E) (e_Seltrans)

Question: Was there a transitional election that year?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.12 Freedom to change government (E) (e_SF1)

Question: Do citizens have the right to change the government?

Responses:

1: No, citizens do not have the right to change the government

2: Rights exist, but with some problems

3: Yes, citizens have the right to change the government

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.13 Freedom of association (E) (e_SF2)

Question: Do citizens have freedom of association?

Responses:

1: No, citizens do not have freedom of association

2: Rights exist, but with some problems

3: Yes, citizens have freedom of association

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.14 Freedom of speech (E) (e_SF3)

Question: Do citizens have freedom of speech?

Responses:

1: No, citizens do not have freedom of speech

2: Rights exist, but with some problems

3: Yes, citizens have freedom of speech

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.15 International observers (E) (e_Siemass)

Question: Were there any international observers during the elections?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.16 Domestic observers (E) (e_Sobsdom)

Question: Were there any domestic observers during the elections?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.17 Number of pages in the report (E) (e_SP1)

Question: How many pages was the report?

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.18 Number of paragraphs in the report (E) (e_SP2)

Question: How many paragraphs was the report?

Clarification: This is an indicator of the extensiveness of the report. It is equal to the number of paragraphs devoted directly to the election in the intro and section 3 on the rights of citizens to change their government.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.19 Structural environment (E) (e_SR0STR)

Question: How good is the legal framework for performing elections?

Responses:

0: Good, no problems

1: Low, minor problems only

2: Moderate problems

3: Major problems

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.20 Overall pre-election political conditions (E) (e_SR11CHEAT)

Question: Were the pre-election standards respected?

Clarification: This variable includes a number of behaviors that violate the international standards of a proper pre-election environment. This variable captures improper use of public funds and unfair use of government resources.

Responses:

- 0: Good, no problems
- 1: Low, minor problems only
- 2: Moderate problems
- 3: Major problems

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.21 Overall pre-election administrative capacity (E) (e_SR12CAP)

Question: Were there problems regarding the pre-election administrative capacity?

Clarification: This variable captures administrative problems with the voter lists and registration that that reports notes as occurring in the pre-election period.

Responses:

- 0: Good, no problems
- 1: Low, minor problems only
- 2: Moderate problems
- 3: Major problems

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.22 Pre-election violence and unrest (E) (e_SR13VIOL)

Question: Were there problems regarding the pre-election violence or unrest?

Responses:

- 0: Good, no problems
- 1: Low, minor problems only
- 2: Moderate problems
- 3: Major problems

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.8.23 Indicator of whether SA1 and SA2 variables had to be reconciled by coders (E) (e_SREC)

Question: Were variables sa1 or sa2 reconciled by coders?

Responses:

- 0: No reconciliation, consensus
- 1: One variable had to be reconciled
- 2: Both variables had to be reconciled

Source(s): Kelley and Kolev (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Kelley and Kolev (2010).

5.9 Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy

5.9.1 Minimally competitive elections (E) (e_competition)

Question: Are the elections competitive?

Clarification: The chief executive offices and the seats in the effective legislative body are filled by elections characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain power.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

5.9.2 Selection of the executive (E) (e_exselec)

Question: Is the executive at least partly elected?

Clarification: The variable indicates if the chief executive is elected (whether directly or indirectly; indirectly means elected by people who have been elected; if indirectly elected, election by a partly elected body counts as being elected).

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

5.9.3 Selection of the legislature (E) (e_legselec)

Question: Is the legislature at least partly elected?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

5.9.4 Lexical index (E) (e_lexical_index)

Question: What is the lexical index of democracy in the country?

Responses:

0: No elections

1: No party or one-party elections

2: Multi-party elections for legislature

3: Multi-party elections for legislature and executive

4: Minimally competitive elections

5: Male or female suffrage

6: Universal suffrage

Source(s): Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

5.9.5 Multi-party legislative elections (E) (e_multiparty_elections)

Question: Are the elections for the lower house (or unicameral chamber) multi-party?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes. The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is (at least in part) elected by voters facing more than one choice. Specifically, parties are not banned and (a) more than one party is allowed to compete or (b) elections are nonpartisan (*i.e.*, all candidates run without party labels).

Source(s): Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

5.10 Haber and Menaldo

5.10.1 Elections NELDA id-number (E) (e_nelda_electionid)

Question: What is the NELDA-type unique identifier for each election date, type, and round?

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.10.2 Normalized polity score (E) (e_polity_s)

Question: What is the country Polity normalized score?

Clarification: The Polity index is normalized to run from 0 to 100 by adding 10 and multiplying by five. This transformation makes regression coefficients easier to interpret.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

5.10.3 Binary regime score (E) (e_Regime)

Question: What is the country Regime score?

Clarification: Based on Przeworski *et al.* *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*, democracy is defined as there being more than one political party and control of the executive alternates between parties.

Responses:

1: Autocratic

0: Democratic

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

5.10.4 Share of democracies in the region (E) (e_region_dem_diffuse)

Question: What is the percentage of democracies in each region?

Responses:

Percent.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

5.10.5 Share of democracies in the world (E) (e_world_dem_diffuse)

Question: What is the percentage of democracies in the world?

Responses:

Percent.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

5.11 Nelda

5.11.1 Prior elections suspended (E) (e_nelda_1_ex)

Clarification: "Prior elections suspended" for executive elections only.

5.11.2 Prior elections suspended (E) (e_nelda_1_leg)

Clarification: "Prior elections suspended" for legislative elections only.

5.11.3 Prior elections suspended (E) (e_nelda_1_notes_ex)

Clarification: "Prior elections suspended" for executive elections only.

5.11.4 Prior elections suspended (E) (e_nelda_1_notes_leg)

Clarification: "Prior elections suspended" for legislative elections only.

5.11.5 Harassment of the opposition (E) (e_nelda_15_ex)

Clarification: "Harassment of the opposition" for executive elections only.

5.11.6 Harassment of the opposition (E) (e_nelda_15_leg)

Clarification: "Harassment of the opposition" for legislative elections only.

5.11.7 Harassment of the opposition (E) (e_nelda_15_notes_ex)

Clarification: "Harassment of the opposition" for executive elections only.

5.11.8 Harassment of the opposition (E) (e_nelda_15_notes_leg)

Clarification: "Harassment of the opposition" for legislative elections only.

5.11.9 Media bias in elections (E) (e_nelda_16_ex)

Clarification: "Media bias in elections" for executive elections only.

5.11.10 Media bias in elections (E) (e_nelda_16_leg)

Clarification: "Media bias in elections" for legislative elections only.

5.11.11 Media bias in elections (E) (e_nelda_16_notes_ex)

Clarification: "Media bias in elections" for executive elections only.

5.11.12 Media bias in elections (E) (e_nelda_16_notes_leg)

Clarification: "Media bias in elections" for legislative elections only.

5.11.13 Opposition (E) (e_nelda_3_ex)

Clarification: "Opposition" for executive elections only.

5.11.14 Opposition (E) (e_nelda_3_leg)

Clarification: "Opposition" for legislative elections only.

5.11.15 Opposition (E) (e_nelda_3_notes_ex)

Clarification: "Opposition" for executive elections only.

5.11.16 Opposition (E) (e_nelda_3_notes_leg)

Clarification: "Opposition" for legislative elections only.

5.11.17 Elections canceled (E) (e_nelda_32_ex)

Clarification: "Elections canceled" for executive elections only.

5.11.18 Elections canceled (E) (e_nelda_32_leg)

Clarification: "Elections canceled" for legislative elections only.

5.11.19 Elections canceled (E) (e_nelda_32_notes_ex)

Clarification: "Elections canceled" for executive elections only.

5.11.20 Elections canceled (E) (e_nelda_32_notes_leg)

Clarification: "Elections canceled" for legislative elections only.

5.11.21 Violence during elections (E) (e_nelda_33_ex)

Clarification: "Violence during elections" for executive elections only.

5.11.22 Violence during elections (E) (e_nelda_33_leg)

Clarification: "Violence during elections" for legislative elections only.

5.11.23 Violence during elections (E) (e_nelda_33_notes_ex)

Clarification: "Violence during elections" for executive elections only.

5.11.24 Violence during elections (E) (e_nelda_33_notes_leg)

Clarification: "Violence during elections" for legislative elections only.

5.11.25 Western monitors present (E) (e_nelda_46_ex)

Clarification: "Western monitors present" for executive elections only.

5.11.26 Western monitors present (E) (e_nelda_46_leg)

Clarification: "Western monitors present" for legislative elections only.

5.11.27 Western monitors present (E) (e_nelda_46_notes_ex)

Clarification: "Western monitors present" for executive elections only.

5.11.28 Western monitors present (E) (e_nelda_46_notes_leg)

Clarification: "Western monitors present" for legislative elections only.

5.11.29 Elections NELDA id-number (E) (e_nelda_electionid_ex)

Clarification: "Elections NELDA id-number" for executive elections only.

Data release: 8

5.11.30 Elections NELDA id-number (E) (e_nelda_electionid_leg)

Clarification: "Elections NELDA id-number" for legislative elections only.

Data release: 8

5.11.31 Type of election (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda_types)

Question: What type of election took place?

Clarification: All elections in this dataset are for national offices, including Presidential, Legislative and Parliamentary (which are combined), and Constituent Assembly.

Responses:

Text.

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.11.32 Prior elections suspended (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda1)

Question: Were regular elections suspended before this election?

Clarification: This question is specifically asking if regular elections were suspended preceding the election at hand, not if elections have ever been suspended. Therefore, if the previous round of elections had been suspended, or sometime after the last round an announcement was made that elections would not be held pending further notice, the answer would be yes. Even if a regime disbands the elected legislature and says it is paving the way for fresh elections, the answer would be yes unless they follow through on the promise in a relatively short period of time (typically less than a year). It does not matter whether elections are held somewhat earlier or later than usual for this question, nor whether there was a regime change that affected the timing of the elections. Nor does it matter whether the freedom of elections changed. Suspending elections often means that the legislative body is also disbanded, and that the regime rules by decree. If a regime had never had elections, the answer is yes.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.11.33 Harassment of the opposition (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda15)

Question: Is there evidence that the government harassed the opposition?

Clarification: If there was evidence of intentional government harassment of the opposition, a "Yes" was coded. Harassment may include detaining opposition leaders, disrupting opposition political rallies with state forces, and shutting down opposition newspapers.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.11.34 Media bias in elections (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda16)

Question: In the run-up to the election, were there allegations of media bias in favor of the incumbent?

Clarification: Reports by either domestic or outside actors of media bias in favor of the incumbent or ruling party, and where the media is totally controlled by the government, and/or no opposition is allowed, the answer is "yes."

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.11.35 Opposition (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda3)

Question: Was opposition allowed?

Clarification: This variable indicates whether at least one opposition political party existed to contest the election. Some countries have multiple government parties but no opposition political party. An opposition party is one that is not in the government.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.11.36 Elections canceled (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda32)

Question: Were results that did not favor the incumbent canceled?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.11.37 Violence during elections (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda33)

Question: Was there significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.11.38 Western monitors present (NELDA) (E) (e_nelda46)

Question: Were Western monitors present?

Clarification: If monitors were not present, nelda45 is coded "no," and "N/A" was coded here.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

5.12 Unified Democracy Score

5.12.1 Democracy score posterior (mean) (E) (e_uds_mean)

Source(s): Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

5.12.2 Unified democracy score posterior (median) (E) (e_uds_median)

Source(s): Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

5.12.3 Unified democracy score posterior (2.5 percentile) (E) (e_uds_pct025)

Source(s): Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

5.12.4 Unified democracy score posterior (97.5 percentile) (E) (e_uds_pct975)

Source(s): Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

5.13 Political Institutions and Political Events

5.13.1 Autocoups (E) (e_autocoups)

Clarification: A dummy variable for any instance in which the ruler illegally changes constitutional rules to reduce the chances of the opposition to oppose policies in the legislature or to win elections.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: The definition comprises any event in which the incumbent illegally closes the legislature the OR closes the legislature legally AND changes electoral rules (including banning parties) or adopts laws that extend his tenure (Philippines in 1972).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.2 Number of houses in legislature (E) (e_bicam)

Clarification: Number of houses of the legislature: 0 if none, 1, 2, 3.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: A legislature that is elected in one election and then divides itself into chambers that differ in some prerogatives and at least at times vote separately is coded as multicameral. An example is Norway as of 1814.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.3 Compulsory voting (E) (e_compulsory)

Clarification: Refers to voting any national level elections.

Responses:

0: Optional.

1: Compulsory.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.4 Coups (E) (e_coups)

Clarification: Number of successful coups d'état during a given year.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: A coup is any event resulting in an irregular removal or resignation of the chief executive that involves a violent action or an explicit threat of resorting to it, by an armed organization. Assassinations of the chief executive are not considered coups unless the group responsible for the action takes over the office. Whenever the rules about the replacement of the chief executive are either not codified or unclear, the force criterion prevails. The definition excludes resignations under pressure of popular mobilization if no armed group (legal or not) is involved (resignation of Carlos Mesa in Bolivia). Similarly, irregular transfers of power among civilians that do not entail force (such as changes of communist leaders) are not considered coups. We place no restriction on whether the armed group causing the replacement is domestic or foreign, nor on the identity of the incoming ruler. In particular, any military intervention of foreign powers producing a replacement of the chief executive is coded as a coup, even if they restore a previously elected ruler (French troops overthrowing Bokassa in Central African Republic). As a general rule, any replacement of a military chief executive by another military man is considered a coup, unless the succession occurred according to pre-established rules (Figueirido replacing Geisel in Brazil). Specifically, resignations of the military chief executive caused by votes of non-confidence of irregular military bodies are considered coups (Galtieri replacing Viola in Argentina). The variable is compatible to other conventional sources such as Powell and Thyne (2010), Marshall and Marshall (2009), and Svobik and Akcinaroglu (2010) for the period 1950–2008, with some difference in the interpretation of specific events. Information for the pre-1950 era is more scarce and therefore the coding may be less reliable.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.5 Lower house dissolution (E) (e_dissolution)

Clarification: Counts the number of times the lower house of the legislature was dissolved in a particular year.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: Included as dissolutions are (1) unconstitutional closures of the legislature and (2) early constitutional closures. Dissolutions that occur as a formality at the end of the term of legislature are not coded but early dissolutions are. Coded -1 if there was no legislature to dissolve. Dissolutions are early if they occur at least one full year before the next regularly scheduled election. If an election occurred in year t and the legislative term is k years, then a dissolution is counted if it occurred in $t \leq year \leq t + k - 2$: For the 22 OECD countries during the post-1945 period, dissolutions are coded as early if they occurred more than 12 months before the end of the legislative term (based on Maravall 2007). Note that this variable can assume a value of 1 even if DISSOLUTION_POWER=0, because dissolutions occur when they are not unilateral and sometimes simply illegal.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.6 HOS dissolution power (E) (e_dissolution_power)

Clarification: Dummy for the power of the head of state to dissolve the legislature (at least the lower house) unilaterally.

Dissolution power is unilateral if the head of state can dissolve the parliament without the consent of the government or leaders of political parties in the legislature. It is still unilateral if dissolution requires the consultation or consent of non-elected bodies or if there are restrictions concerning the frequency or the period during which it can occur.

Responses:

0: if never unilaterally.

1: if a unilateral (that is, not at the request of someone else) decision of the dissolver.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.7 Lists in elections (E) (e_elecparty_leg)

Clarification: Number of lists presented to voters in legislative elections.

Responses:

-1: if no legislature or estate parliament or fully appointed legislature

0: if none.

1: of one.

2: if more.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: Several parties offering a joint single list to the voters, "fronts," are counted as 1. The coding is based on the number of lists in an election, not on the number of parties in the legislature.

If there is more than one election during a year, the last one is coded. If all candidates run as independents coded as 0.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.8 Candidates in elections (E) (e_elecparty_pres)

Clarification: Number of candidates presented to voters in presidential elections.

Responses:

0: if one.

1: if more.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: Applies whether the president is directly or indirectly elected. If there are two rounds, the first one is coded. If there is more than one election during a year, the last one is coded.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.9 Chief executive elected (E) (e_exselec_pipe)

Clarification: Dummy for the chief executive having been elected (whether directly or indirectly; indirectly means elected by people who have been elected; if indirectly elected, election by a partly elected body counts as being elected).

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: In cases of death, constitutional successors of elected chief executives are coded as elected. Coded is each year of the current chief executive. Prime ministers are always coded as elected as long as the legislature is open (OPENL=1). If there is a president and a prime minister, EXSELEC=1 only if both have been elected. If a chief executive is elected, overthrown by force, and then reinstated, coded as of the year of reinstatement.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.10 Franchise age (E) (e_franchise_age)

Clarification: Age at which those otherwise qualified to vote can exercise this right. Whenever age thresholds are different for different groups, lowest age is coded, unless the group which can vote at an earlier age is very small, say holders of Legion d'honneur in post-1946 France.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.11 Legislature composition (E) (e_leg_composition)

Clarification: Captures legal provisions regulating the mode of selection of the lower house of the legislature.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.12 Legislature direct election (E) (e_legdirect)

Clarification: Mode of election of the legislature. Refers only to the lower house.

Responses:

0: Indirect.

1: Direct.

2: Some voters vote directly, some indirectly, depending on individual characteristics.

3: Some voters vote directly, some indirectly, depending on collective characteristics (*i.e.* territory).

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: There were few observations coded as 2 or 3 and they have been collapsed with 1 in the data file. The original data do exist.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.13 Parties in legislature (E) (e_legparty)

Clarification: Number of parties in the legislature. By "party" we take here any recognizable, named grouping, regardless whether and how they appeared in elections. This variable is coded regardless whether the legislature was elected or appointed.

Responses:

-1: if no legislature.

0: if none (including cases where parties are officially banned).

1: if one (including cases where other parties are officially banned).

2: if more.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: During the early period candidates typically competed in elections on an individual basis, without any kind of centralized party organizations or shared programs. Within legislatures, however, they often coalesced into groups, currents, factions, "sentiments," etc. Hence, subjective judgments are inevitable in coding this variable. Our rule of thumb was to code as parties any kind of groups that bare a label that survived over two consecutive legislatures. This was true in several countries of "Liberals" and "Conservatives." In other countries, notably France between 1815 and 1848, however, the divisive issues, the parliamentary groups, and their labels changed frequently, and such cases are coded as "none." A legislature consisting of one party and independents is coded as one party.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.14 Legislature elected (E) (e_legselec_pipe)

Clarification: Dummy for the lower house of the legislature having been at least partly elected. (Coded as 1 if OPENL=1 and LEG_COMPOSITION_ 5).

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.15 Legislature exist (E) (e_openl)

Clarification: A dummy variable for the existence of a legislature.

A legislature is a body that (1) issues at least some laws and (2) does not perform executive functions. "Legislative Councils" which advise the ruler but have no authority to proclaim laws are not considered legislatures. Military Juntas that issue legal acts but also perform executive functions are disqualified by the second criterion.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.16 Opposition (E) (e_opposition)

Clarification: This variable is intended to indicate whether the institutional system allows at least some political pluralism.

Responses:

1: if as of December 31 there is a legislature that was at least in part elected by voters facing more than one choice.

0: if the above is not true OR, only in presidential systems, if it is true BUT either the chief executive is not elected OR was elected unopposed (unless there was consensus among all

parties; as in Chile 1891, 1910).

-1: if the legislature was closed at some point during the year and the state as of December 31 is unclear.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: Even if the legislature consisted of multiple parties but in the election all the candidates were presented to voters on the same, single list, we consider that voters had no choice. If there was only one party while some candidates ran as independents, we also regard it as a situation in which there was no partisan pluralism. If parties were banned and everyone ran as independent, there is no opposition (see Swaziland). If, however, parties were not banned and everyone ran without party labels, then we regard this situation as pluralistic. The idea is that situations in which elections are non-partisan, frequent during the early period, and situations in which more than one party competes in elections represent political pluralism, while monopoly of one party is a political monopoly. In rare cases it is possible for opposition to exist even if the legislative election was not competitive. This occurs if a competitive presidential election occurred during the term of a non-competitively elected legislature (for example, El Salvador in 1977). If all we know is that the elected president run unopposed, the code is 0.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.17 Exclusions (E) (e_oth_exclusions)

Clarification: Captures exclusions not accounted for under FRANCHISE.

Responses:

0: None other (all restrictions are accounted for under FRANCHISE).

1: By ethnicity (some ethnic groups are excluded).

2: By territory (people living in some regions cannot vote).

3: By religion (only adherents of a particular religion(s) can vote).

4: By politics (Individuals sympathizing with some political parties or ideologies are excluded. This code refers only to persons, hence it does not cover cases when political parties are banned.). Includes the language in which suffrage is determined by "moral character."

5: Slaves are excluded.

6: Military personnel or police is excluded.

7: Priests or nuns are excluded.

8: Propertied are excluded (as in Mongolia, USSR 1918).

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: When more than one exclusion applies, all are listed as consecutive digits. For example, if 5, 6, and 7 applies, we code exclusions as 567.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.18 President direct election (E) (e_presdirect)

Clarification: Mode of election of the president in popular elections.

Responses:

0: Indirect. The president is chosen by electors, elected specifically for the purpose of selecting the president (not by the parliament).

1: Direct.

2: Some voters vote directly, some indirectly, depending on individual characteristics.

3: Some voters vote directly, some indirectly, depending on collective characteristics (*i.e.* territory).

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: Cases in which the constitution provides that the president is elected by the legislature,

including those in which the legislature elects only if none of the candidates obtains some minimum threshold of votes, are coded according to the provisions concerning popular elections, that is, such provisions do not make the mode of election indirect. There were few observation coded as 2 or 3 and they have been collapsed as 2 in the data file. The original data do exist.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.19 Secrecy of the vote (E) (e_secret)

Clarification: Secrecy of the vote in legislative elections.

Responses:

- 0: Open, public
- 1: Secret
- 2: Secret optional
- 3: Public for some, secret for others.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Notes: There were few observation coded as 2 or 3 and they have been collapsed with 1 in the data file. The original data do exist.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.20 Upper house block (E) (e_upper_block)

Clarification: Indicates whether the second (upper) house can delay or veto the decisions of the first (lower) house.

Blocking applies to any issue area. Note that if UPPER HOUSE_1 AND UPPER_BLOCK_1, then non-elective legislative power can block.

Responses:

- 1: if the legislature is unicameral.
- 0: if the second (upper) house cannot block or delay legislation passed by the lower (first) house.
- 1: if the second (upper) house can only put a suspensive veto or can send for reconsideration (a "suspensive veto" is any veto that can be overridden by someone).
- 2: if the second (upper) house must approve must legislation or can put a final veto.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.13.21 Upper house (E) (e_upper_house)

Clarification: Composition of the legislature.

Responses:

- 0: if unicameral.
- 1: if second (upper) house is fully elected (directly or not).
- 2: if second (upper) house is partially appointed.

Scale: Nominal.

Source(s): Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

5.14 Polity IV

5.14.1 Institutionalized autocracy (E) (e_autoc)

Question: Is the polity an institutionalized autocracy?

Clarification: Autocracy is defined operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.2 Institutionalized democracy (E) (e_democ)

Question: Is the polity an institutionalized democracy?

Clarification: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (XROPEN and XRCOMP), and constraints on the chief executive (XCONST).

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.3 Executive constraints (E) (e_exconst)

Question: Is there institutional restraint on the executive?

Clarification: This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups" (*i.e.* legislatures, ruling party, councils of nobles, the military, judiciary).

Responses:

1: Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations).

2: Intermediate Category

3: Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive.

4: Intermediate Category

5: Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.

6: Intermediate Category

7: Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.4 Executive recruitment (E) (e_exrec)

Question: How institutionalized, competitive, and open is the recruitment of executive?

Clarification: This variable combines information presented in three component variables: regulation of chief executive recruitment (e_xrreg), competitiveness of executive recruitment (e_xrcomp), and openness of executive recruitment (e_xropen). It measures how institutionalized, competitive and open are the mechanisms for recruiting the executive. Not surprisingly, these three variables are highly interdependent and have tended to organize themselves into eight general patterns of executive recruitment.

Responses:

- 1: Executive selection through ascription — Recruitment of the chief executive (*de facto* head of government) is determined by hereditary succession.
- 2: Dual Executive: ascription and designation — The position of chief executive (*de facto* head of government) is shared. Executive recruitment is determined both by hereditary succession and designation.
- 3: Executive recruitment through designation — Chief executives are chosen by designation by the ruling political elite, without formal competition by parties or individuals representing alternative political viewpoints or platforms.
- 4: Executive recruitment through self-selection — "Unregulated" changes in executive power through forceful seizures of power by rival political elites. In addition to the use, or threat of use, of force, there are no formal mechanisms by which the transfer of executive power is regulated — such as hereditary selection, party designation or elections.
- 5: Executive-guided transition — A transitional period during which the structures and/or forms of governing authority are redesigned and altered systematically under the specific direction of a ruling executive who gained and/or retained office through "autocratic" means: ascription, designation, or self-selection, with the stated intent of reforming the executive recruitment process and/or increasing the relative influence of the legislative/judicial branches of governance. Executive-guided transitions are dominated by the ruling executive and supporting institutions; involvement by non-executive institutions (*e.g.*, autonomous legislative and judicial institutions or opposition groups/parties) is formally limited, restricted, or prohibited.
- 6: Dual Executive: Ascription and Election — The position of chief executive (*de facto* head of government) is shared. Executive recruitment is determined both by hereditary succession and election.
- 7: Transitional or restricted elections — The chief executive is chosen through elections matching candidates from at least two independent parties. These elections are "free" but not necessarily "fair" in both design and practice. This category is typically used to document "liberalizing elections" held by authoritarian rulers who actively seek to bias the electoral process in their favor. This code may also reflect attempts by elected incumbents to unduly influence the outcome of future elections either to win reelection or in an effort to establish a hegemonic party system or the establishment of quasi-democratic power-sharing arrangements. Finally, it is also used to indicate political systems in which non-elected officials have "reserved domains" of executive power.
- 8: Competitive elections — Chief executive (*de facto* head of government) is chosen through competitive elections matching two or more candidates from at least two major parties. Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly. The electoral process is transparent and its outcomes are institutionally uncertain.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.5 Polity combined score (E) (e_p_polity)

Question: What is the Polity score?

Clarification: The Polity score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. The resulting unified POLITY scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.6 The competitiveness of participation (E) (e__parcomp)

Question: Is political participation competitive?

Clarification: The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.

Responses:

0: Not Applicable.

1: Repressed: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party.

2: Suppressed: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation.

3: Factional: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularistic agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.

4: Transitional: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted, Suppressed, or Factional patterns to fully Competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.

5: Competitive: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.7 Regulation of participation (E) (e__parreg)

Question: Is political participation regulated?

Clarification: Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed.

Responses:

1: Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity.

2: Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level (parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected), but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.

3: Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple social groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism.

4: Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.

5: Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.8 Political competition (E) (e_polcomp)

Question: Is there any (institutionalized) political competition?

Clarification: This variable combines information presented in two component variables: the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition (e_parreg) and the extent of government restriction on political competition (e_parcomp).

Responses:

- 1: Repressed Competition: While no significant political activity is permitted outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, nevertheless, some organized political participation occurs within the regime through highly circumscribed institutional channels.
- 2: Restricted Competition: Some organized political activity occurs outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, but the regime systematically limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups from participating in the political arena and/or suppresses the contestation of rival political interests.
- 3: Authoritarian-guided liberalization of repressed or restricted competition or the deepening of hegemonic control: Used to indicate either the concerted effort on the part of hegemonic regimes to open up their political systems to limited (and typically factional) political competition or the transformation of factional-based "quasi-democracies" or "weak authoritarian regimes" into more repressive hegemonic systems in which political competition is increasingly institutionalized and restricted.
- 4: Uninstitutionalized Competition: Political participation is decentralized and fluid in character — revolving around personalities, regional interests, and religious/ethnic/clan groups. There are no enduring national political organizations and systematic regime control of political activity is limited, that is, a situation characterized by a coincidence of weak state and weak society. In the contemporary context, uninstitutionalized competition is most likely to occur in resource poor countries and/or following the collapse of central authority under a (former) repressive, authoritarian state.
- 5: Gradual transition from uninstitutionalized (unregulated) competition to more regulated forms of political competition (the increasing regulation of competition may be centrally-guided or decentralized through the gradual development of political parties and interest groups).
- 6: Factional/Restricted Competition: Polities that oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and faction-based restrictions: that is, when one faction secures power it uses that power to promote its exclusive interests and favor group members while restricting the political access and activities of other, excluded groups, until it is displaced in turn.
- 7: Factional Competition: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level — parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups — but particularistic/parochial agendas tend to be exclusive and uncompromising with limited social integration or accommodation across identity boundaries. Factional competition is distinguished by a relative balance of group capabilities that prevents any one of the groups from capturing state power and imposing restrictions on other groups.
- 8: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: persistent over coercion: relatively coercive/restrictive transitions either from factional/restricted competition to institutionalized competitive participation or from institutionalized competitive participation to factional/restricted competition. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally democratic polities.
- 9: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: limited and/or decreasing overt coercion: This code is used to indicate relatively peaceful transitions either to or from institutionalized competitive participation. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally open electoral polities.
- 10: Institutionalized open electoral participation: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence with little use of coercion. No significant or substantial groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.9 Polity revised combined score (E) (e_polity2)

Question: What is the Revised Polity score?

Clarification: This variable is a modified version of the Polity variable added in order to facilitate the use of the Polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual Polity score by applying a simple treatment, or "fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (*i.e.*, -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (*i.e.*, within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set

- 66: Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing."
- 77: Cases of "interregnum," or anarchy, are converted to a "neutral" Polity score of "0."
- 88: Cases of "transition" are prorated across the span of the transition. For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.10 Regime transition (E) (e_regtrans)

Question: Did the polity undergo a substantive regime change?

Clarification: A regime change is defined simply as a three-point change in either the polity's democracy or autocracy score and may be either a negative or a positive value change. A negative or adverse regime transition is defined as a six-point decrease in the Polity score.

Responses:

- +3: Major Democratic Transition — six points or greater increase in Polity score over a period of three years or less.
- +2: Minor Democratic Transition — three to five point increase in Polity score over a period of three years or less.
- +1: Positive Regime Change — three or more point increase in Polity score without a shift in regime type.
- 0: Little or No Change in POLITY score.
- 1: Negative Regime Change — three to five point decrease in Polity score.
- 2: Adverse Regime Transition — six or more point decrease in Polity score or an interregnum.
- 77: State Failure — complete collapse of central political authority

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.11 Competitiveness of executive recruitment (E) (e_xrcomp)

Question: How is the executive recruited?

Clarification: Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates.

Responses:

- 1: Selection: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court.
- 2: Dual/Transitional: Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection and competitive election.
- 3: Election: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections matching two or more major parties or candidates.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.12 Openness of executive recruitment (E) (e_xropen)

Question: Is the process of recruiting the executive open to everyone?

Clarification: Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process.

Responses:

- 1: Closed: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession and assume executive powers by right of descent.
- 2: Dual Executive — Designation: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.
- 3: Executive — Election: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.
- 4: Open: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.14.13 Regulation of executive recruitment (E) (e_xrreg)

Question: Are there rules in recruiting the executive?

Clarification: Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power.

Responses:

- 1: Unregulated: Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power.
- 2: Designational/Transitional: Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (*i.e.*, one-party systems or "rigged" multiparty elections).
- 3: Regulated: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections.

Source(s): Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

Data release: 5, 7.

Citation: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2016).

5.15 Others

5.15.1 Democratic breakdown (E) (e_bnr_dem)

Clarification: Countries that meet the minimum conditions for democracy (see below) enter the dataset and are coded "0." When countries cease to meet those minimum criteria they are coded "1" and exit from the dataset.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Bernhard *et al.* (2001).

Notes: If, after a democratic breakdown, a country again meets our minimum criteria it re-enters the data as a new democratic episode. The time frame onset in 1913 is a function of when the first country (Norway) meets the minimum conditions. All series terminate in either in a breakdown in various years or right censorship in 2005. The minimal conditions are based on Dahl's notion of polyarchy (competitiveness, inclusiveness) combined with Linz and Stepan's stateness criteria. Competitiveness: Like Przeworski *et al.* we include countries that hold elections for both the executive and legislature, and in which more than one party contests the elections. However, we exclude cases in which we detected outcome changing vote fraud, in which there was either extensive or extreme violence that inhibited voters' preference expression, or in which political parties representing a substantial portion of the population were

banned. Inclusiveness: We only include competitive polities in which at least fifty percent of all adult citizens are enfranchised to vote in our set of democracies. Stateness: We also considered questions of sovereignty, not including colonial states, where founding elections were held prior to the granting of independence, and countries experiencing internal wars in which twenty percent or greater of the population or territory was out of control of the state.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Bernhard *et al.* (2001).

5.15.2 Democracy (E) (e_chga_demo)

Clarification: A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is *de facto* existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (*e.g.* unconstitutional closing of the lower house or extension of incumbent's term by postponing of subsequent elections). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

Responses:

1: Democracy.

0: Otherwise.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Source(s): Cheibub *et al.* (2009).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Cheibub *et al.* (2009).

5.15.3 Lower chamber effective number of electoral parties (E) (e_ellonmpe)

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what was the effective number of parties by share of votes?

Clarification: The effective number of electoral parties in a country's party system at the national level for the specified election year. This is calculated at the national level following Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) specification for elections to the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2016).

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2016).

5.15.4 Lower chamber effective number of legislative parties (E) (e_ellonmpl)

Question: After this election, what was the effective number of parties as measured by share of seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature? Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Bormann and Golder (2016).

Data release: 3-8.

Citation: Bormann and Golder (2016).

5.15.5 Political constraints index III (E) (e_h_polcon3)

Clarification: This index measures the feasibility of policy change, *i.e.* the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The

index is composed from the following information: the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches leading to more constraint); the extent of party alignment across branches of government, measured as the extent to which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch, measured as legislative fractionalization in the relevant house (increasing constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed executives).

Scale: The index scores are derived from a simple spatial model and theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus less feasibility of policy change.

Source(s): The Political Constraint Index POLCON Dataset (2017).

Notes: The coding reflects information as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2002) uses this index to demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Henisz (2002).

5.15.6 Political constraints index V (E) (e_h_polcon5)

Clarification: This index follows the same logic as Political Constraints Index III (h_polcon3) but also includes two additional veto points: the judiciary and sub-federal entities.

Scale: The index scores are derived from a simple spatial model and theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus less feasibility of policy change.

Source(s): The Political Constraint Index POLCON Dataset (2017).

Notes: The coding reflects information as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2000) uses this index to measure the impact on cross-national growth rates of a government's ability to provide credible commitment.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Henisz (2002).

5.15.7 Media freedom (E) (e_mefree)

Question: Is media free?

Responses:

0: It is not possible to safely criticize government or government officials.

1: Social, legal, or economic costs related to the criticism of the government officials limits public criticism and major policy failings can and do occur.

2: Criticism of governments and government officials is a common part of the political dialogue in the mediated public sphere.

Scale: Ordinal.

Source(s): Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle (2015).

Notes: For reasons of consistency with the V-Dem data, the responses to this question from the original source were reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "2". Also, original categories "0" (No effective media) and "8" (Missing data or social/political disruption makes it impossible to code) were set to missing.

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle (2015).

5.15.8 Party system nationalization Cox Inflation Score (E) (e_pssnacois)

Question: A measure of party linkage across a country's electoral constituencies that builds on the economic principle of inflation. Here inflation refers to the discrepancy that occurs in party

linkage as parties are aggregated from the constituency-level to the national-level party system. This measure was developed by Cox (1999).

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2016).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2016).

5.15.9 Party system nationalization Standardized and weighted Score (E) (e_pssnas-trdwsc)

Question: A summary expression of the level of the nationalization of a party system that standardizes for the number of territorial units and also weights for the size of the territorial units (Bochsler, 2010).

Responses:

Numeric.

Scale: Interval.

Source(s): CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2016).

Data release: 1-8.

Citation: CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2016).

5.15.10 Corruption perception index (E) (e_ti_cpi)

Clarification: The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

Source(s): Transparency International (2016).

Data release: 7-8.

Citation: Transparency International (2016).

5.15.11 Competition (E) (e_van_comp)

Clarification: The competition variable portrays the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections. The variable is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest party (the party which wins most votes) in parliamentary elections or by the party of the successful candidate in presidential elections. Depending on their importance, either parliamentary or presidential elections are used in the calculation of the variable, or both elections are used, with weights. If information on the distribution of votes is not available, or if the distribution does not portray the reality accurately, the distribution of parliamentary seats is used instead. If parliament members are elected but political parties are not allowed to take part in elections, it is assumed that one party has taken all votes or seats. In countries where parties are not banned but yet only independent candidates participate in elections, it is assumed that the share of the largest party is not over 30 percent.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2016).

5.15.12 Index of democratization (E) (e_van_index)

Clarification: The index of democratization is formed by multiplying the competition and the participation variables and then dividing the outcome by 100.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2016).

5.15.13 Participation (E) (e_van_part)

Clarification: The political participation variable portrays the voting turnout in each election, and is calculated as the percentage of the total population who actually voted in the election. In the case of indirect elections, only votes cast in the final election are taken into account. If electors have not been elected by citizens, only the number of actual electors is taken into account, which means that the degree of participation drops to the value 0. If an election to choose electors has been held, the participation variable is calculated from the number and distribution of votes in that election. National referendums raise the variable value by five percent and state (regional) referendums by one percent for the year they are held. Referendums can add the degree of participation at maximum by 30 percent a year.

The value of the combined degree of participation cannot be higher than 70 percent, even in cases where the sum of participation and referendums would be higher than 70.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2016).

5.15.14 Index of power resources (multiplicative) (E) (e_van_powres)

Clarification: Measures the level of dispersion of economic, intellectual, and organizational—or, for short, power—resources in society. Computed as the product of Index of Occupational Diversification (van_occup), Index of Knowledge Distribution (van_knowdist) and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (van_distec), divided by 10.000, to range from 0 (low) to 100 (high relative distribution of power resources). Measures the level of dispersion of economic, intellectual, and organizational—or, for short, power—resources in society. Computed as the product of Index of Occupational Diversification (van_occup), Index of Knowledge Distribution (van_knowdist) and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (van_distec), divided by 10.000, to range from 0 (low) to 100 (high relative distribution of power resources). Measures the level of dispersion of economic, intellectual, and organizational—or, for short, power—resources in society. Computed as the product of Index of Occupational Diversification (van_occup), Index of Knowledge Distribution (van_knowdist) and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (van_distec), divided by 10.000, to range from 0 (low) to 100 (high relative distribution of power resources).

Source(s): Vanhanen (2007).

Data release: 7.

Citation: Vanhanen (2007).

5.15.15 Non-autocracy (E) (e_wr_nonautocracy)

Clarification: Variable on what substituted the autocracy. Classes are: (1) Democracy; (2) Foreign-Occupied; (3) Not-Independent; (4) Provisional; (5) Warlord; (6) Warlord/Foreign-occupied.

Source(s): Geddes *et al.* (2014).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Geddes *et al.* (2014).

5.15.16 Regime type (E) (e_wr_regtype)

Clarification: Variable on regime type. Classes are: (1) Indirect military; (2) Military; (3) Military-Personal; (4) Monarchy; (5) Oligarchy; (6) Party; (7) Party-Military; (8) Party-Military-Personal; (9) Party-Personal; (10) Personal.

Source(s): Geddes *et al.* (2014).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Geddes *et al.* (2014).

6 Background Factors (E)

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

6.1 Education

6.1.1 Education 15+ (E) (e_peaveduc)

Question: What is the average years of education among citizens older than 15?

Clarification: The base variable is (a) Average years of education, 15+ (Morrisson and Murtin 2009). Additional data is imputed from (b) Average years of educational attainment, 15+ (Nardulli, Peyton and Bajjalieh 2010 [an updating and extension of Barro and Lee 1996]), (c) Primary completion rate (World Bank 2013), (d) Secondary enrollment rate (World Bank 2013), (e) Literacy rate, 15+ (World Bank 2013), (f) Literacy rate, ages 15-24 (World Bank 2013), (g) Average years of education, 15+ (Clio-Infra). Imputations are generated by linear models — a reasonable imputation procedure in this instance given consistent time-trends and high inter-correlations among the variables.

Step 1: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated, increasing the number of observations for each of the afore-listed variables, as follows: (a): 888 to 8214; (b): 7179 to 8302; (c): 3914 to 5432; (d): 2001 to 3515; (e): 548 to 3171; (f): 540 to 3150; (g) 11827 to 12267.

Step 2: For each country, missing data from the last recorded data point to 2012 (less than a decade in all cases and usually just a few years) is extrapolated. Missing data is not extrapolated backwards.)

Step 3: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), US Census Bureau, UNESCO, Földvári and van Leeuwen (2010), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2011), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012), Didenko, Foldvari, van Leeuwen (2012) and sources listed above.

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), along with other sources listed above.

6.1.2 Educational inequality, Gini (E) (e_peedgini)

Question: How unequal is the level of education achieved by the population aged 15 years and older?

Clarification: Gini coefficient of educational inequality estimated from average education data using the method as suggested by Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2000), Checchi (2004) and Castelló and Doménech (2000: 4). Van Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, and Foldvari (N.d.) provide the following explanation in the Clio-Infra codebook

"In order to convert the educational information in educational Ginis they start with

Where x is average years of schooling in the population aged 15 years and over, i and j are different levels of education, and p_i and p_j are the attainment per level of education, and X_i and X_j are the cumulative average years of schooling at each educational level. This equation can be rewritten as follows:

Where x stands for the average years of schooling per level of education (0= no education, 1= primary education, 2 = secondary education, and 3 is higher education) divided by the percentage population with at least that level of education attained. p_0 , p_1 , p_2 , and p_3 are the percentages of the population with no-, primary-, secondary-, and higher education respectively.

This equation gives the possibility to calculate the educational Gini for every year and country."

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), US Census Bureau, UNESCO, Földvári and van Leeuwen (2010a), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2011), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012), Didenko, Foldvari, van Leeuwen (2012), Van Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, and Foldvari (N.d.).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), along with other sources listed above.

6.1.3 Index of knowledge distribution (E) (e_Vanhanen_knowl_ipo)

Question: What is the index of knowledge distribution?

Clarification: Index of Knowledge Distribution is derived by calculating the arithmetic mean of Students and Literates.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.1.4 Literate population (%) (E) (e_Vanhanen_literate_ipo)

Question: What is the share of literate population?

Clarification: Literates are calculated as the percentage of adult population.

Responses:

Percent.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.1.5 University students per 100,000 (E) (e_Vanhanen_studentpercent_ipo)

Question: How many university students are there per 100 000 inhabitants?

Clarification: Includes universities and other higher education institutions.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.1.6 Number of students (E) (e_Vanhanen_students_ipo)

Question: What is number of students in higher education?

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.2 Geography

6.2.1 Land area (E) (e_area)

Question: What is the land area of a country?

Clarification: Country land area in square kilometers.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.2.2 World regions (E) (e_region_world_2)

Question: In which geographic region is the country located?

Clarification: Based on Hadenius and Teorell (2005), the world is divided into ten politico-geographic regions. It is based on both geographical proximity and demarcation by area specialists who have contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. Minor adjustments to the Hadenius and Teorell classifications are made: 1. Haiti and Suriname is allocated to the Caribbean because neither is Spanish speaking. Moreover, Guyana is in this category, so it makes little sense that neighboring Suriname is not. 2. Mongolia is allocated to Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Union because it was in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence during the Cold War. Historically it also has more in common with Central Asia (which is in Hadenius and Teorell's category for Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Union) than it does with the Pacific or Southeast Asia. 3. Cyprus and Israel are allocated to Western Europe, because the populations of both are of European origin and their political institutions have been clearly shaped by their orientation toward Europe.

Responses:

- 1: Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union (including Central Asia)
- 2: Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti and Dominican Republic)
- 3: North Africa and Middle East (including Israel, Turkey and Cyprus)
- 4: Sub-Saharan Africa
- 5: Western Europe and North America (including Australia and New Zealand)
- 6: East Asia (Including Japan and Mongolia)
- 7: Southeast Asia
- 8: South Asia
- 9: The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
- 10: The Caribbean (including Belize, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Guyana)

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.2.3 Region (geographic) (E) (e_regiongeo)

Question: In which geographic region is this country located?

Clarification: Regions are described based on geographic location. Coverage extended back to 1900 from original source.

Responses:

- 1: Western Europe
- 2: Northern Europe
- 3: Southern Europe
- 4: Eastern Europe
- 5: Northern Africa
- 6: Western Africa
- 7: Central Africa
- 8: Eastern Africa
- 9: Southern Africa
- 10: Western Asia
- 11: Central Asia
- 12: East Asia
- 13: South-East Asia
- 14: South Asia
- 15: Oceania (including Australia and the Pacific)
- 16: North America
- 17: Central America
- 18: South America
- 19: Caribbean (including Belize, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Guyana)

Source(s): United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

6.2.4 Region (politico-geographic) (E) (e_regionpol)

Question: In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

Clarification: Regions are described as politico-geographic in the sense that they are based on geographical proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by scholars in studies of democratization (*e.g.* post-Communist). Coverage extended back to 1900 from original source.

Responses:

- 1: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (post-Communist; including Mongolia)
- 2: Latin America (including Cuba and the Dominican Republic)
- 3: The Middle East and North Africa/MENA (including Israel and Turkey)
- 4: Sub-Saharan Africa
- 5: Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand)
- 6: East Asia
- 7: South-East Asia
- 8: South Asia
- 9: The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand; see 5)
- 10: The Caribbean (including Belize, Haiti, Guyana and Suriname)

Source(s): Quality of Government Standard Dataset (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Teorell *et al.* (2018).

6.3 Economics

6.3.1 Exports (E) (e_cow_exports)

Question: What is the total value of a country's exports?

Clarification: Total exports in current US millions of dollars.

Source(s): Barbieri and Keshk (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Barbieri and Keshk (2016).

6.3.2 Imports (E) (e_cow_imports)

Question: What is the total value of a country's imports?

Clarification: Total imports in current US millions of dollars.

Source(s): Barbieri and Keshk (2016).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Barbieri and Keshk (2016).

6.3.3 Total imports (E) (e_cow_iports)

Question: What are the total imports of country in current US millions of dollars?

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.3.4 Real GDP per capita (E) (e_GDP_Per_Cap_Haber_Men_2)

Question: What is the real GDP per capita?

Clarification: Real gross domestic product per capita on an annual basis for each country in International Dollars in 2000 constant prices.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.3.5 Exchange rate to US dollar (E) (e_miextraus)

Question: What is the exchange rate of the local currency to the US Dollar?

Clarification: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Officer (2011), Heston, Summers and Aten (2012), Reinhart and Rogoff (N.d.).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Clio Infra (2014).

6.3.6 Food supply (E) (e_mifood)

Question: What is the supply of food in a country?

Clarification: Food supply from crops in kilocalories per capita per day.

Source(s): FAOstat (2018).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: FAOstat (2018).

6.3.7 GDP growth (E) (e_migdpgro)

Question: What is the GDP per capita growth rate?

Clarification: Estimated from the variable GDP per capita.

Source(s): e_migdpcc

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.3.8 GDP growth (rescaled) (E) (e_migdpgrlns)

Question: What is the GDP growth rate (rescaled)?

Clarification: An S transformation of GDP growth that expands values close to zero and compresses extreme highs and lows. For positive growth, the transformation is $\ln(\text{growth} + 1)$. For negative growth, the transformation is $-\ln(\text{abs}(\text{growth} - 1))$. For display purposes only; do not use for analysis.

Source(s): e_migdpcc

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.3.9 GDP per capita (E) (e_migdpcc)

Question: What is the GDP per capita?

Clarification: GDP refers to gross domestic production, understood on a per capita basis.

Source(s): The Maddison Project Database (2018)

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: Bolt *et al.* (2018)

6.3.10 GDP per capita, logged, base 10 (E) (e_migdppcln)

Question: What is the GDP per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm?

Source(s): e_migdppc

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.3.11 Government bond yield (E) (e_migovbon)

Question: What is the average annual percentage of long term government bond yield?

Clarification: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), based on Homer and Sylla (2005), OECD (2012), Fratianni and Spinelli (1984).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Clio Infra (2014).

6.3.12 Central government debt, gross (E) (e_migovdeb)

Question: What is the total gross central government debt as a percentage of GDP?

Clarification: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), World Bank (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Clio Infra (2014).

6.3.13 Inflation (E) (e_miinflat)

Question: What is the annual inflation rate?

Clarification: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), based on Arroyo Abad, Davies and van Zanden (N.d.), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (<http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/es/basededatos.html>), De Zwart (2011a), De Zwart (2011b), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Santing (N.d.), World Bank (2013).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Clio Infra (2014).

6.3.14 Family farms (E) (e_Vanhanen_familyfarm_ipo)

Question: What percentage of (cultivated) land area is comprised of family farms?

Clarification: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of observations from 930 to 7774.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document) and Vanhanen (2003).

6.4 Socioeconomic Status

6.4.1 High inequality, capital share of GDP (E) (e_cap_share_extreme_unequal)

Question: Is the share of GDP earned by capital one standard deviation above the mean?

Clarification: Inequality is estimated as the share of GDP that goes to capital. High inequality countries are those above the mean. Very high inequality countries are those at least one standard deviation above the mean.

Responses:

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.4.2 Inequality, capital as share of GDP (E) (e_cap_share_unequal)

Question: Is the share of GDP earned by capital above the average?

Clarification: Inequality is estimated as the share of GDP that goes to capital. High inequality countries are those above the mean. Low inequality countries are those below the mean.

Responses:

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.4.3 Income inequality, Gini (E) (e_peginiwi)

Question: How unequal is the distribution of income?

Clarification: Distribution of income expressed as a Gini coefficient (aka Gini index, Gini ratio). Missing data is imputed, as follows, using linear models (a reasonable imputation procedure in this instance given the stickiness of the variable of interest).

Step 1: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated.

Step 2: Missing data from the last recorded data point to 2012 (less than a decade in all cases) is filled by repeating the last observation.

Source(s): UNU-WIDER (2017).

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document) and UNU-WIDER (2017).

6.4.4 Income inequality, Gini (E) (e_Unequal_UTIP)

Question: Is the Gini coefficient above the mean?

Clarification: Based on the approach taken by James K. Galbraith and Hyunsub Kum (2004).

Responses:

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.4.5 Degree of decentralization of non-agricultural economic resources (E) (e_Vanhanen_decentr_ipo)

Question: What is the degree of decentralization of non-agricultural economic resources in a country?

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.4.6 Index of distribution of economic power resources (E) (e_Vanhanen_epower_ipo)

Question: What is the index of distribution of economic power resources?

Clarification: Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources is derived by first multiplying the value of Family Farm Area with the percentage of agricultural population. Then the value of Degree of Decentralization of Non-Agricultural Economic Resources is multiplied with the percentage of Non-Agricultural Population. After this these two products are simply added up.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.4.7 The mean of index of power resources (E) (e_Vanhanen_mean_ipo)

Question: What is the mean?

Clarification: The variable Mean is the arithmetic mean of the five (from the 1970s six) explanatory variables. This differs from Index of Power Resources in that a low value of any single variable does not reduce the value of Mean to any great extent.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.4.8 Index of occupational diversification (E) (e_Vanhanen_occupation_ipo)

Question: What is the index of occupational diversification?

Clarification: Index of Occupational Diversification is derived by calculating the arithmetic mean of Urban Population and Non-Agricultural Population.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.4.9 Index of power resources (E) (e_Vanhanen_power_ipo)

Question: What is the index of power resources?

Clarification: Index of Power Resources is calculated by multiplying the values of Index of Occupational Diversification, Index of Knowledge Distribution and Index of the Distribution of Economic Power Resources and then dividing the product by 10,000.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.4.10 High income inequality, Gini (E) (e_Very_Unequal_UTIP)

Question: Is the Gini coefficient one standard deviation above the mean?

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5 Natural Resource Wealth

6.5.1 Government revenues from oil, gas, and minerals (E) (e_Fiscal_Reliance)

Question: What percentage of a country's government revenues come from oil, natural gas, and minerals?

Clarification: Fiscal Reliance includes taxes and royalties paid by either privately-owned or state-owned oil and mining firms, as well as dividend payments or direct transfers paid to the government by state-owned firms. Coverage starts from a country's first year of independence (or 1800) to 2006.

Responses:

Percent.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.2 Coal production per capita (E) (e_Coal_Income_PC)

Question: What is the real value of a country's coal production?

Clarification: Real value of coal produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.3 Oil production shock for poor countries (E) (e_gdp_low_firstoil_year)

Question: In the first year of oil production, was the GDP lower than the mean?

Clarification: The sample is split on the basis of GDP Per Capita at the time of first oil production. A country is included in this group if it had a Log of GDP Per Capita below the mean of all non-resource-reliant countries in the first year that it began to produce oil.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.4 Oil production shock for very poor countries (E) (e_gdp_verylow_firstoil_year)

Question: In the first year of oil production, was the GDP one standard deviation lower than the mean?

Clarification: The sample is split on the basis of GDP Per Capita at the time of first oil production. A country is included in this group if it had a Log of GDP Per Capita at least one standard

deviation below the mean of all non-resource reliant countries in the first year that it began to produce oil.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.5 Metal minerals production per capita (E) (e_metals_income_PC)

Question: What is the real value of a country's metal minerals production?

Clarification: Real value of metal minerals produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.6 Natural gas production per capita (E) (e_natural_gas_income_PC)

Question: What is the real value of a country's natural gas production?

Clarification: Real value of natural gas produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.7 Oil reserves (E) (e_reserves_billions)

Question: How much oil does a country have in reserves?

Clarification: Oil reserves in billions of barrels. We construct estimates of oil reserves in billions of barrels for 168 countries from 1943 to 2006.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.8 Interpolated oil reserves per square kilometer (E) (e_reserves_interp_area)

Question: What are the oil reserves per square kilometer (missing data)?

Clarification: Some breaks occur in the 1940s because of missing data and some data is missing for Soviet countries.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.9 Oil reserves per square kilometer (E) (e_reserves_over_area)

Question: What are the oil reserves per square kilometer?

Clarification: Reserves (in billions of barrels) are divided by the country area, in square kilometers obtained from World Bank.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.10 Petroleum, coal, and natural gas production per capita (E) (e_Total_Fuel_Income_PC)

Question: What is the real value of a country's petroleum, coal, and natural gas production?

Clarification: Real value of petroleum, coal, and natural gas produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.11 Petroleum production per capita (E) (e_Total_Oil_Income_PC)

Question: What is the real value of a country's petroleum production?

Clarification: Real value of petroleum produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.12 Petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production per capita (E) (e_Total_Resources_Income_PC)

Question: What is the real value of a country's petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production?

Clarification: Real value of petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals produced per capita.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.5.13 Protected areas: Percentage of total land area (E) (e_wri_pa)

Clarification: Protected areas: IUCN Categories I-IV and other, percentage of total land area. The proportion of a country or region's total land area that is assigned terrestrial protected area status by the World Conservation Union (IUCN). Both IUCN categories I-VI and terrestrial protected areas that are not assigned to a category by IUCN are included here. A protected area is defined by IUCN as "an area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means."

Source(s): IUCN Protected Areas Categories System (2017).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: IUCN (2017).

6.6 Infrastructure

6.6.1 Air cargo, ton/km (E) (e_miaircar)

Question: What is the total air cargo (in tons/kilometer) carried annually?

Clarification: Civil aviation tonnage-km carried by scheduled services by companies registered in the country concerned. Not a measure of travel through a country's airports.

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a), Herbertson and Howarth (1914b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914c), Herbertson and Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.2 Air travel, passenger km (E) (e_miairpas)

Question: What is the total distance (in kilometers) traveled by all air passengers?

Clarification: Civil aviation passenger-Km traveled on scheduled services by companies registered in the country concerned. Not a measure of travel through a country's airports.

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a), Herbertson and Howarth (1914b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914c), Herbertson and Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.3 Motor vehicles (E) (e_mimotveh)

Question: What is the total number of motor vehicles in use?

Clarification: Includes trucks, tractors, buses, and passenger cars.

Source(s): CLIO (2014) drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a), Herbertson and Howarth (1914b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914c), Herbertson and Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.4 Postal items (E) (e_mipostit)

Question: What is the total number of items sent through the postal system annually?

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.5 Railroad freight (E) (e_mirafрто)

Question: What is the total railroad freight (in metric tons) carried annually?

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.6 Railroads freight traffic (E) (e_mirailfr)

Question: What is the total load of railroad freight traffic (million tons per kilometer) carried annually?

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.7 Railroad passenger km (E) (e_mirailkm)

Question: What is the total distance (millions of kilometers) traveled by railroad by all passengers annually?

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.8 Railroads length (E) (e_miraille)

Question: What is the total length (in kilometers) traversed by all railroads?

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.9 Railroad passengers (E) (e_mirailpa)

Question: What is the total number of railroad passengers (in thousands) annually?

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.10 Ships (E) (e_mishiall)

Question: What is the total number of ships?

Clarification: Includes ships of all kinds (above a minimum weight) registered to a country that are in use at midyear.

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.11 Steamships, tonnage (E) (e_mishimto)

Question: What is the total weight of all steamships (in thousands of tons)?

Clarification: Includes steamships (above a minimum weight) registered to a country that are in use at midyear.

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.12 Steamships (E) (e_mishiste)

Question: What is the total number of steamships?

Clarification: Includes steamships (above a minimum weight) registered to a country that are in use at midyear.

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.13 Ships, tonnage (E) (e_mishiton)

Question: What is the total weight (in thousands of tons) of all ships?

Clarification: Includes ships of all kinds (above a minimum weight) registered to a country that are in use at midyear.

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.14 Telegrams sent (E) (e_mitelsen)

Question: What is the total number (in millions) of telegrams sent annually?

Source(s): CLIO (2014), drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin and Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson and Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: CLIO (2014).

6.6.15 Radios (E) (e_radio_n)

Question: What is the number of radio sets?

Clarification: Original source doesn't specify if the indicators considers total number of radio sets or only radio sets in use.

Source(s): Comin and Hobijn (2009).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Comin and Hobijn (2009).

6.6.16 Televisions (E) (e_television_n)

Question: What is the number of television sets in circulation?

Source(s): Comin and Hobijn (2009).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Comin and Hobijn (2009).

6.7 Demography

6.7.1 Fertility rate (E) (e_miferrat)

Question: What is the fertility rate?

Clarification: The fertility rate (*i.e.* total fertility rate, period total fertility rate, total period fertility rate) of a population is the mean number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if (a) she were to experience the current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and (b) she were to survive through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by adding single-year age-specific rates at a given time.

Source(s): Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawn from various sources (unspecified).

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: Gapminder (gapminder.org).

6.7.2 Population total (E) (e_mipopula)

Question: What is the total population (in millions)?

Clarification: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Goldewijk, Beusen, Janssen (2010), History Database of Global Environment (www.pbl.nl/hyde).

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

6.7.3 Urbanization (E) (e_miurbani)

Question: What is the urbanization rate?

Clarification: Ratio of Urban Population to Population.

Source(s): See Population and Urban population.

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.7.4 Urban population (E) (e_miurbpop)

Question: What is the total urban population?

Clarification: The population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria of each area or country (United Nations, with reference to 1950-present). No definition is provided by sources used by Clio-Infra for years prior to 1950. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu) based on Bairoch, Batou, Chevre (1988), Chandler (1987), de Vries (1984), History Database of Global Environment (www.pbl.nl/hyde), Etter, McAlpine, Possingham (2007), Grigg (1980), Goldewijk, Beusen, Janssen (2010), Maddison (2001), Rozman (1973), United Nations (2009a), United Nations (2009b), Urquhart and Buckley (1965), Van Zanden (2009).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

6.7.5 Life expectancy, female (E) (e_pefeliex)

Question: What is the life expectancy at birth among women?

Clarification: Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Human Mortality Database (2008), Human Life Table Database (2007), World Bank (2013), Gapminder (gapminder.org), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (<http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/es/basededatos.html>).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

6.7.6 Height (E) (e_peheight)

Question: What is the average height of the population?

Clarification: Average height estimates are organized by birth decade. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Baten and Blum (2012).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

6.7.7 Infant mortality rate (E) (e_peinfmor)

Question: What is the infant mortality rate?

Clarification: The infant mortality rate is measured as the number of deaths prior to age 1 per 1000 live births in a year. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on various sources.

Data release: 2-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document), along with sources cited above.

6.7.8 Life expectancy (E) (e_pelifeex)

Question: What is the life expectancy?

Clarification: Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on Human Mortality Database (2008), Riley (2005a, 2005b), Human Life Table Database (2007), United Nations Population Division (2010), Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Human Mortality Database (2008), Human Life Table Database (2007), World Bank (2013), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (<http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/es/basededatos.html>).

Data release: 2-3, 7-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); sources cited above.

6.7.9 Life expectancy, male (E) (e_pemaliex)

Question: What is the life expectancy at birth for men?

Clarification: Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu) drawing on Human Mortality Database (2008), Human Life Table Database (2007), World Bank (2013), Gapminder (gapminder.org), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (<http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/es/basededatos.html>).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

6.7.10 Maternal mortality rate (E) (e_pematmor)

Question: What is the maternal mortality rate?

Clarification: Maternal mortality is defined as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy from any cause or disease associated with pregnancy. The maternal mortality rate is calculated as a ratio of 100,000 live births.

Source(s): Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing from various sources (unspecified).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Gapminder (gapminder.org).

6.7.11 Population size (E) (e_population)

Question: What is the size of the population?

Clarification: The data until 2006 is from Haber and Menaldo and the data from 2007 until 2016 is taken from the World Bank.

Responses:

Numeric.

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011); World Bank (2018)

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.7.12 Non-agricultural population % (E) (e_Vanhanen_nonag_ipo)

Question: What percentage of the population work in non-agricultural occupations?

Clarification: 100 - agricultural workers (%).

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.7.13 Urban population % (E) (e_Vanhanen_urban_ipo)

Question: What is the urbanization rate?

Clarification: Ratio of Urban Population to Population.

Source(s): Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Vanhanen (2003).

6.8 Conflict

6.8.1 Civil war (E) (e_Civil_War)

Question: Was there a civil war?

Clarification: Civil war — at least one intra-state war with at least 1,000 battle deaths for each country-year.

Responses:

0: No

1: Yes

Source(s): Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: Haber and Menaldo (2011).

6.8.2 Country code (E) (e_cowcode)

Source(s): Sarkees and Wayman (2010).

Data release: 5-7.

Citation: Sarkees and Wayman (2010).

6.8.3 Armed conflict, international (E) (e_miinteco)

Question: Did the country participate in an international armed conflict?

Clarification: Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

6.8.4 Armed conflict, internal (E) (e_miinterc)

Question: Did the country experience an internal armed conflict?

Clarification: Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

Source(s): Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001).

Data release: 5-8.

Citation: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

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7 Appendix A: Glossary

Attributes This section includes the most specific conceptual building blocks we use to discuss democracy and related concepts. Many of our survey questions attempt to ask about a single attribute, for example, "What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?" Although any of these questions could also be seen as a compendium of multiple attributes (What does it mean to be a legislature? What is a "popular" election?), in a project covering all countries for more than a century, there are degrees of specificity that it is not practical to approach, so attributes are the most specific concepts that we consider feasible to measure.

Chief Executive The Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on the relative power of each office.

Civil Society An organizational layer of the polity that lies between the state and private life. Civil society is composed of voluntary associations of people joined together in common purpose. Four varieties of organizations should *not* be considered part of civil society:

- A: Any organization that has forced membership for some class of people (*e.g.* transmission belt organizations under totalitarian, post-totalitarian regimes, or authoritarian regimes).
- B: Economic firms (whether private or public). However, if owners or workers of firms organize for their mutual interest such organizations are part of civil society. Illustration – General Motors is not part of civil society, but any producers association it takes part in, or any labor union which its workers belong to, clearly is.
- C: Those parts of religious organizations devoted to the practice of spirituality. However, organizations devoted to social or political ends that are based in common religious belief or affiliation (the Moral Majority, CARE, American Friends Service Committee, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Anti-Defamation League, or the Council on American-Islamic Relations) are clearly part of civil society. To clarify: the Catholic Church should not be considered a civil society organization, but in many societies there are a multitude of Catholic organizations, linked to the Church in varying degrees, that are a part of civil society. Such public activities even when physically housed in places of worship should be considered civil society organizations (*e.g.*, charitable or social action committees that are physically located on ecclesiastical property).
- D: Criminal Associations. Such associations may influence or even capture elements within the state or political society. They are not to be considered part of civil society. Examples include narcotics cartels, smuggling organizations, and slavery networks. Civic associations that are declared criminal by political authorities for carrying out civic or political activities should not be conflated with criminal associations.

Component and Subcomponent Relative concepts that are useful when describing the structure of either a concept or an index. For example, egalitarianism is a component of egalitarian democracy, but egalitarianism in turn has its own components, including health and educational equality, which are therefore subcomponents of egalitarian democracy. The V-Dem conceptual scheme sometimes distinguishes five or more levels of specificity. Because these terms are relative, knowing whether a concept is a component or a subcomponent does not reveal how general or specific it is in an absolute sense.

Conceptions The most general concepts of democracy. These are more complex notions that allow for a version of democracy to embrace multiple properties and dimensions. They are attempts to define more holistic, thick concepts that approach natural-language understandings of democracy. In doing so, they tend to overlap with other general concepts of democracy. For example, our conceptions of liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy all include electoral democracy and therefore overlap quite a bit.

Country A sovereign state or semi-sovereign territory. All political units of concern to V-Dem are referred to as countries, even though their status in international law varies — some being colonies others being nation-states or empires.

Dimension A property with an added empirical characteristic: it describes a straight line connecting two poles of a concept. It is practically synonymous with scale. Often we reserve the term dimension for properties whose attributes also can be arrayed between the same two poles. For example, if "civil liberty" is a dimension, many specific civil liberties are correlated: if a case has a high degree of freedom of discussion, it tends to have high degrees of freedom of movement, freedom to organize, freedom from political murder, and so on. There are exceptions, however, when there are accepted ways of reducing multidimensional attributes to a single dimension. For example, male suffrage and female suffrage vary somewhat independently but they can be combining into a dimension of adult suffrage.

Disadvantage Refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, a group or individual is judged disadvantaged if their annual income is significantly below the median national income.

Government The executive branch of the government, including its head of state (HOS) and/or head of government (HOG) — whichever is most prominent, or both if they are both powerful — along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants. We are only concerned here with the government that actually resides within the country or semi-sovereign territory. Thus, in a typical British colony the government would include the governor-general and his local administration but not the King/Queen of England or the government of England.

Head of Government (HOG) A head of government (HOG) is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of its government, typically presiding over a cabinet. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions respect to the head of government that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local prime minister in a British colony, not the prime minister in London).

Head of State (HOS) A head of state (HOS) is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions with respect to the head of state that is seated within the territory in question (such as the governor-general in a British colony, not the King/Queen of England).

High Court By high court we mean the constitutional court of your country or the highest ordinary court. Specifically, if your country has a constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to that court. If there is no constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to the country's highest ordinary court. For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and in Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court, tribunal, or review body. The Supreme Court of the United States is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore we consider it to be the high court of the United States.

Sometimes a country's highest judicial body has separate chambers or divisions. If the court's judges do not rotate between divisions, and only one division possesses jurisdiction over constitutional matters, then please only consider that division in your responses. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If the state is a federation, please focus on the federal judiciary. Finally, if you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to highest ordinary court seated within the territory in question, not abroad (*i.e.*, do not consider a colonial court like the Privy Council for British Colonies).

Index (plural: indices) A measure constructed from multiple variables or indicators.

Legislature A collective body, commonly associated with national governments, having the formal right to propose, amend, enact, and repeal legislation that is binding for the entire political unit. It is typically distinct from other branches of government such as the judiciary and the executive. Advisory bodies that do not have the formal authority to legislate — as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent — are not considered legislatures. Legislative bodies typically have the power to decide on one or more of the following:

- National budget
- Domestic taxation
- International treaty ratification
- Instituting states of emergency
- Declaring war
- Territorial integrity and national sovereignty
- Executive oversight

Membership of a legislative body may be the result of a popular election, selection by lower level bodies, or appointment by representatives of the executive. A legislature may be organized as one or more chambers, often though not always, having distinct responsibilities.

A legislature is a permanent body, considered to exist from the day it has first convened until the end of its legal mandate; or until another date when the body is dissolved for another reason or when it is practically incapacitated during protracted states of emergency, civil wars, or similar conditions; or when its legal existence is eliminated by a suspension of the constitutional order.

Local Government The lowest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. Situated below regional government (if there is a regional government). Refers to government at the level of towns, cities, and counties/communes (all-inclusive).

Lower Chamber The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber," typically means the more numerous chamber that is also more directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

National Government The highest level of aggregation recognized by the V-Dem project. Refers to the national government of a sovereign state or the territorial level of government for a semi-sovereign colony or territory. Thus, the "national" government of India prior to independence — the British Raj — was situated in New Delhi, *not* in London — even though decisions affecting the Indian colony were often made in London.

Ordinary Court A court with general jurisdiction or a court with civil and/or criminal jurisdiction.

Political Party An organization that nominates candidates for public office. The term includes a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituencies then it should be considered the same organization.

Popular Election A process of direct leadership selection in which voters choose parties or individuals to serve in executive offices or as representatives in legislative or constitutional assemblies.

The only accepted mediation is the situation where voters select a body of electors, who are pledged to support specific candidates, and whose sole purpose is to intermediate the leadership selection process, as in US presidential elections.

The electorate (those allowed to vote) in a popular election may include all adult citizens or it may be restricted to particular groups (*e.g.*, men, property holders, racial or ethnic groups). The extent of suffrage is not what qualifies an election as popular (so long as the number of voters is much larger than the number of representatives being selected). Likewise, the freeness or fairness of an election is not at issue. A popular election may be restricted to a single party or candidate, for example, but does not include referendums on term extensions for incumbents.

Principles Properties with normative connotations. When we wish to make reference to the various intellectual traditions that have fostered debate about what democracy should be, we prefer the term principles to properties. For example, when describing theories of deliberative democracy, it is necessary to refer to philosophers such as Habermas who argue for the principle that governments must earn their authority to rule by respectfully providing citizens with rationales for their decisions — a normative claim. However, by referring to various principles we are not endorsing them, only saying that others do. Principles are not necessarily dimensions, as realizing a principle can require achieving a high standard on more than one dimension; and dimensions are not necessarily principles; but both are special types of properties.

Properties Concepts that are more general than attributes. We speak of the participatory property of participatory democracy, for example, to call attention to the participatory aspects of participatory democracy, as distinct from the other features that it may share with egalitarian, liberal, electoral, or deliberative democracy. Because they are at a relatively high level of generality, properties tend to contain many attributes.

Public Authorities Includes the government as well as subnational governments, agencies, parastatals, and the like. Compare State.

Regional Government The second-highest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. A regional government is situated below the national government. Regional units may be referred to as cantons, departments, provinces, regions, or states. Note that some countries are so small that they do not have regional governments, or did not have regional governments for some portion of the 20th century.

Semisovereign Territory This refers to a country that is not fully sovereign but nonetheless exercises some — at least minimal — level of self-determination. Many of the countries of concern to this project began as colonies of an empire. If a country moved from semi-sovereign status to sovereign status over the course of the twentieth century — maintaining comparable borders — then we want to code both entities. Likewise, we want to include countries like Taiwan that are not universally recognized as sovereign but nonetheless enjoy self-determination (in part or in full).

Most questions pertaining to semi-sovereign territories ask you to reflect on the practices and institutions located within that territory — rather than the empire or nation-state that may claim ultimate sovereignty over the territory. Thus, a question about the government or judicial bodies seated within a British colony would refer to the governor-general and his local administration rather than the King/Queen or government of England.

Social Group A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood — by those residing within that society — to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

Specialized Court Specialized courts have jurisdiction restricted to particular areas of the law outside of criminal and civil law. Examples of specialized courts include administrative, commercial, immigration or environmental courts. We exclude constitutional courts from this category.

State A political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis.

Upper Chamber The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber," typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please consider the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the "senate" or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

Variable A measure of a small number of attributes. Synonymous with "indicator."

Variety of Democracy A loose term that could refer both to conceptions of democracy (as defined above) and to other notions of democracy, such as direct democracy (which in our conceptual scheme is a property of participatory democracy).

8 Appendix B: Post-Survey Questionnaire

8.0.1 Post-survey questionnaire introduction (A,B,C) (v2zzint1)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Clarification: Please answer this set of questions after you have completed all other sections of the survey. It consists of questions about your personal background and political perspectives, as well as some general questions about democracy. Answers to personal questions will remain strictly confidential.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.2 Today's date (A,B,C) (v2zzdate)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is today's date?

Responses:

Date.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.3 Gender (A,B,C) (v2zzgender)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is your gender?

Responses:

0: Male

1: Female

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.4 Education (A,B,C) (v2zzedlev)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is your level of education?

Responses:

0: None.

1: Incomplete primary.

2: Primary completed.

3: Incomplete secondary.

4: Secondary completed.

5: Post-secondary trade/vocational school.

6: University undergraduate degree incomplete.

7: University undergraduate degree completed.

8: Masters degree (MA).

9: Ph.D.

10: Juris Doctor or other professional degree (medicine, business).

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.5 Current educational status (A,B,C) (v2zzcurred)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Are you currently enrolled in a degree program?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.6 Country of education (A,B,C) (v2zzedcnt)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In which country are you currently attending school or — if no longer in school — in which country did you complete your highest educational degree (*e.g.*, BA, MA, PhD)?

Responses:

Country (chosen from menu).

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.7 Year of birth (A,B,C) (v2zzborn)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In what year were you born?

Responses:

Numeric.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.8 Country of birth (A,B,C) (v2zzbornin)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In which country were you born?

Responses:

Country (chosen from menu).

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.9 Country of residence (A,B,C) (v2zzreside)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: In what country do you live today?

Clarification: If your time is split between several countries, list that country where you spend the most time or that which constitutes your official residence.

Responses:

Country (chosen from menu)

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.10 Years in country (B,C) (v2zztimein)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How much total time, in years, have you spent in the country that you worked on for this project?

Clarification: Please count time in residence and time visiting. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".

Responses:

Numeric.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.11 Years away from country (B,C) (v2zzyrsout)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since you most recently lived in or visited the country you will be working on?

Clarification: If you are there now, enter 0. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".

Responses:

Numeric.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.12 Country of employer or university (B,C) (v2zzempcnt)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Is your current employer or university located in the country on which you are working for this project?

Responses:

0: No.

1: Yes.

2: Unemployed/Retired.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.13 Employer (A,B,C) (v2zzemploy)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: For whom do you currently work?

Responses:

0: Self-employed, unemployed, or retired.

1: The current executive (presidential administration/cabinet).

2: A ministry, board, or agency within the central government.

3: A ministry, board, or agency within the local/regional government.

4: A state-owned enterprise or another branch of the public administration.

5: A public university.

6: A private university.

7: A private-sector company.

8: An NGO or non-profit private organization.

9: Full-time student.

10: Other.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.14 Role in project (A,B,C) (v2zzrole)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What is your primary role in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project?

Responses:

0: Research assistant coding (or entering) factual data across many countries — type (A) coder.

1: Country research assistant — type (B) coder.

2: Country expert — type (C) coder.

3: Research assistant working at University of Gothenburg.

4: Research assistant working at University of Notre Dame.

5: Other research assistant.

6: Regional manager (RM).

7: Project manager (PM).

8: Principal investigator (PI).

9: Not sure.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.15 Democracy Scores (B,C) (v2zzdemsc)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: What democracy score would you assign to the following countries on a 0-100 scale?

Clarification: Imagine a scale that measures the degree of democracy-autocracy in countries around the world today, stretching from 0 to 100. 0 represents the most extreme autocracy in the world today and 100 represents the most democratic country in the world today.

These scores are meant to represent the actual state of regimes across the world today, not ideal-types. Thus, countries could become, over time, more autocratic than the most autocratic country in the world today, or more democratic than the most democratic country today. And they may have been so in the past. All we are concerned about here is the state of regimes at the current time.

Because some regimes are undergoing rapid change, it is important to clarify a specific date. Your coding should reflect the state of democracy in a country on 1 January, 2012.

In assigning scores we ask that you apply your understanding of democracy. This need not accord with the vision of democracy embraced by extant indices (Freedom House, Polity, *et al.*) or with the perspective of the V-Dem project (which embraces a variety of models of democracy).

All we ask is that you consider democracy-autocracy on a unidimensional scale. Of course, we realize that democracy is much more complicated than this. But we feel nonetheless that important information can be captured in a single dimension and we want to know how you view the subject.

We realize that you know more about some of these countries than about others. Do not be concerned by this. Simply enter the score that represents your best estimate.

Responses:

0: The country you worked on Range (Regional managers (RMs) should insert here the country that they know best within the region they are assigned to work on. Leave this question blank if you are working on numerous countries across multiple regions.) [v2zzdemyc]

1: Costa Rica Range [v2zzdemcr]

2: Cuba Range [v2zzdemcu]

3: India Range [v2zzdemin]

4: Nigeria Range [v2zzdemni]

5: North Korea Range [v2zzdemnk]

6: Russia Range [v2zzdemru]

7: Saudi Arabia Range [v2zzdemsar]

8: South Africa Range [v2zzdemsaf]

9: Sweden Range [v2zzdemswe]

10: Switzerland Range [v2zzdemswz]

11: United Kingdom Range [v2zzdemuk]

12: United States Range [v2zzdemus]

13: Venezuela Range [v2zzdemvz]

Answer-type: Multiple-input, cluster question. Note for interpretation of data: In the online version of this question the country IDs listed above are recorded in the confidence field because the country_id corresponds to that of the country coded in other surveys. In the Excel version for lateral coders, however, confidence is listed as 99 for all answers and the country_ids are the correct country_ids for any countries that were selected. In both survey formats, countries that were skipped have a score of -999 in the code field. No confidence is recorded for this question in either format.

Notes: This question is not included in the dataset.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.16 Free markets (A,B,C) (v2zzfremrk)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Consider the following statement: "The free market, the protection of property rights, and private ownership of businesses are fundamental principles of a free society." How strongly do you agree or disagree?

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.

1: Somewhat disagree.

2: Neither agree nor disagree.

3: Somewhat agree.

4: Strongly agree.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.17 Principles of democracy introduction (A,B,C) (v2zzint2)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Clarification: There are many ways of conceptualizing democracy. In the following section, we ask about your own views of this subject. Specifically, we ask you to consider seven conceptions of democracy — electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensus, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. After a short description of each conception, we ask you to rate how strongly you support this conception of democracy on a standard Likert scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree).

We are interested in your own views of the subject, *i.e.*, how closely these various conceptualizations fit with your intuitive sense of what democracy means, or should mean. When you say "democracy," what do you mean to communicate? How do you think the concept is most usefully defined?

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.18 Electoral democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzelcdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The electoral principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The electoral principle — also known as contestation, competition, elite, minimal, realist, or Schumpeterian — is the idea that democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups, which vie for the electorate's approval during periodic elections before a broad electorate. Parties and elections are the crucial instruments in this largely procedural account of the democratic process. Of course, many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring and enhancing electoral contestation, *e.g.*, civil liberties, an active media, a written constitution, an independent judiciary (to enforce the rules of the game), and so forth. However, these factors are viewed as secondary to electoral institutions.

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.

1: Somewhat disagree.

2: Neither agree nor disagree.

3: Somewhat agree.

4: Strongly agree.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.19 Liberal democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzlibdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The liberal principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The liberal principle identifies democracy with limited government, rule of law, and the preservation of individual liberties. The liberal model assumes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. Principles and procedures must be established so as to ensure that rule by the majority does not result in the loss of individual liberties.

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.

1: Somewhat disagree.

2: Neither agree nor disagree.

3: Somewhat agree.

4: Strongly agree.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.20 Majoritarian democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzmajdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The majoritarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The majoritarian principle (aka responsible party government) reflects the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign. The many should prevail over the few. To facilitate this, political institutions must concentrate power (within the context of competitive elections). In practical terms, this means strong and centralized parties, a unitary rather than federal constitution, plurality rather than proportional electoral laws (or PR with high statutory thresholds), and so forth.

Responses:

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.21 Consensus democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzcondem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The consensus principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The consensus principle is the idea that democracy is achieved when consensus is achieved. This means that new policies should not be adopted by a polity unless and until a consensus (or near consensus) is reached. In order to assure that the principle of consensus is honored institutions should be set up in such a way as to assure that power is dispersed across numerous independent (or quasi-independent) bodies. In practical terms, this means a large party system or diffusely organized parties, a federal constitution, proportional electoral rules, and so forth (directly contrary to the majoritarian conception).

Responses:

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.22 Participatory democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzprtdem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The participatory principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The motivation for participatory democracy is uneasiness about delegating complete authority to representatives. Direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. And within the context of representative government, the participatory component is regarded as the most democratic element of the polity. This model of democracy thus highlights the importance of voting, but also of citizen assemblies, party primaries, referenda, social movements, public hearings, town hall meetings, and other forums of citizen engagement.

Responses:

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.

3: Somewhat agree.

4: Strongly agree.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.23 Deliberative democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzdeldem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The deliberative principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The deliberative principle focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. In this conception, democracy requires more than a mindless aggregation of existing preferences; there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. Some political institutions have a specifically deliberative function, such as consultative bodies (hearings, panels, assemblies, courts); polities with these sorts of institutions might be judged more deliberative than those without them. However, the more important issue is the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry.

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.

1: Somewhat disagree.

2: Neither agree nor disagree.

3: Somewhat agree.

4: Strongly agree.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.24 Egalitarian democracy sympathy (A,B,C) (v2zzegldem)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: The egalitarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The egalitarian principle of democracy stresses that formal political rights and civil liberties are insufficient for political equality. The polity should also address material and immaterial inequalities that inhibit the actual exercise of these rights and liberties. Ideally, groups — as defined by income, wealth, education, ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual identity, or other ascriptive characteristics — should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not already exist, the egalitarian principle requires state efforts to make the distribution of socio-economic resources, education, and health more equal so as to enhance political equality. (This principle does not entail equality of power between leaders and citizens, as leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful.)

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.

1: Somewhat disagree.

2: Neither agree nor disagree.

3: Somewhat agree.

4: Strongly agree.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.25 Time spent for coding (B,C) (v2zztimespent)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: Approximately how much focused work time did it take you to complete your coding work in this V-Dem annual update, including time spent preparing as well as time spent in the data entry tool?

Responses:

Range 1-30 hours.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.26 Coding experience (B,C) (v2zssatisf)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: How satisfied are you with your experience coding for V-Dem?

Responses:

- 0: Very dissatisfied
- 1: Somewhat dissatisfied
- 2: Neither
- 3: Somewhat satisfied
- 4: Very satisfied

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.27 Reason of satisfaction (B,C) (v2zzreasatisf)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: What influenced your level of satisfaction regarding coding for V-Dem?

Responses:

Text.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.28 Post-survey questionnaire comments (A,B,C) (v2zzcoment)

Project Manager(s): John Gerring

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions.

Responses:

Text.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.29 Another reason for coding (B,C) (v2zzanfirstreas)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: If you had another reason that you code for V-Dem, please specify here.

Responses:

Text.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.30 Another second reason for coding (B,C) (v2zzansecondreas)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: If you had another reason that you code for V-Dem, please specify here.

Responses:

Text.

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.31 Reason for coding (B,C) (v2zzfirstreas)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: Please select the most important reason you code for V-Dem.

Responses:

- 0: V-Dem compensation provides me with extra income.
- 1: Coding for V-Dem provides me with valuable experience I can use to improve my work.
- 2: Coding for V-Dem provides me with valuable experience I can use to gain other positions as an expert.
- 3: Being a part of the V-Dem network provides benefits for my reputation.
- 4: The V-Dem dataset is providing a valuable tool for scholars and policy makers and I am proud to be contributing.
- 5: Coding for V-Dem is a fun hobby.
- 6: I take pride in spreading information about my country of expertise.
- 7: I take pride in spreading information about my area of expertise.
- 8: Another reason

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.32 Materials used (B,C) (v2zzmaterials)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: In completing the coding task for V-Dem, either this year or in the past, what materials did you use to gather your information? Select all that apply.

Responses:

- 0: Public Library
- 1: University Library
- 2: Private Library
- 3: National Archives
- 4: Private Archives
- 5: Academic Articles
- 6: National Public Newspapers
- 7: International Newspapers
- 8: National Public Radio
- 9: National Private Radio
- 10: International Radio
- 11: Government Data
- 12: Government Websites
- 13: Data from NGOs or Research Institutions
- 14: Websites of NGOs or Research Institutions
- 15: Personal Experience
- 16: Experiences of Professional Contacts/Friends/Family

Answer-type: Multiple selection

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

8.0.33 Second reason for coding (B,C) (v2zzsecreas)

Project Manager(s): Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

Question: Please select the second most important reason you code for V-Dem.

Responses:

- 0: V-Dem compensation provides me with extra income.
- 1: Coding for V-Dem provides me with valuable experience I can use to improve my work.
- 2: Coding for V-Dem provides me with valuable experience I can use to gain other positions as an expert.
- 3: Being a part of the V-Dem network provides benefits for my reputation.
- 4: The V-Dem dataset is providing a valuable tool for scholars and policy makers and I am proud to be contributing.
- 5: Coding for V-Dem is a fun hobby.
- 6: I take pride in spreading information about my country of expertise.
- 7: I take pride in spreading information about my area of expertise.

8: Another reason

Data release: Only in disaggregated dataset.

9 Appendix C: Background Notes

This section of the document lays out background information about various topics undertaken in the questionnaire and in the V-Dem project at large: (1) Civil Liberty, (2) Civil Society Organizations, (3) Deliberation, (4) Direct Democracy, (5) Elections, (6) Executive, (7) Judiciary, (8) Legislature, (9) Media, (10) Political Equality, (11) Political Parties, (12) Sovereignty, (13) Subnational Democracy, and (14) Voting and Representation.

We list the V-Dem Project Manager who constructed the indicators for that topic, scholars whose work has influenced our thinking (some of whom were personally consulted in the process of designing these indicators), organizations that collect data on these subjects (if any), and extant studies or datasets that relate to the subject (if any).

9.1 Civil Liberty

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Scholars: David Beetham (U. of Leeds, emeritus), David Cingranelli (SUNY, Binghamton), Christian Davenport (U. of Notre Dame), Todd Landman (Essex), David Richards (U. of Connecticut).

Organizations: Amnesty International, Freedom House, Hauge Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), Human Rights Watch, Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, World Justice Project.

Studies, datasets: Annual Reports (Amnesty International); Annual Reports (Human Rights Watch); Arat (1991); Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Foundation); Cederman textitet al. (2009); Cingranelli and Richards (1999; n.d.); Freedom in the World, Nations in Transit, Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom House); Freedom House (2006); Gibney and Dalton (1996); Green (2001); Landman (2004); Landman, Carvalho (2009); Skaaning (2006a, 2006b, 2008); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (US Department of State).

9.2 Civil Society Organizations

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Scholars: Sheri Berman (Barnard College), Lena Blomstrand (Head of Civil Society Center, Sida), David Campbell (Notre Dame), Grzegorz Ekiert (Harvard), Andrew Green (independent scholar), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Marc Howard (Georgetown), Jude Howell (Director, Centre for Civil Society, LSE), Jan Kubik (Rutgers), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Susan Stokes (Yale), Lucan Way (University of Toronto), Meredith Weiss (SUNY Albany).

Organizations: Center for Civil Society (UCLA), Centre for Civil Society (LSE), Civil Society Center (Sida, Sweden), National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, DC), Center for Civil Society and Democracy (Georgetown), Center for Civil Society Studies (Johns Hopkins University).

Studies, datasets: Anheier (2004); Andrew Green (proposal); The Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project, Ekiert, Kubik (2001); Helmke, Levitsky (2004); Civil Society Index (CIVICUS); Civil Society Ratings (the Civil Society Center at Sida and Helmut K. Anheier); European Social Survey; Freedom House; Nations in Transit; The U.S. "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" Survey; World Values Survey.

9.3 Deliberation

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg

Scholars: Andre Bächtiger (University of Luzern), John Dryzek (ANU), Jurg Steiner (UNC, Chapel Hill).

Studies, datasets. Bächtiger (2005); Dryzek (2009); Mutz (2008); Ryfe (2005); Steiner *et al.* (2004); Thompson (2008).

9.4 Direct Democracy

Project manager: David Altman

Scholars: Shaun Bowler (UC Riverside), Anita Breuer (Cologne), Todd Donovan (Western Washington), Markus Freitag (Konstanz), Archon Fung (Kennedy School of Gov, Harvard), Elisabeth Gerber (Michigan), Sara Hobolt (Oxford), Simon Hug (Geneve), John Matsusaka (USC), Maija Setälä (Turku), Caroline J. Tolbert (Iowa), Adrian Vatter (Zurich).

Organizations: Centre for Democracy (C2D), IRI-USA.

Studies, datasets: Suchmaschine für direkte Demokratie; National Conference of State Legislatures (US only).

9.5 Elections

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Scholars: Matthijs Bogaards (Jacobs University, Bremen), Jörgen Elklit (Aarhus U., Denmark), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Susan Hyde (Yale), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Judith Kelly (Duke), Gerry Munck (USC), Andrew Reynolds (UNC), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Rakesh Sharma (IFES). *Organizations:* ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Carter Center, IFES, National Democratic Institute (NDI), OAS Department of Cooperation and Electoral Observation. *Studies, datasets:* Bjornlund (2004); Carter Center *et al.* (2005); Elklit, Reynolds (2005); Eriksson (2002); European Union (2007); Gerken (2009); Hyde and Malinov (2009); Kelley, Kolev (2010); Kollman *et al.* (2011); Lindberg (2009); Munck (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); Project on International Election Monitoring; Schedler (2006).

9.6 Executive

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Scholars: Kirk Bowman (Georgia Institute of Technology), John Carey (Dartmouth), Steven Fish (UC Berkeley), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Fabrice Lehoucq (UNC Greensboro), Gerardo Munck (USC), Anibal Perez-Linan (U. of Pittsburgh), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Matthew Shugart (UCSD).

Studies, datasets: Amorim Neto (1998); the ARCHIGOS project (Goemans, Gleditsch, Chiozza 2009); Banks (2009); Bienen and van de Walle (1991); Bowman, Lehoucq and Mahoney (2005); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012) (Elkins *et al.* 2009); van Cranenburgh (2008); DPI (Beck *et al.* 2001); the ACLP dataset (Cheibub *et al.* 2009); Henisz (2000; 2002); the Institutions and Elections Project, IAEP (Regan *et al.* 2009); Lentz (1994; 1999); Metcalf (2000); Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak (dataset); Schemmel (rulers.org); Siaroff (2003); UNDP (2004;77-84); worldstatesmen.org.

9.7 Judiciary

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton *Scholars:* Vanessa Baird (Colorado-Boulder), Rebecca Bill-Chavez (Navy), Dan Brinks (UT-Austin), Clifford J. Carrubba (Emory), Matthew Gabel (Washington U.), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Jeffrey Lax (Columbia), Andrew Martin (Washington U.), Georg Vanberg (UNC).

Organizations: Human Rights Watch; The World Justice Project (American Bar Association); World Bank. See also organizations listed under Civil Liberties.

Studies, datasets: American Bar Association (2007); Bertelsmann (2008); Carrubba, Gabel, Helmke, Martin, Staton (2008); Cingranelli and Richards (2008); Clague *et al.* (1999); Elkins and Ginsburg (2009); Executive Opinion Survey of the Global Competitiveness Report (available for 80 countries in 2002); Feld and Voigt (2003); Gwartney and Lawson (2007); Henisz (2000); Howard and Carey (2004); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007); Keith (2002); La Porta *et al.* (2004); Ríos-Figueroa (2006); Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2009); Tate and Keith (2007); Tate *et al.* (2002); Vera Institute of Justice (2003).

9.8 Legislature

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Scholars: Joel Barkan (University of Iowa), John Carey (Dartmouth), Scott Desposato (UCSD), John Huber (Columbia), Mark Jones (Rice), Lanny Martin (Rice), Robert Mattes (U. of Cape Town), Scott Morgenstern (U. of Pittsburgh), Shaheen Mozaffar (Bridgewater State College).

Organizations: IPU.

Studies, datasets: African Legislatures Project (ALP); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); Fish, Kroenig (2009).

9.9 Media

Project manager: Michael Coppedge / Holli Semetko

Scholars: Devra Moehler (Annenburg School, University of Pennsylvania), Erik Nisbet (Ohio State), Pippa Norris (Kennedy School of Government); Wisdom Tettey (University of Calgary).

Organizations: IREX.

Studies, datasets: IREX Media Sustainability Index (www.irex.org/msi/index.asp); Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index; Index of internet freedom (Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University).

9.10 Political Parties

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Scholars: Stefano Bartolini (EU Institute, Florence), Pradeep Chhibber (UC Berkeley), Kenneth Janda (Northwestern), Mark Jones (Rice), Richard S. Katz (Johns Hopkins University), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Herbert Kitschelt (Duke), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame), Peter Mair (EU Institute, Florence), Karen Remmer (Duke), Kenneth Roberts (Cornell), Erik Wibbels (Duke).

Studies, datasets: John Carey (dataset); Comparative Manifestoes Project; Michael Coppedge (classification of Latin American parties); DPI (Beck *et al.* 2001); Kenneth Janda (dataset); Wiesehomeier-Benoit (dimensions of party competition), CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011).

9.11 Political Equality

Project manager: John Gerring

Scholars: Kathryn Hochstetler (University of New Mexico), Ayesha Jalal (History and Sociology, Tufts), Raúl Madrid (Texas-Austin), Mick Moore (Center for the Future State/Institute for Development Studies, Sussex), Alex Pacek (Texas A&M), Deborah Yashar (Princeton).

9.12 Sovereignty

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Scholars: Karen Adams (U. of Montana), Tanisha Fazal (Columbia), Erik Gartzke (UCSD), Robert Jackson (Boston University), Stephen Krasner (Stanford), Douglas Lemke (Penn State), Kunle Owolabi (Villanova).

Organizations: Correlates of War project.

Studies, datasets: Karen Adams (dataset); Correlates of War (dataset); List of Independent States (Gleditsch, Ward).

9.13 Subnational Democracy

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Scholars: Andrew Barnes (Kent State University), Caroline Beer (University of Vermont), Karen

Beckwith (Case Western Reserve University), Dan Berger (University of Chicago), Justin Buchler (Case Western Reserve University), Ernesto Calvo (University of Maryland, College Park), Rebecca Bill Chavez (U.S. Navel Academy), Todd Eisenstadt (American University), Carlos Gervasoni (Universidad Torcuato), Agustina Giraudy (American University), Brian Grodsky (University of Maryland, Baltimore), Matt Ingram (State University of New York, Albany), Pierre Landry (University of Pittsburgh), Tomila Lankina (De Montfort University), Alfred Montero (Carleton College), Bryon Moraski (University of Florida), Nikolai Petrov (Carnegie Center Moscow), Elizabeth Remick (Tufts University), Karen Remmer (Duke University), Aseema Sinha (Claremont-McKenna College), Oxana Shevel (Tufts University), Lily Tsai (MIT).

Organizations: United Cities and Local Government, Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralization.

Studies, datasets: Ammons (2001); Bardhan, Mookherjee (2006); Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan (1997); Campbell (2003); Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot (1998); Commonwealth Local Government Forum ; Council of Europe (Local democracy reports for member states) ; Crook, Manor (1998); Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project; Globalization and World Cities; John (2001); Kaufmann, Leautier, Mastruzzi (2005); McCarney, Stren (2003); Montero, Samuels (2004); Municipal Development Partnership (PDM, seat in Cotonou, Benin) ; Olowu, Wunsch (2003); Oxhorn (2004); Soos (2002); UN Habitat (various years); World Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy, aka the Gold Report.

9.14 Voting and Representation

Project manager: Pamela Paxton

Scholars: Kenneth Bollen (UNC), Drude Dahlerup (Stockholm), Matt Golder (Florida State U.), (Rochester), Melanie Hughes (Pittsburgh); Tatu Vanhanen (University of Tampere, Finland, emeritus).

Organizations: IDEA, IPU, U.S. Department of State.

Studies, datasets: Cederman et al. (2009); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); IDEA (Global Survey of Voter Turnout); IDEA Quota Database; Moon et al. (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Paxton et al. (2003); Paxton, Hughes, and Green (2008); US Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service (2001); U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports; Vanhanen (2000).

10 Appendix D: Structure of Aggregation

10.1 V-Dem Democracy Indices and Indicators

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
<i>Electoral democracy index</i>				v2x_polyarchy	
	Additive polyarchy index			v2x_api	
	Multiplicative polyarchy index			v2x_mpi	
	Freedom of expression and alternative sources of information index			v2x_freexp_altinf	
	Government censorship effort—Media			v2mecenefm	0.2784
	Harassment of journalists			v2meharjrn	0.3274
	Media self-censorship			v2meslfcen	0.3142
	Media bias			v2mebias	0.2638
	Print/broadcast media perspectives			v2merange	0.2763
	Print/broadcast media critical			v2mecrit	
	Freedom of discussion for men			v2cldiscm	0.2726
	Freedom of discussion for women			v2cldiscw	0.2726
	Freedom of academic and cultural expression			v2clacfree	0.3502
	Freedom of association index (thick)			v2x_frassoc_thick	
	Party ban			v2psparban	0.3228
	Barriers to parties			v2psbars	0.257
	Opposition parties autonomy			v2psoppaut	0.2574
	Elections multiparty			v2elmulpar	0.4058
	CSO entry and exit			v2cseeorgs	0.3705
	CSO repression			v2csreprss	0.4114
	Share of population with suffrage			v2x_suffr	
	Percent of population with suffrage			v2elsuffrage	
	Clean elections index			v2xel_frefair	
	EMB autonomy			v2eembaut	0.3871
	EMB capacity			v2eembcap	0.4767
	Election voter registry			v2elrgstry	0.4671
	Election vote buying			v2elvotbuy	0.619
	Election other voting irregularities			v2elirreg	0.3724
	Election government intimidation			v2elintim	0.4057
	Election other electoral violence			v2elpeace	0.6608
	Election free and fair			v2elfrfair	0.3409
	Elected officials index			v2x_elecoff	
	Legislature bicameral			v2lgbicam	
	Lower chamber elected			v2lgello	
	Upper chamber elected			v2lgelecup	
	Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber			v2lginello	
	Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber			v2lginelup	
	HOS appointment in practice			v2expathhs	
	HOG appointment in practice			v2expathhg	
	HOS selection by legislature in practice			v2exaphos	
	HOG selection by legislature in practice			v2exaphogp	

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
			HOS appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdfcbhs	
			HOG appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdjcbhg	
			HOS dismisses ministers in practice	v2exdfdmhs	
			HOG dismisses ministers in practice	v2exdfdshg	
			HOS = HOG?	v2exhoshog	
			Chief executive appointment by upper chamber	v2exapup	
			Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval	v2exapupap	
			HOS = HOG?	v2exhoshog	
			Chief executive appointment by upper chamber	v2exapup	
			Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval	v2exapupap	
<i>Liberal democracy index</i>				v2x_libdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Liberal component index			v2x_liberal	
	Equality before the law and individual liberty index			v2xcl_rol	
		Rigorous and impartial public administration		v2clrspct	0.5089
		Transparent laws with predictable enforcement		v2cltrnslw	0.3726
		Access to justice for men		v2clacjstm	0.2344
		Access to justice for women		v2clacjstw	0.2344
		Property rights for men		v2clprptym	0.4594
		Property rights for women		v2clprptyw	0.4594
		Freedom from torture		v2cltort	0.3957
		Freedom from political killings		v2clkill	0.4086
		Freedom from forced labor for men		v2clslavem	0.4852
		Freedom from forced labor for women		v2clslavef	0.4852
		Freedom of religion		v2clrelig	0.5745
		Freedom of foreign movement		v2clfmov	0.4246
		Freedom of domestic movement for men		v2cldmovm	0.3861
		Freedom of domestic movement for women		v2cldmovw	0.3861
	Judicial constraints on the executive index			v2x_jucon	
		Executive respects constitution		v2exrescon	0.5771
		Compliance with judiciary		v2jucomp	0.3243
		Compliance with high court		v2juhccomp	0.3389
		High court independence		v2juhcind	0.4309
		Lower court independence		v2juncind	0.4134
	Legislative constraints on the executive index			v2xlg_legcon	
		Legislature questions officials in practice		v2lgqstexp	0.4954
		Executive oversight		v2lgotovst	0.375

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
			Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	0.2417
			Legislature opposition parties	v2lgoppart	0.3822
<i>Deliberative democracy index</i>				v2x_delibdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Deliberative component index			v2xdl_delib	
			Reasoned justification	v2dlreason	0.3317
			Common good	v2dlcommon	0.5885
			Respect counterarguments	v2dlcountr	0.3221
			Range of consultation	v2dlconslt	0.2659
			Engaged society	v2dlengage	0.2426
<i>Egalitarian democracy index</i>				v2x_egaldem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Egalitarian component index			v2x_egal	
		Equal protection index		v2xeg_eqprotec	
			Social class equality in respect for civil liberties	v2elacjust	0.2003
			Social group equality in respect for civil liberties	v2elsocgrp	0.584
			Weaker civil liberties population	v2elsnlpct	0.7884
		Equal access index		v2eg_eqaccess	
			Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrngen	0.4758
			Power distributed by socioeconomic position	v2pepwrses	0.4659
			Power distributed by social group	v2pepwrsoc	0.4451
		Equal distribution of resources index		v2xeg_eqdr	
			Means-tested vs. universalistic policy	v2dlunivl	0.6244
			Particularistic or Public good	v2dlencmps	0.6801
			Educational equality	v2peedueq	0.2356
			Health equality	v2pehealth	0.1712
<i>Participatory democracy index</i>				v2x_partipdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Participatory component index			v2x_partip	
		Civil society participation index		v2x_cspart	
			Candidate selection, National/local	v2psenslnl	0.7531
			CSO consultation	v2csensult	0.3921
			CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	0.3997
			CSO womens participation	v2csgender	0.642
		Direct popular vote index		v2xdd_dd	
			Initiatives permitted	v2ddlexci	
			Initiatives signatures %	v2ddsigpci	
			Initiatives signature-gathering time limit	v2ddsiglci	
			Initiatives signature-gathering period	v2ddsigdci	
			Initiatives level	v2ddlevci	
			Initiatives participation threshold	v2ddpartci	

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
			Initiatives approval threshold	v2ddapprci	
			Initiatives administrative threshold	v2ddadmci	
			Initiatives super majority	v2ddspmci	
			Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year	v2ddyrci	
			Referendums permitted	v2ddlexrf	
			Referendums signatures %	v2ddsigrpf	
			Referendums signature-gathering period	v2ddsigrdf	
			Referendums participation threshold	v2ddpartrf	
			Referendums approval threshold	v2ddapprrf	
			Referendums super majority	v2ddspmrf	
			Referendums administrative threshold	v2ddadmrf	
			Occurrence of referendum this year	v2ddyrrf	
			Plebiscite permitted	v2ddlexpl	
			Plebiscite participation threshold	v2ddpartpl	
			Plebiscite approval threshold	v2ddapprpl	
			Plebiscite super majority	v2ddspmpl	
			Plebiscite administrative threshold	v2ddadmpl	
			Occurrence of plebiscite this year	v2ddyrrpl	
			Constitutional changes popular vote	v2ddlexor	
			Obligatory referendum participation threshold	v2ddpartor	
			Obligatory referendum approval threshold	v2ddappor	
			Obligatory referendum super majority	v2ddspmor	
			Obligatory referendum administrative threshold	v2ddadmor	
			Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year	v2ddyror	
			Obligatory referendum credible threat	v2ddthreor	
			Popular referencum credible threat	v2ddthrerf	
			Plebiscite credible threat	v2ddthrepl	
		Local government index		v2xel_locelec	
		Local government elected		v2ellocelec	
		Local offices relative power		v2ellocpwr	
		Local government exists		v2ellocgov	
		Regional government index		v2xel_regelec	
		Regional government elected		v2elsrgel	
		Regional offices relative power		v2elrgpwr	
		Regional government exists		v2elreggov	

* Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables.

10.2 Indices Created Using V-Dem Data

Democracy Indices Created Using V-Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
<i>Electoral regime index</i>			v2x_elecreg	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election		v2xel_elecparl	
	Election type		v2eltype_0	
	Election type		v2eltype_1	
	Election type		v2eltype_4	
	Election type		v2eltype_5	
	Legislature closed down or aborted		v2xlg_leginter	
	Legislature bicameral		v2lgbicam	
	Presidential election		v2xel_elecpres	
	Election type		v2eltype_6	
	Election type		v2eltype_7	
	Chief executive no longer elected		v2x_hosinter	
	HOS = HOG?		v2exhoshog	
	HOG appointment in practice		v2expathhg	
	HOS appointment in practice		v2expathhs	
	Presidential election aborted		v2x_hosabort	
	HOS = HOG?		v2exhoshog	
	HOG appointment in practice		v2expathhg	
	HOS appointment in practice		v2expathhs	
	Presidential election		v2xel_elecpres	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted		v2x_legabort	
	Legislature bicameral		v2lgbicam	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election		v2xel_elecparl	
<i>Executive electoral regime index</i>			v2xex_elecreg	
	Presidential election		v2xel_elecpres	
	Election type		v2eltype_6	
	Election type		v2eltype_7	
	Chief executive no longer elected		v2x_hosinter	
	HOS = HOG?		v2exhoshog	
	HOG appointment in practice		v2expathhg	
	HOS appointment in practice		v2expathhs	
	Presidential election aborted		v2x_hosabort	
	HOS = HOG?		v2exhoshog	
	HOG appointment in practice		v2expathhg	
	HOS appointment in practice		v2expathhs	
	Presidential election		v2xel_elecpres	
<i>Legislative electoral regime index</i>			v2xlg_elecreg	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election		v2xel_elecparl	
	Election type		v2eltype_0	
	Election type		v2eltype_1	
	Election type		v2eltype_4	
	Election type		v2eltype_5	
	Legislature closed down or aborted		v2xlg_leginter	
	Legislature bicameral		v2lgbicam	

Democracy Indices Created Using V-Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
		Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted	v2x_legabort	
		Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
		Legislative or constituent assembly election	v2xel_elecparl	
<i>Regimes of the World index</i>			v2x_regime	
		Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar_osp	
		Executive elections multiparty	v2elmulpar_osp_ex	
		Legislative elections multiparty	v2elmulpar_osp_leg	
		Election free and fair	v2elfrfair_osp	
		Legislative election free and fair	v2elfrfair_osp_leg	
		Executive election free and fair	v2elfrfair_osp_ex	
		HOS appointed by legislature	v2ex_legconhos	
		Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
		Access to justice for men	v2clacjstm_osp	
		Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw_osp	
		Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	v2cltrnslw_osp	
		Electoral regime index	v2x_elecreg	
		Executive electoral regime index	v2xex_elecreg	
		Legislative electoral regime index	v2xlg_elecreg	
		Electoral democracy index	v2x_polyarchy	
		Liberal component index	v2x_liberal	
<i>Women political empowerment index</i>			v2x_gender	
		Women civil liberties index	v2x_gencl	
		Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovew	0.4432
		Freedom from forced labor for women	v2cls slavef	0.4869
		Property rights for women	v2clprptyw	0.4233
		Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw	0.3626
		Women civil society participation index	v2x_gencs	
		Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	0.5375
		CSO womens participation	v2csgender	0.2294
		Percent (%) female journalists	v2mefemjrn	0.5378
		Women political participation index	v2x_genpp	
		Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrgen	
		Lower chamber female legislators	v2lgfemleg	
<i>Corruption index</i>			v2x_corr	
		Legislature corrupt activities	v2lgcrrpt	
		Judicial corruption decision	v2jucorrdc	
		Public sector corruption index	v2x_pubcorr	
		Public sector corrupt exchanges	v2excrptps	
		Public sector theft	v2exthtftps	
		Executive corruption index	v2x_execorr	
		Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	
		Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembez	

Democracy Indices Created Using V-Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
<i>Electoral component index</i>			v2x_EDcomp_thick	
	Freedom of association index (thick)		v2x_frassoc_thick	
	Party ban		v2psparban	0.3228
	Barriers to parties		v2psbars	0.257
	Opposition parties autonomy		v2psoppaut	0.2574
	Elections multiparty		v2elmulpar	0.4058
	CSO entry and exit		v2cseeorgs	0.3705
	CSO repression		v2csreprss	0.4114
	Share of population with suffrage		v2x_suffr	
	Percent of population with suffrage		v2elsuffrage	
	Clean elections index		v2xel_frefair	
	EMB autonomy		v2elembaut	0.3871
	EMB capacity		v2elembcap	0.4767
	Election voter registry		v2elrgstry	0.4671
	Election vote buying		v2elvotbuy	0.619
	Election other voting irregularities		v2elirreg	0.3724
	Election government intimidation		v2elintim	0.4057
	Election other electoral violence		v2elpeace	0.6608
	Election free and fair		v2elfrfair	0.3409
	Elected officials index		v2x_elecoff	
	Legislature bicameral		v2lgbicam	
	Lower chamber elected		v2lgello	
	Upper chamber elected		v2lgelecup	
	Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber		v2lginello	
	Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber		v2lginelup	
	HOS appointment in practice		v2expathhs	
	HOG appointment in practice		v2expathhg	
	HOS selection by legislature in practice		v2exaphos	
	HOG selection by legislature in practice		v2exaphogp	
	HOS appoints cabinet in practice		v2exdfcbhs	
	HOG appoints cabinet in practice		v2exdjcbhg	
	HOS dismisses ministers in practice		v2exdfdmhs	
	HOG dismisses ministers in practice		v2exdfdshg	
	HOS = HOG?		v2exhoshog	
	Chief executive appointment by upper chamber		v2exapup	
<i>Freedom of expression index</i>			v2x_freexp	
	Government censorship effort — Media		v2mecenefm	0.2869
	Harassment of journalists		v2meharjrn	0.337
	Media self-censorship		v2meslfcen	0.3563
	Freedom of discussion for men		v2cldiscm	0.2189
	Freedom of discussion for women		v2cldiscw	0.2189
	Freedom of academic and cultural expression		v2clacfree	0.2983

Democracy Indices Created Using V-Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
<i>Civil liberties index</i>			v2x_civlib	
	Private civil liberties index		v2x_clpriv	
	Freedom from forced labor for men		v2clslavem	0.4639
	Freedom from forced labor for women		v2clslavef	0.4639
	Property rights for men		v2clprptym	0.4085
	Property rights for women		v2clprptyw	0.4085
	Freedom of foreign movement		v2clfmov	0.3682
	Freedom of domestic movement for men		v2cldmovm	0.272
	Freedom of domestic movement for women		v2cldmovw	0.272
	Freedom of religion		v2clrelig	0.4932
	Religious organization repression		v2csrlgref	0.5174
	Physical violence index		v2x_clphy	
	Freedom from political killings		v2clkill	
	Freedom from torture		v2cltort	
	Political civil liberties index		v2x_clpol	
	Government censorship effort — Media		v2mecenefm	0.3126
	Harassment of journalists		v2meharjrn	0.3516
	Media self-censorship		v2meslfcen	0.3731
	Freedom of discussion for men		v2cldiscm	0.2302
	Freedom of discussion for women		v2cldiscw	0.2302
	Party ban		v2psparban	0.4088
	Barriers to parties		v2psbars	0.3465
	Opposition parties autonomy		v2psoppaut	0.3602
	CSO entry and exit		v2cseeorgs	0.2895
	CSO repression		v2csreprss	0.3134
<i>Accountability index**</i>			v2x_accountability	
	Vertical accountability index		vv2x_veracc	
	Electoral regime index		v2x_elecreg	
	HOS appointed by legislature		v2ex_legconhos	
	Relative power of the HOS		v2ex_hosw	
	EMB autonomy		v2elembaut	
	EMB capacity		v2elembcap	
	Election voter registry		v2elrgstry	
	Election other voting irregularities		v2elirreg	
	Election government intimidation		v2elintim	
	Elections multiparty		v2elmulpar	
	Election free and fair		v2elfrfair	
	Percentage of population with suffrage		v2elsuffrage	
	HOS appointment in practice		v2expathhs	
	HOG appointment in practice		v2expathhg	
	HOG selection by legislature in practice		v2exaphogp	
	Party ban		v2psparban	

Democracy Indices Created Using V-Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
		Barriers to parties	v2psbars	
		Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	
		Horizontal accountability index	v2x_horacc	
		High court independence	v2juhcind	
		Lower court independence	v2juncind	
		Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	
		Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	
		Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	
		Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	
		Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	
		Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
		Diagonal accountability index	v2x_diagacc	
		Government censorship effort — Media	v2mecenefm	
		Internet censorship effort	v2mecenefi	
		Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	
		Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	
		Media bias	v2mebias	
		Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	
		Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	
		CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	
		CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	
		CSO repression	v2csreprss	
		Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm	
		Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	
		Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	
		Engaged society	v2dlengage	
		<i>Party institutionalization index</i>	v2xps_party	
		Party organizations	v2psorgs	
		Party branches	v2psprbrch	
		Party linkages	v2psprlnks	
		Distinct party platforms	v2psplats	
		Legislative party cohesion	v2pscohesv	
		<i>Core civil society index</i>	v2xcs_ccsi	
		CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	0.2124
		CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	0.3172
		CSO repression	v2csreprss	0.4638
		<i>Alternative sources of information index</i>	v2xme_altinf	
		Media bias	v2mebias	0.2725
		Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	0.2556
		Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	0.245
		<i>Divided party control of legislature index</i>	v2x_divparctrl	
		National party control	v2psnatpar	
		National party control ordinal version	v2psnatpar_ord	

Democracy Indices Created Using V-Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score (Un-modeled Variance)*
<i>Division of power index</i>			v2x_feduni	
		Local government exists	v2ellocgov	
		Regional government exists	v2elreggov	
		Local government elected	v2ellocelc	
		Regional government elected	v2elsrgel	
		Local offices relative power	v2ellocpwr	
		Regional offices relative power	v2elrgpwr	
<i>Rule of law index</i>			v2x_rule	
		Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	0.4889
		Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	0.4504
		High court independence	v2juhcind	0.5427
		Lower court independence	v2juncind	0.568
		Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	0.448
		Rigorous and impartial public administration	v2clrspct	0.398
		Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	v2cltrnslw	0.4617
		Access to justice for men	v2clacjstm	0.488
		Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw	0.488
		Judicial accountability	v2juaccnt	0.6182
		Judicial corruption decision	v2jucorrdc	0.521
		Public sector corrupt exchanges	v2excrptps	0.4334
		Public sector theft	v2exthftps	0.4091
		Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	0.487
		Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembez	0.3658

* Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables.

** Because the accountability indices do not use standard BFAs, we do not report uniqueness scores here. Details regarding model fit can be found in the methodological appendix of V-Dem Working Paper No. 58.

11 Appendix E: Changes Between Previous Versions of the Dataset

11.1 New in Version 7.1 Compared to Version 7

- **New indices and indicators**
 - Accountability index (v2x_accountability)
 - Vertical accountability index (v2x_veracc)
 - Horizontal accountability index (v2x_horacc)
 - Diagonal accountability index (v2x_diagacc)
- **Modified indices and indicators**
 - Errors with E type variables in version 7 have been fixed.
 - HOS and HOG appointment in practice variables (v2expathhs, v2expathhg) in the Country Year dataset have been corrected to be aggregated by the last observation within a year.
- **Other new or modified information**
 - The issue in v7 with identifiers for the main country coded by experts has been fixed.
 - Versions of Male suffrage (v2msuffrage), Female suffrage (v2fsuffrage) and Suffrage (v2asuffrage) into executive (*_ex) or legislative (*_leg) elections have been dropped from the dataset, since the original variables are not election specific.
 - Convergence problems with Vertical accountability index (v2x_veracc), please see "Cautionary Notes" for further details.

11.2 New in Version 7 Compared to Version 6

- **New indices and indicators**
 - Obligatory referendum index (v2xdd_i_or)
 - Popular initiative index (v2xdd_i_pi)
 - Popular referendum index (v2xdd_i_rf)
 - Plebiscite index (vx2dd_i_pl)
 - Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd_cic)
 - Top-down component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd_toc)
 - Equal access index (v2xeg_eqaccess)
 - Regimes In the World – the RIW Measure (E) (e_v2x_regime)
 - Regimes In the World – the RIW Measure with confidence intervals (E) (e_v2x_regime_ci)
 - High court size (by law) (v2juhcsizl)
 - High court size (in practice) (v2juhcsizp)
 - Female judges (v2jufemjdg)
 - First woman appointed (v2jufirstfm)
 - Lower chamber electoral system- 13 categories (v2elloelsy)
 - Lower chamber election district magnitude (v2elloeldm)
 - Constitutional changes popular vote (v2ddlexor)
 - Obligatory referendum participation threshold (v2ddpartor)
 - Obligatory referendum approval threshold (v2ddappor)
 - Obligatory referendum credible threat (v2ddthreor)
 - Plebiscite Credible Threat (v2ddthrepl)

- Initiatives administrative threshold (v2ddadmci)
 - Popular Initiative Credible Threat (v2ddthreci)
 - Referendums signatures % (v2ddsigprf)
 - Referendums administrative threshold (v2ddadmrfr)
 - Popular Referendum Credible Threat (v2ddthrefr)
 - Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (v2ddyror)
 - Occurrence of plebiscite this year (v2ddyrl)
 - Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year (v2ddyrci)
 - Occurrence of referendum this year (v2ddyrrf)
 - HOS age (v2exagehos)
 - HOG age (v2exagehog)
 - Legislature declares war by law (v2lgwarlaw)
 - Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (v2exapup)
 - Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (v2exapupap)
- **Modified indices and indicators**
- Direct popular vote index (v2xdd_dd) has been updated with a new aggregation formula.
 - Divided party control of legislature index has been corrected to Divided party control index (v2x_divparctrl).
 - Elected executive index (v2x_accex) has been replaced with Elected officials index (v2x_elecloff).
 - Party system institutionalization index (v2xps_party) has been renamed to Party institutionalization index and was modified with a new aggregation formula.
 - Equal protection index (v2xeg_eqprotec) has been modified to exclude equal access to justice for men and women (v2xcl_acjst).
 - Equal distribution of resources index (v2xeg_eqdr) has been modified to be formed by the indicators particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps), means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies (v2dlunivl), educational equality (v2peedueq) and health equality (v2pehealth).
 - Egalitarian component index (v2x_egal) is formed by equal protection index (v2xeg_eqprotec), equal distribution of resources (v2xeg_eqdr) and in version 7 additionally by equal access index (v2xeg_eqaccess).
 - Freedom of expression indices (v2x_freexp, _thick) are no longer including Media Internet censorship (v2mecenefi).
 - Election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp) is divided into executive and legislative election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp_ex) (v2elfrcamp_leg).
 - The text for the subsets of Fraud allegations by Western monitors (v2elwestmon), has been changed to refer to Fraud allegations by Western monitors for executive/legislative elections only (v2elwestmon_ex) (v2elwestmon_leg).
 - Stronger respect for civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgstch) is renamed to Stronger civil liberties characteristics.
 - The variable tags of the following questions within Direct Democracy have been renamed:
 - * Obligatory referendum super majority (v2ddspmjor) to (v2ddspmor)
 - * Plebiscite permitted (v2ddlegpl) to (v2ddlexpl)
 - * Plebiscite participation threshold (v2ddbindpl) to (v2ddpartpl)
 - * Plebiscite approval threshold (v2ddthrcon) to (v2ddapprpl)
 - * Plebiscite administrative threshold (v2dddistspl) to (v2ddadmpl)
 - * Plebiscite super majority (v2ddspmpl) to (v2ddspmpl)
 - * Initiatives permitted (v2ddlegci) to (v2ddlexci)

- * Initiatives signatures (v2ddsigcin) to (v2ddsignci)
- * Initiatives signatures % (v2ddsigcip) to (v2ddsigpci)
- * Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (v2ddgrtlci) to (v2ddsiglci)
- * Initiatives signature-gathering period (v2ddgrgpci) to (v2ddsigdci)
- * Initiatives participation threshold (v2ddbndci) to (v2ddpartci)
- * Initiatives approval threshold (v2ddthreci) to (v2ddapprci)
- * Initiatives super majority (v2ddspmjci) to (v2ddspmci)
- * Referendums permitted (v2ddlegrf) to (v2ddlexrf)
- * Referendums signatures (v2ddsigrfn) to (v2ddsigrnf)
- * Referendums signature-gathering limit (v2ddgrtlrf) to (v2ddsigrf)
- * Referendums signature-gathering period (v2ddgrgprf) to (v2ddsigrdf)
- * Referendums participation threshold (v2ddbndrf) to (v2ddpartrf)
- * Referendums approval threshold (v2ddthrerf) to (v2ddapprf)
- * Referendums super majority (v2ddspmjrf) to (v2ddspmrf)
- * Number of popular votes this year (v2ddnumvot) to (v2ddyral)
- * Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (v2ddvotcrd) to (v2ddcredal)
- The information in the codebook about Male suffrage (v2msuffrage), Female suffrage (v2fsuffrage) and Suffrage (v2asuffrage) has been corrected to indicate that responses are given in percent.
- Income inequality, Gini (e_Unequal_UTIP) has been corrected to measure whether the Gini coefficient is above the mean.

- **Other new or modified information**

- Updated list of countries.
- Updated list of variables.
- Updated citations for V-Dem Reference materials.
- New citation for Ordinal versions of V-Dem’s indices (Lindberg 2016).
- Gaps in coding periods should be interpreted as including the start and end year of the gap. For example, Germany is coded 1900-1945, 1949-2016, which means that the years 1946, -47, and -48 are excluded from the dataset.
- Freedom of expression index (v2x_freexp) was included in Electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) in v6. This has been fixed for v7, where the Expanded freedom of expression index (v2x_freexp_thick) instead is included in the Electoral democracy index.

11.3 New in Version 6 Compared to Version 5

- **Changes:**

- All CSV files are now encoded in UTF-8. When importing CSV data on platforms where UTF-8 is not the default, ensure that the correct encoding is specified in order to properly render diacritics for text variables.
- v2x_suffrage and v2elsuffrage have been modified with small changes to their respective comprising indices.

- **Bug fixes:**

- Superfluous variables corresponding to the means of the binary versions of the following variables have been removed: v2exdfdshg, v2exdfdshs, v2exdjcbhg, v2exctlhg, v2exctlhs, v2exrmhsol, v2exrmhgnp.
- Country specific coding periods were previously incorrectly set for the 6.1 country-date dataset. As a result, 279 observations falling outside of the V-Dem coding periods have been removed.
- Missing data for the variables v2expathhg and v2exaphogp for Serbia from 1900 to 1941 have been filled in.

- A bug was fixed regarding the ordinalization of indices. Previously, for the corresponding 5 category ordinal variables, observations that were meant to be 0.75 were incorrectly set as 0.5.
- **New indices and indicators**
 - Civil liberties index
 - Private civil liberties index
 - Physical integrity rights index
 - Political civil liberties index
 - Additive polyarchy index
 - Multiplicative polyarchy index
 - Divided party control of legislature index
 - Division of power index
 - HOG term length by law
 - HOS term length by law
 - Election voter turnout
 - Primary school enrollment
 - Secondary school enrollment
 - Secondary tertiary enrollment
 - Political equality comments
- **Modified indices and indicators**
 - Electoral democracy index has been updated with a new aggregation formula.
- **Other new or modified information**
 - Providing a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.*, v2elmulpar_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.
 - Providing uniqueness scores to the structure of aggregations – all indices and indicators. Uniqueness is the variance that is ‘unique’ to the variable and not shared with other variables. It is equal to 1 – communality (variance that is shared with other variables). Factor loadings are the weights and correlations between each variable and the factor. The higher the load the more relevant in defining the factor’s dimensionality. A negative value indicates an inverse impact on the factor.
 - Updated lists of number of variables.
 - Updated list of countries.